Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-099 *21 May 1996*

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N. Atlantic Assembly: Roman, Ratiu Positively Assess Solana's NAA Address

AU2105094096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1935 GMT 20 May 96

[Statements by Romanian rapporteurs Petre Roman and Ion Ratiu, after the conclusion of the North Atlantic Assembly spring session in Athens on 20 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The last plenary meeting of the spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly [NAA] was held today in Athens. The meeting was attended by a Romanian parliamentary delegation led by Ion Ratiu, vice president of the Chamber of Deputies.

The central point of today's plenary meeting was the address made by the secretary general of the alliance, Javier Solana, who gave a clear signal that NATO expansion toward East and Central Europe will indeed take place and that the NATO Council will extend the invitation to some of the candidate countries before the end of this year. Within this context, the speeches made by Petre Roman, special rapporteur in the Political Commission, and Ion Ratiu, corapporteur in the Defense and Security Commission, were received favorably. They stressed the need for NATO enlargement to include the former communist countries and expressed Romania's firm determination to integrate and its exceptional prestige within the Partnership for Peace.

Our colleague Daniela Simionescu has transmitted from Athens the statements made by Petre Roman and Ion Ratiu at the conclusion of today's plenary meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly.

[Begin Roman recording] The principal guest at the plenary meeting of the NATO Parliament Assembly held today was Mr. Solana, who, talking about NATO enlargement, made a few noteworthy, important, and positive statements from our—that is, Romania's—viewpoint. After he had said that, as a result of the visits he paid to Central and East European countries, the road of the alliance toward enlargement is consistent and determined and the progress made along it evident, he made a remark that I consider very positive—namely, that the free choice of these countries to align to NATO is the best basis so that in Europe there should no longer be any post-Yalta understandings other than those based on democracy. I believe that this is a very good allusion—namely, that a Yalta-type situation should not be allowed to occur again. Likewise, Mr. Solana in his speech made an important remark: that all those countries that wish to become members with full rights in NATO, free and sovereign countries, are welcome.

The viewpoint of the alliance remains that of a decisive commitment in favor of supporting the aspirations to freedom, sovereignty, and democracy of these countries and that this commitment of NATO will remain clear and definitive.

I believe that Mr. Solana expressed something very important today on behalf of NATO, that there is no speculation whatsoever. In fact, in general, no speculation has appeared during debates here about which countries join, or when some and when others will join NATO, and no talks have been held on this issue and, I believe, this in itself is a very positive fact. As a matter of fact, Mr. Solana said that NATO's expansion is certainly an act that will carry further and extend the security, stability, and democracy shield and that there is no reason that this should lead to Russia's isolation, as Russia has often stated.

I believe that, in the speech made by Mr. Solana, we encountered the first signal in the way we would wish—namely, that the countries that have a free and sovereign choice about the way they wish to ensure their national security by joining NATO have every right to do so and that NATO is ready to receive them. This is precisely the message we needed. I refer to our—that is, Romania's—own viewpoint. [end recording]

[Begin Ratiu recording] This spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly has particular significance for us mainly because it established very soundly the continuity of the North Atlantic Assembly and NATO and the need for this institution—it is already an institution—and organization to expand and enlarge toward the East.

We, the Romanians, have had the opportunity to convey the fact that we are a positive element and that we can contribute to the increase and growth of security in Europe, not only to ensure our own security, by joining NATO. NATO Secretary General Solana even stressed this fact in his speech, and we had the satisfaction of receiving from him a positive response regarding the possibility of our joining in the first wave. The question I have formulated in the concluding session of the spring session stressed the fact that, from a military viewpoint, we give a lot, something that he suggested is important for us to do. We are not only a country that benefits from security, but we also contribute to security. He admitted that, from this viewpoint, we are at the top, so to speak. The decision will be made at the end of this year. Other countries will be invited as well. We do not exactly know whether we will also enter this group. However, we have a chance precisely because we have

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Albania: Envoy Discusses Chances of EU Association

AU2005142296 Tirana ATA in English 1126 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 20 (ATA)—The Council of Ministers of the European Union decided in its meeting on May 13 that the European Commission will present shortly a mandate for the conclusion of an agreement with Albania which is an important step to association.

Elio Germano, ambassador of the European Union in Tirana said in an interview with the Albanian television: "If we consider the action of the Council of Ministers to start negotiations I can say that there will be no delay of technical character and I think that everything will be solved within June under the Italian presidency."

"The content of the agreement will have a preparatory character until Albania can be integrated in wider economic ties with EU," Germano said adding that "this does not mean that we have to wait long."

"I say that the EU with an evolvable clause for Albania clearly expressed the goals of this Union in relation to your country," Elio Germano said.

Albania: Cabinet Approves Treaty With Greece, Transport Plan

AU2105103896 Tirana ATA in English 1754 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 20 (ATA)—The Council of Ministers, presided over by Premier Aleksander Meksi, approved on Monday in principle the "National Roads Project," worth $66 million, to rehabilitate some 90 km. of national road in the east-west and north-south corridors.

The project will be financed by the World Bank, the Italian Government, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Kuwaiti Fund, the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] programme, and the Albanian Government.

The project will include the rehabilitation of the Elbasan-Librazhd, Librazhd-Qukes, Qukes-Qafe Thane, Tapize-Pushe Kruje, Milot-Lezhe roads and two bridges on the Mat and Drin river.

The local unit for the application of the Water National Strategy was also created. It will cooperate with the French firm BCEOM, winner of the tender, for the application of the aforesaid project, worth some 400,000 ECU.

The Council of Ministers also approved the release of the fund of 8.5 million Leks for the construction of the Ardenica aqueduct.

The council agreed to the creation of the Labour and Social Affairs National Council, which will treat questions about politics and legislation in labour and employment, professional training, wages, social insurances, social assistance and other issues.

The council issued a decision for the special defence of pregnant women and maternity. The decision sanctions specifically the defence of the ability to be a mother, the adoption of the working conditions, the working hours for the pregnant women and new mothers.

The ministers approved the Law on Ratifying the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neigbourliness and Security Between the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Greece. The treaty is ratified for a 20 year period and will be enforced on the day of exchanging ratification instruments.

The council agreed to Albania's participation in the initiative for the development of the transport's infrastructure among Albania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and Bulgaria, in the context of the U.S. Government's initiative for the development of the Southern Balkans.

The ministers also consented two grants of the U.S. Government for the programme of investment in maintenance equipment in the Albanian transport sector, and that of purchasing equipment for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of roads and bridges in the context of the Elbasan-Qafe Thane project.

Albania: Berisha Addresses 20,000 at DP Rally

AU2005135696 Tirana ATA in English 1014 GMT 19 May 96

[Report by R. Hoxha]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kukes, May 18 (ATA)—About 20 thousand people, inhabitants of Kukes and surrounding areas, joined today a meeting organized in the center of the city in which the President of Albania Sali Berisha called on all them to support the Democratic Party (DP).

President Berisha said that the major goal of the DP program is the welfare of the people and he expressed his belief that this program will be carried out in the next four years.

"The DP based its program for the improvement of the people's welfare on the friendship established with other most developed countries of Europe, with international

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financial institutions and hundreds of millions of dollars guaranteed for the setting up of infrastructure," Berisha said.

Contrary to this program, the red front proposes ways which sow unemployment and poverty, he said. Thus, I invited you not to believe in principles of Marx.

Berisha also focused on the national issue. DP is the greatest Albanian political force in defence of freedom and rights of all Albanians wherever they are. In the last four years we managed together with the Kosova government to bring the Kosova issue on all European tables.

The meeting was greeted by the DP candidates for deputies Urim Muja and Jemin Gjana.

President Berisha also met with the inhabitants of the commune of Shemri in the Kukes district today.

During the last four years we managed to change the name of Albania and today Albania is honoured by the world because the DP follows right principles.

Berisha focused on the aid the democratic government will give to these areas particularly for the improvement of infrastructure, irrigation, telecom and the organisation of seasonal emigration.

The meeting was greeted by the DP candidate for deputy Bashkim Kopliku.

Albania: Meksi: DP Has 'Moral Right' To Ask People for Vote

AU2005140596 Tirana ATA in English 1839 GMT 19 May 96

[Report by A. Sakja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 19 (ATA)—Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi told the electorate of the Constituency Number 54 in the capital that the Democratic Party (DP) has the moral right to ask for the vote of the people because it has carried out the program totally and the Albanians feel themselves better than in 1990.

Meksi was also present in the meetings the DP candidates for deputy Albert Brojka, party foreign secretary, and Marjeta Pronjari held yesterday with the electorate in the capital.

Referring to the projects applied, Meksi cited the legalisation of emigrants, the Bovilla project and others. He said that Tirana will have 24-hour running water within next spring and the improvement of roads will be completed.

"Your vote is the vote for the future," he said "but is also a vote to separate you definitively from communism."

Wolfgang Gosruck, representative of the conservative party of Austria and the envoy of President Thomas Klestil addressing the meeting with the electorate of the DP candidate Brojka said that the Democratic Party is an "acceptable and welcome party in the European democratic formations." DP is worthy of its EDU membership, he said calling it the only political force which will lead Albania into Europe.

Albania: Berisha Holds Election Rallies in Mat District

AU2105101396 Tirana ATA in English 2010 GMT 20 May 96

[Report by H. Ruspi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Burrel, May 20 (ATA)—The President of the Republic of Albania Sali Berisha met on Sunday [19 May] with the electorate of Klos, Mat district, southern Albania.

In the rally held in the Klos town, Berisha informed the inhabitants of the new prospects laying ahead for Klos. He said that four years of negotiations made possible an agreement with one of the most powerful firms in the world for the exploitation of chrome which will benefit Klos, Martanesh, and Bulqize.

"We have decided to decentralise financial sources. In 1995, 50 per cent of the budget was created through humanitarian aid, whereas now the budgetary deficit has been reduced from 49 per cent to 6.4 per cent," Berisha said.

At the end the president introduced to the participants the candidate for deputy in the Constituency 24, Idriz Cumara.

Berisha held the second rally in Mat with inhabitants of the Kurdari village, one of the most persecuted villages in this district by the communist dictatorship, where 15 people were executed.

Later, Berisha cut the inauguration ribbon of the works for the new aqueduct of the village for which $1 million have been accorded.

In the Burrel town, Berisha attended the rally in which took part thousands of inhabitants from the town and the nearby areas.

The president made a presentation of the last four years of democratic governing and said that four years ago "we were liberated from the most savage dictatorship Europe had ever known after the Second World War."

Later, Berisha said that in its programme the Democratic Party has committed itself to uplift the welfare of the individual as its major national objective.

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"We have guaranteed thousands of millions of dollars to invest in the coming years. There are hundreds of companies in the world trusting the Albanians, the Democratic Party, the laws of Albania," Berisha said.

"The May 26 elections, are not elections for governing. They are elections for our national ideals, the future of Albania, freedom and democracy. Democracy and freedom are inseparable. We won the freedom but should consolidate it further."

At the end, Berisha presented Democratic Party candidates Azem Hajdari and Jerosllav Alla.

Albania: Socialist Party Protests Ruling on Ballot Procedure

AU2105095796 Tirana ATA in English 1653 GMT 18 May 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 18 (ATA)—Representatives of the Socialist Party [PS] in the Central Election Commission, Ylli Bufi and Bashkim Caka, told a press conference today that they are concerned over the kind of form of the voting outcomes and who will sign them. But they said that no decision has been taken yet.

"The report should be signed by all the members of the commission based on the content and logic of the law in general," Bufi said.

He added that after many "unjust and arbitrary actions and attitudes, the majority in the Election Commission tries to change the report on the election outcome through secret decisions."

Bashkim Caka, member of the Central Election Commission, asked whether this decision is illegal and where does it say that it should be signed by all the commissions' members, said analogically that Articles 64/5 and 72/b of the Law on Elections referring to the number of the ballot papers and electors define that they should be signed by all the members. But he could not say which law is being violated.

Bufi said that according to sources inside the commission "the report was changed upon an order depriving the other members to sign and giving the right of signing only to the head and secretary of the commission."

According to him all the voting outcome will be signed only by the Democratic Party [PD] representatives because the chairmen and the secretaries have been appointed by prefect without taking into consideration the up today practice." [sentence, quotation marks as received]

Asked who has ordered the commission, Bufi said that "everything that was not achieved through a majority of votes has been imposed or ordered."

The Central Election Commission has not yet ruled on this issue.

"We have taken all the measures to defend the free vote on May 26. The idea to boycott the elections is out of question," Kastriot Islami said, refusing to answer some questions saying that they were not related to the topic of the conference.

Albania: Emigrants Living in Greece Returning To Vote

AU2005142996 Tirana ATA in English 1206 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 20 (ATA)—Albanian citizens in Greece are returning to Albania through two border crossing points and by ferry boat to take part in parliamentary election on May 26.

Over 300 Albanian emigrants with visas and special border passes crossed the Kakavija border point yesterday while dozens of other arrived in Saranda by ferry boat from Corfu, the Greek island.

Border authorities of both countries have guaranteed measures which allow a quick check in service for all emigrants while the travelling agencies in Greece and Albania have increased bus services.

The return of emigrants is expected to reach its peak this week and travelling agencies have guaranteed low price tickets and free of charge travelling for a category of emigrants.

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Bulgaria: Disputes Over Balkan Foreign Ministers Meeting

AU2105100996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 21 May 96 p 3

[Article by Lyudmila Zasheva in Sofia: "Balkan Foreign Ministers Meeting on Brink of Failure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Balkan foreign ministers may not meet in Sofia as planned months ago. This emerged from a series of consultations held over the weekend. Experts were expected to agree the final date of the conference, but this did not happen.

After Slovenia and Croatia declined to take part because they did not consider themselves to be Balkan countries, now Turkey and Albania are showing signs that they are cooling toward the idea.

Bulgaria's proposal to hold the meeting on 8 and 9 June was reportedly rejected by Turkey on the grounds that the UN "Habitat" conference would be held in Ankara at the same time. According to diplomats, however, Ankara was unhappy about the heightened contacts between Sofia, Moscow, and Athens on building the oil pipeline. Our southeastern neighbor wants the Caspian oil to pass through its territory, which is not the plan according to the proposed Novorossiysk-Burgas-Alexandroupolis route. According to informed observers, even Foreign Minister Pirinski's attempt to smooth over the situation by accepting the invitation from his Turkish counterpart Gonensay to make an official visit cannot placate Ankara.

Albania does not accept the date either because of its upcoming elections. Diplomatic sources claim that from the outset it was not overjoyed by the Bulgarian prime minister's proposal because of Serbia's participation. Tirana and Belgrade are still unable to solve the Albanian problem in Kosovo.

For its part, Bulgaria advocates holding the meeting on 8 and 9 June to enable the conference to draft a message to the Council on Applying the Dayton Accords, which is due to meet in Florence on 14 June. For the time being, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry cannot say what will happen with the meeting if Turkey and Albania decline the proposal.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Will Not Assume Bank's Foreign Debts

AU2005133296 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Milena Boyadzhieva: "On Way to China, Videnov Acknowledged Possibility of Partial Moratorium on Debt"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sofia—The state will not take over the foreign debts of Mineralbank. "For the time being, no contractual or legal basis exists for such a commitment," Prime Minister Zhan Videnov declared yesterday before leaving by air for China and Vietnam at the head of an impressive delegation. Mineralbank's foreign debts total $252 million, of which $140 million is owed to creditors associated with the Japan Industrial Bank, while the remainder is owed to members of the Paris Club. Experts commented that this in fact implies a partial moratorium on the foreign debt. The prime minister declared that no other banks will be closed in addition to Mineralbank and the First Private Bank. However, he reminded the journalists that the Agrobusinessbank, Kristalbank, and the Yambol Bank remain under the control of the Bulgarian National Bank. Depositors in these banks will also be able to withdraw their leva, but only from the State Savings Bank, while they will be able to withdraw 25 percent of their foreign deposits every six months over a two-year period. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Teraton Gets Back Full Arms Trading License

AU2105112096 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 21 May 96 p 11

[STANDART NEWS staff report: "Government Restores Teraton's Arms-Trading License"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It was announced yesterday that the government has restored a full arms trading license to the Teraton Company. The decision of the Interdepartmental Council on the Defense Industry was adopted on 8 May. Thus, Teraton is the second company after Armimex to get back its full license after its suspension for several months.

Informed experts consider that this marks the final phase of the preparations for negotiations with Russia, whose specialists are expected to arrive shortly. Bulgaria is due to sign contracts with them for cooperation in the military field. According to the experts, Armimex's permit to trade in arms was returned as a result of pressure from the Russian side. According to informed sources, all the know-how that Moscow has provided has passed

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through the Main Engineering Administration, which was succeeded by Armimex.

Bulgaria: General Staff Council Views Military Reforms

AU2005135596 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 17 May 96 pp 1, 3

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA staff report: "Improving the Structure of the Bulgarian Army Is the Order of the Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 15 May, the General Staff's Military Council held a meeting to discuss the proposals of the commanders, heads of administrations, and chiefs of independent sections of the General Staff on improving the organizational structure of the Bulgarian Army in 1996 and 1997. It is envisioned that the changes will take effect in September 1996. The rapporteur on the subject was Lieutenant Colonel Anyu Angelov, deputy chief of the General Staff responsible for armaments inspection.

After the discussions, the Military Council accepted the proposals for changes to the Bulgarian Army's organizational structure. The basic principle followed was to retain the established strengths for the General Staff and the troops, while optimizing structures and posts so that their functional obligations can be better fulfilled.

The task was set of making a gradual transition toward separating the training centers from the strengths of the combat units. The commanders were instructed to prepare proposals regarding the strengths of the new formations that are to be introduced under the reform's schedule for 1996.

The proposals will assist the commanders in training personnel, administering and providing all services for the troops, and in guarding the installations.

Lt. Col. Lyuben Pekhlivanov, deputy chief of the General Staff responsible for material and equipment supplies, submitted for discussion a package of documents on army medical inspections. These documents were drafted in conformity with the requirements of the Defense and Armed Forces Act and the amendments to the basic military regulations.

The contents of the six documents had been coordinated with the armed services, the Main Administration of the Construction Troops, the troops of the Ministry of Transport, the Health Ministry, and the Academy of Military Medicine. Their purpose is to enhance the precision of the work of all the bodies concerned with accepting new personnel into the Bulgarian Army and with medical inspections. If time permits, this year's intake of conscripts will be accepted in accordance with the requirements of these documents, which prescribe that all the examinations by experts are to be conducted by one and the same bodies. Accordingly, by a Council of Ministers decree the Medical Administration of the General Staff will order that medical inspections of conscripts are to be conducted only by army medical bodies and institutions.

The meeting discussed at length the psychological testing of new recruits to the Armed Forces. The commanders of military training establishments will be given the opportunity to conduct additional psychological tests of student applicants. More stringent requirements are imposed on the commanders and chiefs of military hospitals and sanatoria with a view to improving order and discipline in accepting and discharging servicemen. The package of documents is expected to be approved and sent out to the units of the Bulgarian Army by 15 June.

Lt. Col. Stefan Popov, deputy commander of the Bulgarian Air Force, submitted a concept on harmonizing and developing the military part of the national air space and air traffic control system. The concept is adapted to correspond to the envisioned amendments to the organizational structure and strength of the Air Force under the approved reform. After the comments made have been taken into account, the concept will be submitted to the defense minister for discussion by the Supreme Military Council.

The General Staff's Military Council also discussed in depth the problems connected with supplying the military with munitions and ammunition. Colonel Boncho Botev, chief of the Administration for Missiles, Artillery, and Radar Equipment, answered questions raised by members of the Military Council.

Col. Gen. Totomirov stated that the report had been prepared with precision, and issued instructions to all commanders to try to exploit unused capacities in carrying out training and firing practices. He said that the activities of the Missiles, Artillery, and Radar Equipment Administration should be more closely coordinated with the commanders of the different armed services, and that substitutes should be sought for types of munitions in short supply.

The General Staff's Military Council also expressed a view on the strength of the Armed Forces Inspectorate proposed by the Defense Ministry. The council firmly believed that the strength of the Inspectorate should correspond to its control functions as stated in the Defense and Armed Forces Act, but at the same time continuity should be ensured in the career development of the military's main leading personnel. Experience

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gathered by foreign armies was also considered during the discussions.

Bulgaria: Minister, Unions Discuss Military Reform

AU2105123696 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 20 May 96 pp 1, 5

[Article by Rayna Angelova: "Structural Reform in the Army Will Be Socially Guaranteed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Friday, 17 May, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov held an official meeting with the leaderships of the two military trade union federations: the Federation of Independent Trade Union Organizations of the Bulgarian Army and the Defense Independent Trade Union. The high level of the talks was reinforced by the attendance of Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff; Deputy Defense Minister Stoyan Shatov; Major General Dragomir Ivanov, head of the Military Repair Plants Administration; Colonel Ivan Ivanov, head of the Finance Administration; Vasil Stoyanov, head of the Social Policy Administration; and leaders of other ministerial departments.

The transition that we are implementing has its social side, to which we pay continuous attention, Defense Minister Pavlov said in his speech, in which he figuratively described the defense workers and Defense Ministry employees as our army's "soldiers without insignia." The proceedings of the two-hour meeting revealed the common desire to suggest, discuss, and openly seek possible ways to solve the problems that crop up. Although one-man command is the leading principle in the Defense Ministry, the relationships with the trade union structures have their own legal basis. This was the reason for forming the Defense Sector Council for Social Cooperation, the minister stressed, adding that dialogue is an essential and legally regulated way of solving the problems that arise.

In summarizing the achievements in the social sphere, Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov mentioned the perquisites that the defense workers and employees in the Defense Ministry system had recently gained, such as regular indexation of incomes, higher wages for long service, the introduction of daily allowances equivalent to those received by military servicemen, payment of travel allowances for annual leave, and tax allowances for work clothing.

Among the questions that are soon to be resolved by legal means are the establishment of a social fund to assist employees suffering serious material hardship, the insurance of certain categories of jobs, and the extremely difficult problems of satisfying the ministry's housing needs.

The meeting generally affirmed that, compared with the other structures financed from the state budget, at the present stage the Defense Ministry had best resolved the social problems.

Rosin Georgiev and Todor Vodenov, the presidents of the two trade union federations, expressed the unions' desire to conduct an active and constructive dialogue with the ministry leadership. They placed the accent on incomes policies, giving priority to the salaries of scientific and teaching personnel, medical staff, and those engaged in the repair and maintenance of combat equipment and weapons. General alarm was voiced concerning the serious situation of units and companies in the economic sphere within the Defense Ministry system, which was attributed to the irregular allocation of the funds due from the state budget.

The meeting confirmed that incomes policy within the Defense Ministry cannot depart from the government's policy, and all the trade union requirements must be guaranteed by providing resources and by drafting the necessary regulations and laws. The defense minister expressed his hope that the Defense Ministry's military repair plants and economic structures would soon be reregistered under the Commercial Act and that the problem of the salaries of scientific, teaching, and medical staff would soon be resolved.

Col. Gen. Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, reaffirmed that social guarantees would be provided for the military's structural reform. He said that military employees and workers affected by the reform will be reassigned to new jobs. It is not our desire to reduce the number of jobs, he said, and the way to achieve this is the program that has been prepared for the training and retraining of the military employees affected by the reform.

The discussions were constructive and the participants voiced their common satisfaction with the meeting. They also reaffirmed their desire for ongoing dialogue and cooperation. The two sides will discuss how the questions raised have been resolved and what has been achieved in September, when Defense Minister Pavlov has scheduled another meeting with the leaderships of the two trade union federations.

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Bulgaria: Article Surveys New Gunsights, Range Finders

AU2005132996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 18 May 96 p 43

[Article by Nayden Iliev: "Home-Produced Gunsights Are Better that Western Ones"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria produces optical devices for small arms, artillery, and antitank guns that analyses show are in many cases better than similar Western equipment.

Some of the products of the Optical Mechanics Plant in Sofia and the Optical Electronics Plant in Panagyurishte are sold on foreign markets.

Of particularly high quality are the optical sights for the Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, and the SPG-9 and RPG-7 grenade launchers, as well as the sights for the Fagot, Faktoriya, and Konkurs antitank missiles.

Periscopes with heating prisms, periscope observing instruments, and the PP-61.AM periscope sight are installed in tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers. The PAB-2.AM is a basic instrument for determining target coordinates and the battery's topographic situation.

The NSPU night sight for Kalashnikov submachineguns can also be mounted on the RPG-7 grenade launcher.

The Bukhal binocular device is designed for driving, observation, or reconnaissance at night. It offers a 150-meter range of visibility at night. It is equipped with an infrared emission device for reading maps, complete with optical and antilaser filters.

The laser range finders are of a very high standard. For example, the Lebed laser rangefinding binoculars measure the distances to targets up to 10 km away with an accuracy of 5 meters. With a 7X magnifying system, the Lebed can be hand-held or mounted on the gun's aiming circle.

The Radian range finder is suitable for tactical artillery reconnaissance. It is portable and easy to operate. The Meridian range finder is also fitted with an electronic goniometer. It can store the coordinates of 250 targets and has an built-in computer. It measures target ranges up to 20 km to an accuracy of 5 meters.

The Talaz laser simulator has saved the Bulgarian Army a lot of ammunition. It simulates the firing of shells with a laser beam that operates within a range of 300 to 2,000 meters. The simulator is capable of 10,000 "shots."

Bulgaria: Premyanov Says Reform Essential Despite Risks

AU2005150496 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 20 May 96 p 9

[Interview with Krasimir Premyanov, leader of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "The Bulgarian Socialist Party Must Carry the Reforms Through, Even at the Risk of Losing Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Veleva] Mr. Premyanov, how will you control the growing discontent arising from the banking collapse, the company liquidations, and the chaos reigning in the state?

[Premyanov] I consider that the media should reflect the events in Bulgaria relating to the government of the country from the viewpoints of the legislature and executive, with the necessary understanding of the aims, sense, and need of the reforms. We need this understanding and support. It is clear that we must make friends with the media to ensure that the processes in the country are objectively reflected. I highly value the media's independence.

[Veleva] However, when the media reflect the events in Bulgaria, the prime minister calls them enemies. What sort of "understanding" do you seek from the media?

[Premyanov] Let us not make fragmentary comments, but talk serious politics. In individual cases, everyone has his own reasons for conveying his grievances and claims. This is also a principle of democracy. However, one must talk the same language. When one discusses economic reforms, one must talk in the language of economics, not in the language of self-seeking criticism. The position of the political opponent is also understandable. It is clear why it is negative in most cases. What is a pity is when it is distorted by nihilistic attitudes. Even the opposition should show a constructive approach and a measure of understanding regarding the most important issues.

[Veleva] However, in your language no "grain crisis" exists, yet at the same time Bulgaria has no bread. The prime minister promised not to lay a finger on bank deposits, but the banks are not paying out.

[Premyanov] I confirm that such a difference and contradiction exists. One thing I can say for certain: It is already a fact that the state reserves have been brought in as a regulator of supply within the framework of normal demand. Another point is that our system of government does not allow for the kind of fictions that existed years ago when we had a totalitarian society. The state is no longer everything.

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[Veleva] Why do the rulers not tell the people the truth? You have claims against the media, yet when the media and the public have claims against your government, you refuse to acknowledge them. Do you not realize that you are already losing the people's confidence?

[Premyanov] The claims are also specified in dialogue. Accordingly, I think that such a dialogue is essential between all constructive forces. I stressed the media, but the dialogue should be conducted via the vector of the common interest in the direction of Bulgaria's interests. I do not believe that the government and we as a ruling majority have served our own interests by telling lies. I strongly reject such accusations. The truth must not only be presented as a fact, but be explained with all its nuances and in the precise fields to which it applies. Between what the government says, namely that grain is available, and the fact that there is no bread stands a half-truth that must be elucidated. Transparency, openness, and dialogue with society are essential because we realize that Bulgaria is in a situation in which the government alone cannot carry out the reforms. There is no doubt that the reforms concern all the Bulgarian people. The people must join in the efforts to lead the country out of the crisis.

[Veleva] Quite a number of deputies from the Left already admit that they cast their votes with "disgust" in the debating chamber in support of party decisions that have to be formulated in parliamentary form.

[Premyanov] They are lying to you. You say "quite a number" of deputies. If you tell me who they are, I will tell you which of them are sincere in making such assertions and to what extent the claim you made is true. There are decisions that the parliamentary group discusses. However, not on a single occasion has the group's chairman imposed the whip under Article 11 of the group's regulations. Many suggestions have come from below, which I as chairman have opposed with the conviction that our deputies understand politics and everyone of them bears his or her responsibility for the common success.

[Veleva] Your colleague said that the time has come to solve the dilemmas "either Zhan or the party" and "either Zhan or the state." Even during the vote on the national emblem, voices were heard in your lobby exclaiming: "We are being governed by idiots!"

[Premyanov] You are very ethical in your quote. Such a dilemma can only be posed by an ill-wisher who likes political shadowboxing. This issue cannot be posed like this. The real problem may be formulated as follows: "Is the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] the party of reforms that can launch them despite all risks, or not?" The BSP won the elections not to evade its responsibilities, but to conduct real politics. The reforms in Bulgaria are years late. This situation cannot continue any longer.

[Veleva] You know, you have to carry these reforms through by consensus. Ms. McGuirk [IMF mission leader] said that the IMF will not allocate funds as long as society fails to reach a consensus on the reform.

[Premyanov] I think that consensus does exist in Bulgaria.

[Veleva] Really? On what issue?

[Premyanov] On the need for reforms, on the nature of the reforms, on Bulgaria's development along the road of a social market economy. The 36th National Assembly ratified the agreement on settling Bulgaria's foreign debt. Consensus exists on this issue as well. It is well known that Bulgaria has to pay almost $5 billion over four years, from 1995 to 1998. The lion's share has to be paid while we are in office. If anyone can find a better formula or propose an alternative, I would say: "Yes, different views from ours do exist, and there are no conditions for consensus." The imperatives of economics now postulate this consensus. It is quite natural for the opposition to want to replace the government. It is another matter that the state of the political system and the condition of the real political forces in Bulgaria do not permit them to prove their views by civilized dialogue.

[Veleva] Do you admit that the BSP may fall from power if it fails to cope with the reforms?

[Premyanov] I think that it is better for the BSP to carry through the reform and risk losing power than to evade its responsibilities to stay in power.

[Veleva] I cannot understand whether you accept the criticism of the government for declaring war against the trade unions, the bankers, the president, the opposition, the media, and everyone.

[Premyanov] All five of them are wrong. The government in Bulgaria is public and subject to parliamentary control.

I am sorry that the positions were predetermined in advance in our conversation. You ask me questions. If I could, I would have steered our conversation in a different direction—closer to the objective problems and with a greater measure of goodwill.

[Veleva] I am sorry, too, that our dialogue was so difficult.

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Bulgaria: OSD Urges Change in BSP Policies

AU2005133196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 May 96 p 3

["DUMA PRESS" staff report: "OSD Calls for a Turnabout in Present BSP Policies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] Political Council categorically rejects the intrigues, attacks, the division of the party into 'good men' and 'reformers,' and the shedding of doubt on the policy of national consensus and peaceful transition. We regard all these phenomena as attempts to manipulate party and public opinion that bring discredit upon the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. We issue an appeal for this outdated political practice to be stopped." This is one of the key positions adopted in the standpoint that the OSD Political Council adopted on 18 May.

At the same time, the Political Council confirmed its support for the structural reform and called for a turnabout in BSP policies, an updating of the cabinet's program, and a radical change in attitudes to the opposition, the parliamentary and extraparliamentary political forces, private business, civic and public organizations, and the media. In the view of the OSD, unless the government alters its political style, it may lose its last chance.

In the context of this situation, the OSD believes that for the presidential elections the BSP must nominate a strong, electable, independent, and proreform figure who enjoys a high level of public confidence and who is capable of providing guarantees for consensual thinking and political conduct.

Bulgaria: Commentary Considers BSP's Election Prospects

AU2105112696 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 21 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by Dora Chichkova: "Opposition Dreams of Early Parliamentary Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The thesis that early parliamentary elections will follow a possible defeat of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] in the presidential elections is becoming a major element of the opposition's election campaign. The Blues [members of Union of Democratic Forces, SDS], Oranges [supporters of Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, BZNS], and Zhelev's supporters all repeat this refrain with equal alacrity. Following the principle that "a hungry chicken dreams of grain," the extraparliamentary parties have also raised the same slogan. They are mobilizing their electorate and sharpening their fangs.

Nevertheless, early parliamentary elections are highly unlikely, although not impossible. The reason is simple: They do not depend on the presidential vote. The most that can happen if Zhelev retains his post or surrenders it to Petur Stoyanov is a mass propaganda campaign under the motto that "the electoral correlation of forces has changed."

This is all very well, but first, this conclusion is debatable, because the vote for the president is largely based on personalities and cannot be identified with a vote for a political force. Second, the formation of democratic habits requires that at least one parliament should be allowed to complete its term of office, even if it ends it with its popularity at zero. Third, and most important, the Constitution does not provide for a change of parliaments on such a basis, even though we have played this card at least twice during the last five years.

Parliament's survival principally depends on the survival of the parliamentary majority and its capability to produce a government.

It is true that, as far as the BSP and its coalition are concerned, this capability will face a major test if it loses the battle for the presidency. However, it is still too early to predict how the inevitable intraparty drama that will develop in such a situation will end.

It is also true that no one in the BSP would want a denouement in this "extreme form." The political elite would prefer the party to traverse the chasm of government with minimal shocks at the top. This would be a sign of solidity and maturity. However, a handful of people closest to Videnov who are well aware of these moods in the party, and perhaps Videnov himself, are permitting themselves to test the loyalty of the BSP Supreme Council and Parliamentary Group. This has led to the explosive tension within the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group and at BSP headquarters that has revealed itself with increasing frequency of late at party meetings, plenums, and in interviews. Unless these outbreaks are "defused" in a democratic and civilized manner within the coming months, a loss in the presidential elections will really cause them to explode.

In balanced democracies, no one makes a drama out of one party winning the presidency, with another winning parliamentary or local elections. What is more, the voter consciously alternates in voting, and so ensures a balance and mutual control of the forms of power.

In our own as yet untamed democracy, the choice, alas, continues to be limited to the lesser evil, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to decide which this is. If the BSP manages to capture a third of

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the key positions of power, there is a real danger that the politburo daydreams and other throwbacks to the past that have recently developed within its ranks may become uncontrollable. If the opposition wins the presidential elections, revanchism and deliberate sabotage of the government will become unrestrainable. Both possibilities will be fatal for our dissension-riven little state, yet a third alternative does not appear to exist.

The brief but difficult period that the BSP spent in opposition showed that precisely at such moments of crisis the 100-year-old party manages to summon up its intellectual and moral resources to save its own skin. In the final analysis, this may mean that, in contrast to the "youthful" SDS, which lost power to save Filip Dimitrov, the BSP will sooner part with Zhan Videnov than lose power.

The presidential election campaign does not offer an equal start for the main participants. While the opposition has been playing its election vaudeville for months now (and will continue to do so in the future), the BSP is stewing in its own cabinet juice. The vaudeville, however frivolous it may look on the television screen, presupposes an easier success. For the BSP, success will only become possible if the party seriously and effectively consolidates itself in opposition to the vicious styles and interests that are corroding it from within and sapping its strength as a ruling party. Although it may be very painful, such a success would be a double victory: for the party itself and for the country as a whole.

As the opposition has rightly said, the BSP has to make the next move.

Bulgaria: DPS Alleges Plot To Assassinate Leader Dogan

AU2105104096 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 21 May 96 p 1

[Article by Fikrie Salifova: "Plot To Assassinate Dogan Under Preparation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dzhebel—A plot is being prepared to assassinate Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms], the local DPS chairman Ahmed Hussein announced yesterday at a memorial meeting held in Dzhebel to mark the seventh anniversary of the peaceful demonstrations against the communist regime. It would be terrible if the plan were carried out, he added.

DPS leader Ahmed Dogan, SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] presidential candidate Petur Stoyanov, DPS parliament deputies, and representatives of four emigrant organizations were invited to the rally by the citizens of Dzhebel.

Deputy Remzi Osman urged the population to gather in front of the police headquarters in Kurdzhali and not to leave until the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] police chief Zlatko Pilev, notorious for his participation in the election campaign on behalf of the BSP, offered his resignation. He is accused of using the police to defend the party interests of the ruling party. Osman also said that, after the presidential elections, the opposition will attack the government until it falls from power. He urged the electors to cast their votes in the primaries on 1 June and in the actual presidential elections for the opposition's united candidate, Petur Stoyanov. The latter told the multitude that he was visiting Dzhebel as a man who feels respect for the victims of the Communist Party's assimilation policies. He hoped that the citizens of Dzhebel and their children would never again have to experience events that divide Bulgarian citizens. Presidential adviser Mikhail Pavlov read a greetings message from President Zhelev.

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Czech Republic: Extensive Air Defense Maneuvers To Culminate

AU2005132796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 May 96 p 3

[Report by "(gag)": "The Missile Troops Have Tested Tamara on Maneuvers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Doupov—The most extensive maneuvers this year involving the state's air defense, in which tactical aircraft and paratroop units are taking part, will culminate this week in several locations in the Republic. Various crisis options for an air attack on the country are being tried out in the exercises.

The operation, in which 1,500 troops have been deployed, is also exceptional because Czech information and radar hardware comparable with the world's best is being used in it. The best known is the Tamara radar reconnaissance system and the newly developed Vera monitoring system. On the other hand, the pilotless Sojka reconnaissance aircraft and the extraordinarily effective Sektor VS and AIS [expansions unknown] command and control system for air defense units are being tested for the first time in field conditions.

Colonel Jiri Cuma, who commands the antiaircraft missile brigade that defends Prague and Central Bohemia from air attacks, is convinced that, thanks to this hardware, his troops will be capable of bringing down even the most modern aircraft, regardless of the older missile hardware. Cuma even claims that his missile batteries have been very successful in intercepting the feared Scud missiles. "We have always eliminated them without any problems, and we have even done so far more successfully than the Americans with their Patriot missiles," added the officer.

Czech Republic: Zieleniec, UK Defense Secretary Meet

LD2005154296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's visit by Michael Portillo, UK secretary of state for defense, to Prague included a short meeting with Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec. The latter commented on their meeting for Czech Radio:

[Begin Zieleniec recording] We discussed the entire range of aspects concerning our communication with Great Britain on political and military matters. We have traditionally been close to the British concept of security in Europe. Britain has always stressed that NATO is the basis of European security and stability. From this point of view, there was an understanding among us during the talks with the secretary of state. Our talks were not only friendly but also very matter-of-fact. [end recording]

Czech Republic: FM: Dialogue With Russia Must Continue

LD2005190796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During an official visit to the Czech Republic, Michael Portillo, British secretary of state for defense, pointed out the need to hold talks with Russia on NATO enlargement. In this connection, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec told Czech radio:

[Begin Zieleniec recording] The alliance has decided to take decisive steps next year aimed at enlarging NATO. In this respect, at least two countries are being mentioned, and the Czech Republic is always on the list of candidates.

At the same time, though, it is important to maintain the political and security dialogue with Russia. Russia is a superpower, which has a place of its own in the debate on European and world security. It is important not only to maintain this dialogue, but also to maintain a certain quality of the political rapprochement between all of the countries of Central and East Europe. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Commentary on Latest Political Scandal in SR

AU2005143296 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 17 May 96 p 8

[Commentary by Peter Schutz: "Crime Engenders Crime"]

[FBIS Translated Text] That which in the Slovak Republic [SR] for some unknown reason is still called politics is transcending its own pinnacles. The publication and contents of a telephone conversation between Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek and Secret Service Director Ivan Lexa cannot be labeled either a scandal or an affair—it is just impossible to describe it.

Even if there were no other objections to Lexa, the mere publication of his vulgarisms would disqualify him as a state official in any decent country. Of course, his obscene remarks are the least of it. We are standing face to face with a pretty major suspicion involving the manipulation—or, alternatively, the inducement to manipulation—of the investigation into the Kovac Jr. scandal by the triumvirate of state dignitaries who have in their job descriptions the protection of legality and the law-governed state. The third, according to Lexa and Hudek, as is unequivocally apparent from the conversation, is the prosecutor general. Even Prime

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Minister Vladimir Meciar falls under grave suspicion. In the dialogue, there is a figure, whom the two heroes consulted on their steps, referred to as the "boss."

The fact that the investigation into the Jr. scandal has been politically influenced is not surprising per se. There has long been a great deal of evidence of this. The actual existence of a tape recording of a conversation between the two heads of the "power-wielding" departments is far more shocking. Although "classic" bugging by a third party is cited in the first reactions of the politicians, as in the press, there are also other possibilities: One of the participants made a private recording, which then somehow got into the wrong hands. And, finally, conversations in the security departments are sometimes taped and placed in the archives automatically, so, not even internal subversion is out of the question.

The first alternative leads to a terrifying conclusion about the collapse of the country's security system. Whether the "operation" was carried out in the apparatus of the minister or the director of the Slovak Information Service [SIS], Slovak citizens can no longer be sure of anything. If two of the most powerful men in the state—one of them responsible for the security of all of its citizens, the other for counterespionage coverage, among other things—cannot manage to protect their privacy in this country, who can feel safe in Slovakia at the moment?

The biggest mystery in this version is, of course, who assigned the "operation" and who carried it out. It is somehow being assumed automatically that the unprecedented deed is attributed to certain parallel intelligence structures, more or less identified with the "pre-Lexa" SIS leadership and linked to part of the opposition—first and foremost, the Christian Democratic Movement and its "independent civic investigative commission." The hypothesis has no logic: The conversation was supposed to have taken place in mid-October 1995. In the atmosphere of the all-out media war unleashed around the Kovac Jr. case, it is simply inconceivable that the opposition, working with maximum application on finding SIS and Lexa personally guilty, would "hoard" such a capital trophy for seven long months. If this were really an illegal wiretap, obviously it involves either an operation by so-called doubles (agents playing for both sides) or is a purely internal affair of the extant power structures in which the conviction that Lexa has already played out his role is becoming fixed.

Rather more credible is the version involving a "stray" private recording made at the discretionary end of the wire. This would say a lot about the informer-saturated system and relations in general among the leading representatives of the regime, who are collecting preventively compromising materials on those around them. But, in the final analysis, the alternative to internal subversion leads to the same conclusion as an illegal wiretap. No matter which of the possibilities is the "right one," another shocking consequence is as clear as day: The published recording is certainly not the only "example." Citizens of the Slovak Republic simply have to bear in mind that, as of 14 May 1996, their interior minister and secret service director are blackmailable people. Naturally, in this context, the idea of the involvement of foreign intelligence is quite legitimate.

The power struggle in Slovakia has gone for broke without rules—the day after the Hudek-Lexa conversation was broadcast on a private radio station, public-service Slovak Television carried a half-hour film captured by a hidden camera in the milieu of the alleged fellow culprits in the Kovac Jr. kidnapping on "the president's involvement in the Technopol case." The spiral of hatred and revenge is spinning in ever faster revolutions and cannot be stopped. Covering up the traces of criminal acts inevitably leads to more collisions with the law. Crime in various guises is bursting out in Slovak politics.

Czech Republic: Coalition Disagreement on Ministry Distribution

AU2005152596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 May 96 p 2

[Article by Andrea Kabelova: "The Coalition's Views on Filling the Departments Already Differ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The composition of the next government will not be determined until the postelection coalition talks, but it is already clear today that the current governing parties—the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party—which will probably also form the coalition after the elections, have completely different views on the method of distributing the ministerial seats. They only agree that, in the event of an ODS victory, the chairman of this party, Vaclav Klaus, will again be prime minister.

The politicians divide the other departments into groups according to their level of importance. At the same time, the seats in each group should be distributed among the individual parties in accordance with the results they achieve in the elections. However, the parties cannot agree which ministries should be in the first—the most important—group. Namely, it should contain the departments that have the most power. A party that gains such a ministry will not only increase its influence

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considerably on the political level, but will also be able to intervene significantly in the life of the whole of society.

While the People's Party maintains that the so-called first line should be made up of the Foreign, Interior, Defense, and possibly Finance Ministries, and they insist on defense in particular, the alliance does not consider this department to be the most important. It, on the other hand, attaches most importance to the Finance Ministry.

"I have to laugh at this; we have not even discussed it yet. I think it is like making out the check without the innkeeper. The election results will really determine everything," says Jiri Honajzer, a member of the ODS Executive Committee. Even some ODS deputies, for example, do not agree that the Finance Ministry should be in the first group. That is, they are convinced that this department belongs unequivocally in the same group as the economic ministries—the Economy, Agriculture, Trade and Industry Ministries and, obviously, also the Ministry for Economic Competition.

The politicians consider other departments, for example, health or education, to be less important and, therefore, rank them along with the rest in the last group.

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Slovakia: Foreign Minister Pays One-Day Visit to Vatican

AU2105095996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 May 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Replacement of A. Neuwirth by A.M. Huska Is Supposedly Just Speculation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In a telephone conversation with NARODNA OBRODA yesterday, Slovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Juraj Matejovsky characterized Friday's [17 May] trip by Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk to the Vatican as a "normal working visit and bilateral talks." According to him, Minister Schenk was received in the Vatican by a partner of equal standing—Jean Louis Tauran, secretary of the State Secretariat of the Holy See for Relations With States. Juraj Matejovsky did not specify on whose initiative the visit took place or what the subject of talks was. However, he resolutely denied that the talks concerned the person of the ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the Holy See, A. Neuwirth, or the appointment of Dominik Hrusovsky as papal nuncio to Belarus. Asked why A. Neuwirth did not accompany Minister Schenk on his visit to the country where he is the ambassador, J. Matejovsky replied that A. Neuwirth had work obligations in Bratislava. He described Neuwirth's stay in Slovakia as "routine talks" that are not a subject of public interest, which is why he does not even monitor the length of his stay. Reports about the government's alleged intention to replace A. Neuwirth with Augustin Marian Huska, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], were described by the spokesman as speculation, to which he does not intend to react.

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 20 May on page 3, under the headline "He Has Not Yet Bought an Attache Case," carries a 400-word interview with NRSR Deputy Chairman A.M. Huska by Maros Smolec. In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Huska responds to an article in the 16 May issue of Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak, which alleged that Prime Minister Meciar seeks Huska's appointment as Slovak ambassador to the Vatican to "move him out of political life." Huska points out that, in March 1996, he was elected Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deputy chairman until 1998 and that he will be NRSR deputy chairman until the next elections. Huska believes that he is "most useful" in the posts he currently occupies and views the NARODNA OBRODA allegations as the author's "wishful thinking."]

Slovakia: Kovac Jr Case Shelved for Lack of Evidence

LD2005132796 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Major Jozef Ciz, the investigator in the case of the abduction of the president's son, Michal Kovac Jr., has decided to shelve the case. He justified his decision by saying that the investigation had failed to find facts that would justify the launching of criminal proceedings against any particular person.

Slovakia: Hudek on Published Tape, Technopol Inquiry

AU2005144796 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 15 May 96 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek by Pavel Kapusta on 14 May; place not given: "By Scandalizing the Minister and the Police Corps, the Opposition Is Diverting Attention From the Technopol Affair"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek yesterday granted an interview to SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, Slovak Radio's Radio Journal program [main newscast] and Radio Twist's Journal, in which he responded to the publication of the alleged transcript of his private telephone conversation with the Slovak Information Service [SIS] chief. He also cited some new facts concerning the multimillion [currency not specified] Technopol fraud case.

[Kapusta] What is your position on the recording broadcast on Radio Twist and the subsequent publication of its transcript in the daily SME?

[Hudek] I have been registering signals for some time that something is being prepared against me. My suspicion was confirmed Monday [13 May] night. The scandalizing of me, above all, also means the scandalizing of the Ministry of Interior, which is among the key government departments in this state. The question of tapes that supposedly contain my wiretapped telephone conversations is only one aspect of the campaign being waged by some opposition deputies, particularly from the ranks of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH].

The pressures the Christian Democrats are bringing to bear upon the whole ministry in conjunction with the Michal K. Jr. affair, as well as in conjunction with the explosion of Robert R.'s car, clearly show what the actual aim is—to discredit the investigators of the entire Police Corps and the leadership of the Ministry of Interior. They are doing this amateurishly and transparently, however. In none of their arguments were they

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able to separate political juggling [zonglerstvo] from facts—simply because facts in the form they would like to have them do not exist. All of this also has another aspect—by means of the bitter media campaign around the kidnapping of the president's son and now also the explosion of Robert R.'s car, they were quite successful in camouflaging the gist of the matter from which the whole affair began to unfold—the Technopol case.

[Kapusta] How do you intend to react in the near future to the increasingly aggressive attacks?

[Hudek] We will proceed far more actively than before. The citizens must learn about everything, particularly about the reasons that make opposition politicians do what they are doing.

[Kapusta] Are any new facts known to you that concern the Technopol affair?

[Hudek] The proposal has been prepared to file a suit against inspector Jan V., who used to work at the former Bratislava Office of Criminology. In July and August 1992—the exact time has not been verified—he was inspecting on Technopol premises, pretending to be an Interpol officer, the case of fraud committed by the Dutch firm INTROCOMMERCE against Technopol. He had no authorization to do this. He was interrogating people and taking over documents concerning the fraud without having the matter registered in accordance with administrative regulations. He was doing this in spite of being aware that conclusively proven fraud was involved. He even had the whole file filed away and, instead of passing the matter on to the investigator for implementation, he saw to it that, on 18 May 1994, the whole file, containing 43 pages of documents, was destroyed. In the course of the investigation, it has also been ascertained that Jan V. used to meet with Marian K., who, together with Michal K., features in the fraud as one of its protagonists.

[Kapusta] This fact has not been published in the opposition press, and the self-styled investigating commission of General Pittner has not made it public, either....

[Hudek] I would like to take this opportunity to ask Deputies Carnogursky, Pittner, and others why they intentionally overlook such facts and why they criticize the work of the investigators of Michal K. Jr.'s abduction abroad, who strictly abide by the legal norms of this state? Or could that be the reason? Why did Mr. Pittner not initiate the investigation of the fraud against Technopol while he was minister of interior? Does he perhaps apply different yardsticks to the president's son and ordinary citizens of this state? Today I also had an opportunity to read Deputy Pittner's statement at a KDH briefing, in which he said with regard to bugging telephone calls and similar practices that such methods are incorrect but conceded that, in today's political situation, it is possible to use even information obtained in this way. Does this mean, perhaps, that I, as minister of interior, have the moral right, in view of the present political situation, to have telephones bugged, for example, or to order that someone be placed under surveillance?! I hope that the common sense of the citizens of this country will prevail and that they will realize that scandalizing my person, investigators, and the entire Police Corps by the opposition only serves to divert attention from the gist of the matter—the Technopol case. I am also confident that we all will realize in due course that the people who brandish freedom, decency, and democracy are bugging telephones, brazenly lying, and cheating.

[Kapusta] Are you going to assume a stand on the report that Deputy Ladislav Pittner published at the 14 May news conference?

[Hudek] I do have a copy of it. It consists of 24 pages, plus supplements. I will comment on its specifically after having studied it.

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 17 May on pages 1 and 5 carries a 1,000-word interview with Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek by a "for"-signed SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA correspondent entitled "The Opposition Is Abandoning Legal Forms of Political Struggle." In the interview, which was conducted on 16 May, Hudek responds to the "attacks" during the 16 May National Council of the Slovak Republic session, when a number of opposition deputies demanded his resignation. Hudek qualifies the opposition accusations as "utterly unfounded" and accuses unspecified KDH and Democratic Union deputies of "militancy, hatred, incitement of passions and aggressiveness, and attacks on the foundations of the state and the government." Making use of parliamentary immunity, Hudek says, the opposition is "abandoning the legal forms of political struggle" and "organizing compromising intelligence games, illegally obtaining and misusing all kinds of official documents, and fabricating false testimonies." In the interview, Hudek is also asked why, in his first reaction to the publication of his alleged telephone conversation with SIS Director Ivan Lexa, he "conceded the authenticity" of the conversation. Hudek replies: "Everyone who knows me knows that I always have things verified and do not react too hastily. The contents of the tape therefore shook and upset me at first. I never claimed that the whole tape contained the exact recording of my conversation. But I recognized my voice and diction on the tape, as well as the voice on the other end, and I partly remembered fragments of the conversation. I was unable, however, to recall the sequence of

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questions and answers, the causal relationship between them, and their time. This fact and a number of other findings that I obtained after listening to the transcript of the alleged recording led me to the conclusion that, while the voices are original, the tape had been cut from a number of dialogues or statements. For this reason, I absolutely rule out the authenticity of such a dialogue. Those who paid close attention to the recording may have noticed that there are illogical replies and punctuated passages. I believe that a series of recordings is involved that have been manipulated in such a way that matters got in that serve someone to solve some very serious political questions about the development of our state."]

Slovakia: SDL: Privatization Corruption Government's Fault

LD2005135396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], the current government coalition, which makes it possible for the National Property Fund [FNM] to act in a destructive, corrupt, and antisocial way, bears full responsibility for the privatization agony [privatizacna agonia] in the Slovak Republic.

This is said in a statement issued by the SDL leadership at a meeting today and made available to TASR. The statement goes on to say that the FNM clearly favors privatization benefiting various, artificially set up limited companies at the expense of employees' just demands.

Slovakia: Coalition Party Against Privatization of Banks

LD1905214496 Bratislava VTV Television in Slovak 1730 GMT 19 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers in Slovakia [ZRS], gave us an interview on the current situation and trends regarding privatization in Slovakia. Let us hear his views on this frequently debated issue.

[Begin recording] [Luptak] There will never be enough fairness and honesty for an honest division of assets or privatization. In my view, financial institutions should not yet be privatized. This is a view held by both our party and me personally. Some financial institutions should not be privatized at all. For example, the Slovak Savings Bank should not be privatized because it holds people's deposits. If it went bankrupt, that would be the end, the nation would lose its savings.

Our party has nothing to lose and never had anything to lose. We have not privatized anything. Neither our ministers nor our deputies privatized anything. We have always supported employees' shareholding companies.

Of course, I am not saying that everything within the coalition is O.K. If something goes wrong, many people become nervous, but I think the developments are good.

[Unidentified correspondent] Are you not afraid that some people will, under the disguise of ZRS membership, misuse their position and privatize?

[Luptak] No. We do vet, and I can tell you that I am prepared to stand up in front of people in factories. We know what and whom we helped in privatization—that is, we helped the employees.

[Correspondent] In response to this, we have quoted a particular case in which a ZRS member and a candidate for the post of director general presented a privatization project that was disadvantageous to the employees.

[Luptak] Well, people can present their projects, but that does not constitute a guarantee that the project will go through or that it will be selected. In the end, Mr. Trstensky's project was not accepted. [end recording]

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Hungary: Kovacs on NATO Entry, Basic Treaty With Romania

LD2005225596 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1910 GMT 20 May 96

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by an unidentified correspondent in the station studio in Budapest; from the "Panorama" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] What do we really want, Mr. Minister, quick admission to the EU—there has been mention of a first round which may not be followed by a second—or, perhaps, well considered and thoroughly prepared admission at a later date?

[Kovacs] We need both, with the exception of the last statement regarding admission to the EU at a later date. We need quick admission on the best possible terms for Hungary. I am not in favor of waiting for a second round, because it is very likely that there will be at least 10 years between the two waves of admissions. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] There are practically no opponents to admission to the EU. That is not the case with our admission to NATO. For years Russia has been stressing its objection to NATO expansion toward the east. [passage omitted] Would it be necessary or useful if one of the countries concerned, perhaps Hungary, launched a more active diplomatic campaign to prepare for our admission to NATO as it concerns Russia?

[Kovacs] We have held consultations with Russia even to date and are prepared to continue to do so in the future. However, we are not prepared to hold consultations about whether Hungary is allowed to join NATO or on the terms of its admission because these matters must be worked out by Hungary and NATO during their negotiations. We are prepared to hold consultation on the role of Russia and how NATO expansion would fit with an all-European security structure. We have a vested interest in seeing that Russia does not view NATO expansion as a process aimed at its isolation. We would like Russia to see this step as part of an all-European process in which Russia also has a role. We have held consultations with Russian in this sense.

[Correspondent] We have exchanged the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty ratification documents. Now we are looking toward the acceleration of upcoming talks with Romania. Is it possible to convince Romania to accept the recommendation by the Council of Europe [Recommendation No 1201] on minority issues? If not, is there any way to protect the interests of Hungarians? [passage omitted] Is the Hungarian Government considering the possibility of Hungary being admitted while Romania is left out?

[Kovacs] Hungary has no reason to conclude a basic treaty with Romania on stipulations less than those included in the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty. We think it is important that legal guarantees for minority rights—in accordance with European norms and with reference to relevant European documents—should be laid down in the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty as well. We will strive for this in future, as we have done so far.

What will happen if Hungary joins the EU and NATO before Romania is another question. I would like to stress that from the very beginning the Hungarian Government has made efforts—or, more precisely, has stressed—that it is in its interest that as many countries as possible join the Euro-Atlantic organizations. This would benefit regional stability, bilateral relations, as well as minorities.

The question is what will happen if Hungary meets the admission criteria but one of its neighbors—let us say Romania, as you raised in your question—does not. In this case, Hungary would have two choices: One is to wait for its neighbor, Romania; that is, to slow down our own admission process. I do not think that is a good solution. If somebody misses the train, I cannot help the person by tearing my ticket up and staying on the platform. The solution is for Hungary to join the EU and NATO—hopefully both—when it meets the requirements and to continue to show an interest in Romania's admission as soon as possible.

Regarding admission to the EU, what we have to handle is not Romania's fear or worry. We have to find solutions for difficulties in border crossing, because Hungary's accession to the EU—which, I assume, will be accompanied by joining the Schengen agreement—can make traffic through the Hungarian-Romanian border significantly more difficult. This would affect every Romanian citizen, including ethnic Hungarians living there. A technical solution will have to be found to keep the situation from becoming a problem in Romanian relations and from hindering the Hungarian minority in Romania from keeping in touch with their Hungarian relatives.

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Hungary: Kovacs Says Opposition Hindering Integration Efforts

AU2005152396 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Attila Seres: "The Opposition Is Trying To Slow Down Our Euro-Atlantic Integration, Kovacs Says"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The opposition has criticized Hungarian foreign policy a number of times in recent days. In his interview with NEPSZABADSAG, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, who gave a quick assessment of the past two years at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's event, assumes that the opposition is launching a coordinated attack against Hungarian diplomacy and that some of their leaders are trying to slow Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration for selfish partisan reasons.

Kovacs finds it worrisome that while the opposition parties voice their commitment to Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration, some of their politicians make statements that indicate contrary intentions. For example, Sandor Lezsak, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, recently said that he has noted a lack of trust among leading European conservative politicians in the socialist-liberal government coalition. At the same time, Hungarian leaders who meet the same conservative politicians on a daily basis have seen the opposite of this. They have not noted any lack of confidence from any of the negotiating partners. Naturally, Western politicians are understandably cautious now, before the beginning of the admission talks. They do not want to name the group of countries ready for integration. At the same time, both in the case of NATO and the European Union, Hungary is mentioned as being among the countries having the best chance for membership.

The favorable assessment is indicated by the fact that Hungary was admitted to the OECD—whose members are countries with developed economies—second after the Czech Republic in our region.

The second area of opposition criticism can be best identified by a statement of Viktor Orban [chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party], according to which it is more important to protect Hungarian interests against the EU than to be in the first group of countries to be admitted. In connection with this, Kovacs said that the government is preparing to take the firmest possible stance to assert Hungarian interests at the admission talks. Nevertheless, he considers it vitally important to be in the first round of expansion because, according to experience, the next group of countries will only be admitted five to 10 years later. This would represent a disadvantage to Hungary's social and economic development from which it would be almost impossible to recover. Opposition politicians should get used to the idea that the EU and NATO will very likely start the admission talks before 1998; that is, with the current government, Kovacs said. However, rather than being the interest of the Socialist or the Free Democrat parties, this is primarily the country's interest and should be placed before party political considerations. According to Kovacs, certain opposition politicians are playing for time and trying to hinder the process because they do not want to give the coalition a winning card for the elections. Bit this is a dangerous game that could delay Hungary's admission by five to 10 years.

Presbyterian Bishop Laszlo Tokes's statement is partly connected to this issue. He said that it would have tragic consequences for the Hungarians in Romania if Budapest joined the Euro-Atlantic organizations without Bucharest. Although not tragic, as Tokes claims, it would indeed be unfavorable if Romania and the Hungarians there could only get into these organization later. However, it would be even more unfavorable if the 10 million Hungarian citizens living within the borders could not join the EU or NATO. Kovacs indicated that, from time to time, Tokes accuses the Hungarian Government of sacrificing its brethren over the border on the altar of Euro-Atlantic integration. His statement suggests that the opposite should be done: The admission of 10.5 million Hungarians should be delayed in the supposed interests of the Hungarians in Romania. The Hungarian Government cannot choose this road.

Hungary: Slovak Ambassador Views Basic Treaty, Rider

AU2005130296 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Eva Mitrova, Slovak ambassador to Hungary, by Csilla Medgyesi; place and date not given: "According to Slovakia, the Addendum Is a Domestic Issue—The Basic Treaty Has Come Into Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty has gone into effect after leaders of the Hungarian and Slovak Foreign Ministries' main international legal departments in Budapest on 15 May exchanged documents confirming the treaty signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in Paris on 19 March 1995. MAGYAR HIRLAP interviewed Eva Mitrova, Slovakia's ambassador to Budapest, on the significance of the document and on the validity of the Slovak parliament's rider.

[Medgyesi] How do you assess the fact that the basic treaty has finally gone into effect?

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[Mitrova] The document is proof that politicians in both countries understand what this age demands of them and of this whole Eastern-Central European region. Our European integration is only possible if we understand and support each other. There is no point whatsoever in rivalry because the world treats us as a unit anyway. As a result of this pragmatic stance, a number of issues have already begun to be resolved even though the ratification documents have only been exchanged today.

[Medgyesi] Which issues do you mean?

[Mitrova] The opening of a new border crossing point two weeks ago, the easing of border crossings, and joint application for PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] aid to rebuild the Maria Valeria bridge, which used to connect Esztergom and Parkany [Sturovo]. I can also quote another example: The Slovak Government will soon decide on the Hungarian request on a certain border correction at Balassagyarmet. Here, the old bed of the Ipoly River—and thus the border—is so winding that it has not been possible to build a parking lot or a park near the Balassagyarmet mayor's office because the area is already in the border zone.

[Medgyesi] The Hungarian opposition has called attention to the fact that even before the basic treaty came into force, Bratislava had violated it through several new laws (amendment to the Penal Code, change of the administrative borders, the state language law).

[Mitrova] Changing the administrative borders also means that we will have eight instead of three counties. It logically follows that the proportion of the Hungarian minority will be higher in some of them than before. However, this is not mentioned because it would make it obvious that the measure was not meant against the Hungarians. I will invite those who are worried about the use of the minority language to Slovakia to personally see what language the street and shop signs are in and what language people speak in the shops, the post offices, and the offices. In some villages we have only a Hungarian school, and the Slovak children are taken to a school from several villages. No one talks about the fact that Slovaks living in Hungarian villages cannot listen to a church service in their mother tongue.

[Medgyesi] President Michal Kovac signed the basic treaty without the Bratislava parliament's rider, and the documents that have now been exchanged do not include the rider. What, then, is the role of this interpretation?

[Mitrova] Allow me to digress a bit. Everyone keeps mentioning the Franco-German agreement as an example. However, they do not mention that the Germans accepted an addendum very similar to the Slovak decision and the French did not object. They saw it as a domestic German issue because it was not part of the basic treaty and did not influence its implementation. The Slovak parliament ratified the basic treaty while calling the government's attention to certain issues. Therefore, this is an explicitly domestic issue. For this reason, it was rather surprising that the domestic affairs of the Slovak Government, parliament, and certain institutions were followed by not only with great attention but also with rather unfounded criticisms and negative predictions in Hungary.

Hungary: Finance Minister Addresses Assembly on Economy

LD2005204696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1303 GMT 20 May 96

[Address by Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy to a session of the National Assembly in Budapest—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed National Assembly: [passage omitted] The first few months show several contradictory trends, as we have mentioned on several occasions. There was a sharp drop in economic growth between October and November last year. This was basically related to a rather drastic adjustment in our economic policy in spring 1995. This had an effect on the economy, and these processes have worked through the economy. The reduction in the rate of economic growth is also due to this fact.

Industrial output showed a modest recovery in the first two months of this year, but the figures are worse in March, when industrial output fell. We have certain forecasts—not statistics but surveys—for April. These analyses show that another minor recovery can be expected. Over the the first three months, industrial output increased by 1.6 percent. Domestic sales dropped drastically, while exports increased sharply. Over the first three months exports grew 13 percent in real terms. I think that this is a significant performance and an encouraging sign.

The construction industry is showing the usual performance seen at the beginning of this year. Prospects for agriculture are favorable, thanks to God and perhaps the prayers by Smallholders. [passage omitted]

On the whole, I can say that economic performance has improved, but this improvement is smaller than planned by the government and expected by parliament when it approved the 1996 budget.

Wages increased 18.5 percent over the first three months of the year. There is an increasing gap between the

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competitive sphere—where wages hardly fell, if at all—and the sphere of public employees—where the fall in real wages is very significant. This is primarily related to the fact that pay increases in the latter sector were implemented at a later date, in May or June, and came into force retroactively. [passage omitted including indistinct portion]

The rate of price increases fell over the first few months. This is demonstrated by the 1.6 percent price index in April. However, the fall in the inflation rate is not enough. The government is not satisfied with this.

There was a dynamic growth in savings. Total savings by the population in forints and in foreign currencies increased 36 percent. This figure indicates that there were savings even in real terms, and this is a substantial condition for economic growth.

Equilibrium in various sectors of the economy was satisfactory. It means that exports have grown at a higher rate than imports for a longer period now. The balance of payments is passive, but the deficit is $600 million less than it was at the same period last year and is fully covered by capital inflow.

The state deficit fell over the first four [as heard] months. Examining the deficit of the entire state administration, the position of the central budget improved to the same extent that the position of the social insurance deficit worsened. The total budget deficit can be kept under 4 percent of GDP. However, I have not discusses here the possibility that the National Bank of Hungary—despite an improving economic situation—may find itself in a worse position as it may have to repay debts at an exchange rate higher that that in effect when the debts were acquired.

On the whole, I have to say that the government is not happy with the rate of economic growth, the rate of the fall in inflation, and the position of the social insurance budget. But despite these tendencies, economic development shows a trend we have otherwise reckoned with. Thank you.

Hungary: Finance Ministry Expects Deficit To Exceed 4%

AU2005143196 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 17 May 96 pp 1, 11

[Report by Marton Nehez-Posony and Zsolt Papp: "The 4-Percent State Administration Deficit Cannot Be Adhered to—According to the Finance Ministry, Stabilization Has Not Yet Ended"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Finance Ministry's calculations, the state administration's expected deficit will be half a percent higher than the 4 percent stipulated by the IMF. The Finance Ministry's report analyzing state administration processes in the first quarter finds it likely that a supplementary budget will have to be made for the social insurance funds.

For this reason, the Finance Ministry urges strict management of wages and staff size at the budget institutions and demands responsible management at the ministries handling the special financial funds. According to the report, in spite of the favorable state of the central budget in the first quarter, certain danger zones have emerged in some areas of state administration. For this reason, the stabilization cannot at all be considered complete. The ministry sees the deterioration of the balance of social insurance funds, the high level of housing construction support from the central budget, and the relatively high wage payments at the beginning of the year as these danger zones. The slowing of industrial output growth and the related increase of imports can be seen as further warning signs. The fact that inflation has not been reduced at the desired rate is also seen as a problem.

The failure to carry out the extraordinary collection is one of the reasons for the 14.8 billion forints deficit of the social insurance funds. Parliament set the end of year deficit of the social insurance funds at 17.81 billion, while the Finance Ministry expects the deficit to be between 40 and 45 billion forints.

The balance of social insurance is further worsened by the wage increase of health care workers, which was not covered and ultimately had to be paid for by health insurance. The wage increase in itself can make the social insurance supplementary budget justified, and postponing until May the hike in drug prices increases the chance of this.

The need for a 5 to 6 billion additional source in connection with agricultural export incentives requires increased attention on the spending side of the central budget. In addition, the growing interest in housing construction support gives rise to concern; in the first quarter, the budget paid out 9.3 billion forints on this and the annual goal of 29.8 billion will probably be exceeded by 6 billion. At any rate, the Finance Ministry suggests that undue claims be identified. The introduction of the changed child care allowance, child care fee, and public health care is expected to generate some 7 to 8 billion additional spending. More than 11 billion will be claimed from the 10.45 billion forints in general reserves during the year. Therefore, it will be necessary to reexamine and differentiate among the claims, the Finance Ministry's report says.

The fact that there is little chance this year to complete the extraordinary collection of 24 billion forints of

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social insurance contributions also increases the deficit of state administration. The extraordinary collection is prescribed by the law on the social insurance budget and it is one of the preconditions for the deficit of the funds not to exceed 17.8 billion forints by the end of the year. As we have reported, the Finance Ministry has set up a working group in the interest of reducing the deficit and collecting the extraordinary 24 billion forints of contributions. According to our information, at the working group's 15 May session, amendments to a number of laws were discussed which could speed up procedures. One of these is an early change of certain sections of the bankruptcy law and the amendment of the law on implementation [vegrahajtas]. The social insurance self-governments also consider it necessary to be able to remit amounts below 2,000 forints because the collection of these is too much work for the apparatus. As Zolna Berki, head of the social insurance collection department, told MAGYAR HIRLAP, they are requesting the government's help in settling the debts of state-owned companies, budget institutions, and the sports clubs, which owe more than 2 billion forints.

An expert of the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing [APEH] who did not wish to be identified told MAGYAR HIRLAP that apart from the amendment to the laws, no other means exist to ensure quick collection of the outstanding contributions. In his opinion, a maximum of 3 to 4 billion forints out of the planned 24 billion can be collected this year.

According to our information, the Finance Ministry suggested that the APEH and the Customs and Revenue Police participate in the collection. It has again been proposed that the apparatusses of these two organizations be merged with the 395-strong collection section of the social insurance self-governments. As far as we know, the social insurance self-governments do not support this plan.

Hungary: Defense Spokesman on Possible Fighter Purchase

LD2005193696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1630 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to the U.S. military magazine ARMS TRADE NEWS, the United States is offering arms deliveries worth $8 billion to Eastern European countries. Gabor Benesi reports:

[Begin recording] [Benesi] Since Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary expressed their intention to replace aging Soviet fighter planes, they have received a great deal of offers. [passage omitted]

Although the three states have yet to invite concrete bids or to purchase anything, some analysts are talking about a new arms race.

Even if such armament existed before Eastern Europe's NATO entry, it could only take place within certain frameworks, Lajos Erdelyi, spokesman for the Defense Ministry, has said.

[Erdelyi] The agreement signed between the Warsaw Treaty [as heard] and NATO on the reduction of European conventional weapons says that by mid-November 1995 the participating countries must reduce their conventional weapons to a certain limit. [passage omitted]

We are below the quota regarding fighter planes and combat helicopters.

The number of fighter aircraft in our possession is well below the quota, which puts the limit at 180 aircraft. The official number we report to Vienna is 144, but we know for sure that within a couple of years following the turn of the millennium, the Hungarian Army will have only 28 fighters, the 28 MiG-29's we bought recently. So we will be far below the quota.

Although we have been receiving American, Swedish, and French businessmen who are outlining the capabilities of their planes and roughly what deal they could offer, we have not received any concrete offers yet. [passage omitted]

To compile our requirements, we must know in advance the possibilities, the requirements of the Hungarian Army, and the economic possibilities, which the government should define. [end recording]

Hungary: Editorial Criticizes Horn Statement on Corruption

AU2005171196 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 May 96 p 3

[Editorial by Endre Aczel: "Birds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyula Horn's statement had a dual message. One was for the coalition coordination due on 20 May, and the other for the Hungarian people.

As for the first, the Socialist prime minister adheres to the idea of the central investigation office and does not want the alternative ideas of Gabor Kuncze, Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] member deputy coalition prime minister and interior minister. His stance seems to be final. As for the second, Horn informed the people in a rather dramatic voice about the reasons for his stubbornness. In his view, organized crime is within the walls and the situation is not simply bad, it is

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catastrophic. ("Organized crime is seriously threatening our social values.") If this is so, special measures are needed. All Hungarian people (minus the SZDSZ) should understand this.

It is not I who invented the term "special." It is in the statement—as an adjective for the central investigation office. It is not the most fortunate description because it embarrassingly reminds us of the name of CHEKA ("Chrezvychaynaya Kommissiya"), the organization created after the Bolshevik revolution to curb counterrevolution, therefore, it is suitable for arousing fear.

What can I say? I do not like "special organizations," not even when their creators claim with the purest of hearts that only the wicked have reason to be afraid and innocent people ("citizens, honest entrepreneurs, local governments, the public") have nothing to fear and cannot have anything to fear. However, an organization like this, subordinated to the government, realizes its "special" situation, let me not say power, within moments, and from there on it would require a very strong democracy to curb it. It is better to have nonspecial organizations. At least I know what they are capable of.

But this is not so bad. Up to now, I thought that the central investigation office would have the task of quickly and efficiently uncovering economic crimes that cause extreme harm to the public and, although blushing, it sees corruption and the so-called black economy as one of its targets. However, the Horn statement says nothing about this. This statement is a completely new document of the literature on this issue. It talks almost exclusively about organized crime. This extends (according to the dictionary) to organized theft, robbery, foreign sale of goods acquired through those means, prostitution, and illegal gambling. It also has a bit of arms smuggling, prohibited alcohol and drugs sales, and such.

Well then: Which element of this organized crime is Horn challenging even at the cost of breaking up the coalition? To quote one of my colleagues: "I do not know." I can only hope that the prime minister will not leave his own party and government as much in the dark as he did me.

It is of course a completely different matter that people who became rich through oil falsification, tax and customs fraud, and similar methods are continuing to build their little empires by buying politicians and media (newspapers, radios). These are undoubtedly disgusting things but they only influence the general well-being of an economy to a minimal degree. Lockheed bought former Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei for $2.2 million so the Japanese state airlines would buy their planes, but Japan was still getting richer and stronger all the time. Another example. The entire Italian political elite was corrupt, but at the height of its corruption, Italy's per capita GDP was just ahead of completely corruption-free Britain, and it became Europe's third economic power. Therefore, I can say that Hungary certainly has many problems, but organized crime or even corruption are not the first among its fundamental problems.

Naturally, society's sense of justice is a completely different matter. If Horn wants to heal the illnesses of this with his own investigators, as he himself indicated—"law and justice have to prevail under all circumstances"—then so be it! But the two should not be confused, if possible, because it is always compulsory to make law prevail, but it is only desirable, at the most, to make justice prevail. Not mentioning the fact that the central investigation office certainly will not be able to remedy the slowness of the administration of justice. To use a living example, Steffi Graf's father is not waiting for his court case until autumn because the investigators were slow, but because the Mannheim court's (seven) economic courts of appeal [itelotabla] are irredeemably "overloaded."

To come to even simpler spheres: We naturally understand the SZDSZ's concerns and veto. Horn's "special" organization is suitable for creating a serious suspicion that the SZDSZ-controlled Interior Ministry's (police) sphere of authority will decrease and its organizations will fall into a subordinated position. (Should anyone have tried to cut the communist interior minister's—Rajk—rights in the former coalition times, he would have been in trouble!) This is the reason Kuncze and his party are (literally) defending their ranks and perhaps this is one of the reasons he cautions of a future in which, unavoidably, two rival—I emphasize rival—organizations would also face each other in investigation cases. One (the central investigation office) subordinated to the Socialists and another (police) to the SZDSZ, both in a competitive situation. And both would be happy to catch some of the other's "birds." Is it not better the way it is when the birds can fly free?

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B-H: Kasagic Denies Rift Among Serbs, Supports Karadzic

LD2105111296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1031 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 21 May (SRNA)—"Claims that I am the man through whom the division of the Serb Republic should have been accomplished, a coup against President Karadzic staged, and thus the unity of the Serb people undermined, are wrong," former Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said today.

In a statement sent to SRNA, Kasagic added that the "survival of the Serb Republic is a result of the struggle waged by the Serb people of which President Karadzic and I are of the same opinion. Some misunderstandings in the area of internal affairs are of no importance for the implementation of the Dayton agreement."

The former prime minister said that the change of a prime minister or government is a country's internal affair and is a normal event in crisis situations; the Serb Republic has developed a regime which is able to defend the interests of the Serb people, abiding by the documents of the Dayton agreement, and that it has no reason to be concerned for its future.

B-H: FRY Office Reportedly Confirms Karadzic Resignation

AU2005173496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 May 96

[Report by Nada al Issa—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] War criminal Karadzic has indeed resigned, although this is still being kept secret from the public. The resignation was demanded by Belgrade under pressure from the international community, we learned from Western diplomatic sources in Zagreb, and also confirmed by the FRY Office to the capital of Croatia. Nada al Issa reports from Zagreb.

[Al Issa] Has Belgrade indeed renounced the war criminal from Pale, or is all this yet another political game of stalling for time? In the FRY office to Zagreb, diplomats are making it clear that, by stalling for time, the first thing that the FRY could obtain are sanctions. True, they did not get any official instructions regarding Karadzic, but they assert that everything that has been published about Karadzic by the Belgrade press is true. And what is said there is that the psychiatrist [Karadzic] has indeed resigned under Belgrade's pressure, while transferring his authority to Biljana Plavsic is just an attempt to keep himself in the political play, which is a struggle for survival for him, because as long as he is in Pale, he is not in The Hague. In any case, the FRY [words indistinct] will certainly not permit itself to undergo more sanctions because of the Bosnian or the Croatian Serbs, which Warren Christopher has clearly announced and threatened. Therefore, at the FRY office to Zagreb it is made quite clear that Belgrade supports Prime Minister Kasagic, because with him Dayton still has a chance of succeeding [words indistinct], and if Karadzic remains in Pale, even as [word indistinct] of Plavsic's, then it is good-bye to the peace process.

B-H: Bildt Says Karadzic Now Has 'Less Power'

AU2105112196 Paris AFP in English 1033 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 21 (AFP)—Top civilian coordinator in Bosnia Carl Bildt said Tuesday that hardline Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has been partly sidelined by international efforts to remove the indicted war crimes suspect from the political stage.

Returning from a further round of talks in Belgrade with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Bildt said Karadzic had less power than he did a week ago as a result of Bildt's own efforts to marginalise the Serb leader.

"Whatever you say concerning the situation now Mr. Karadzic is less in pow[illegible]..than a week ago and we will see what is the situation a week from now," Bildt said.

Bildt's statement came after days of cat and mouse negotiations between the high representative and the Serb leadership. Karadzic delegated some of his powers over the weekend to a hardline deputy, but the Serb leadership maintains that there was no question of Karadzic resigning.

"I'm certainly not trusting anyone in this particular game," Bildt said.

The international community had tried to marginalise Karadzic by forging close contacts with his moderate premier, Rajko Kasagic, but Karadzic headed off the danger by dismissing him last Wednesday.

Kasagic denied Tuesday that he had been trying to change camps or help oust Karadzic in a statement issued in Banja Luka, the largest Serb town in Bosnia.

In the statement, Kasagic hit out at "mistaken" speculation that the Serb camp was divided, and denied that "anyone was preparing a coup against the president of RS," the Republika Srpska, as the Serb entity in Bosnia is known.

"Throughout their history, Serbs have never done such things, despite the difficulties that they have gone through," Kasagic said.

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B-H: Karadzic's 'Apparent' Turnabout Angers Milosevic, Bildt

MS2105093596 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 21 May 96 p 16

[Report by Christopher Lockwood and Sasa Niksic in Belgrade: "Pressure Grows on Karadzic To Quit Leadership"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Serbia's president, Slobodan Milosevic, and Carl Bildt, the international community's High Representative for Bosnia, were last night due to hold talks aimed at forcing the indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serbs. Diplomatic sources say that both Mr Milosevic and Mr Bildt are angered by Dr Karadzic's apparent decision to renege on an agreement he offered to both that he would leave public life.

Officials close to Mr Bildt stressed last night that in talks in Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital, that lasted throughout Saturday night, a firm commitment was given that Dr Karadzic would stand aside.

Dr Karadzic was not present at those talks but his main personal adviser, Jovan Zametica, was. Mr Zametica was in touch with Dr Karadzic throughout that night and Mr Bildt's men have no doubt the agreement was cleared by him.

The talks followed a meeting in Belgrade on Friday between Mr Milosevic and Mr Bildt, at which the Serbian president was bluntly told that it was time to get tough with Mr Karadzic.

But by Sunday, Dr Karadzic had apparently changed his mind. Instead of handing over power, as agreed, to the moderate vice-president Nikola Koljevic, he ceded only some of his functions to the other vice-president, the hardliner Biljana Plavsic, known as "the Serbian Empress" for her uncompromising nationalist views. "This has driven Milosevic crazy," said one source last night. He and Miss Plavsic, a biology professor and former American Fulbright scholar, are said to dislike each other.

She once publicly refused to shake his hand after he accepted the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia, which the Bosnian Serbs later rejected.

There is a picture of her kissing the cheek of Arkan, the most notorious of the Serb warlords who ethnically cleansed Bosnia. "There are 12 million Serbs," she once said. "We can afford to lose six million of them in battle."

Yesterday, there were signs that the Bosnian Serb hardliners were fighting to retain power. Miss Plavsic went to Banja Luka in northwestern Bosnia, supposedly the stronghold of the moderate Bosnian Serbs opposed to Dr Karadzic, to insist he remained in control.

There was "no question" of Mr Karadzic stepping down, she said. People with what she called "lively imaginations" had misinterpreted Dr Karadzic's decision to cede to her responsibility for negotiating with the international community, as a decision to step aside. "It is nothing of the sort," she said.

"Dr Karadzic is president of the republic. The president of the republic has the right to hand over some of his responsibilities to the vice-president."

The move had been rendered necessary by the fact that the staff of Mr Bildt, who is charged with overseeing the civilian aspects of the Dayton peace agreement deal, refuse to deal with Dr Karadzic.

In a further sign that the hardliners among the Bosnian Serbs were attempting to consolidate their power after the confusions of the last few days, the Bosnian Serb government yesterday closed down RADIO BiG, the only independent radio station in the Bosnian Serb republic, which broadcasts from Banja Luka. But by last night it was reported to be back on the air.

Mr Bildt is also thought likely to be asking Mr Milosevic to use his influence to secure the arrest of Mr Karadzic and his extradition to The Hague to face war crimes charges. He said that it was "essential" that Dr Karadzic be put on trial.

B-H: Kasagic Ouster Seen as 'Consistency' in Karadzic Policy

AU2005180196 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 96 p 14

[Commentary by Djordje Martic: "Karadzic Is Generating Chaos"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the attempt to remove Rajko Kasagic from the political stage, Radovan Karadzic has reconfirmed his inclination toward spectacular political moves, without paying too much thought to what it costs. Of course, this refers to the price paid by his fellow countrymen.

This is quite in the spirit of the Balkan variant of patriotism promoted over the past years by the circles of nationalist activists of a particular kind, who consider the defense of their own positions to be the loftiest patriotic task.

In the history of this region, Karadzic will be remembered as a man who rejected everything that was offered to him, and he was always offered more than he

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eventually got. This characteristic explains why he accepted the Dayton accord so unwillingly at the time. He feels at his strongest in a time of chaos, and the Dayton accord leads toward the normalization of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This accord means an end to the trade in black mourning scarves, the confrontation with the real existing problems that are a reason for cooperation among people, and by no means a reason for bad blood. After all, Dayton means fewer opportunities for epic manipulation with the rural majority and the restoration of the former position of the urban minority in the Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Today, Karadzic is sovereignly in control of the police and Pale television, but by these means he is not able to resolve the real problems of the citizens in Banja Luka or those wretched people who were expelled by Karadzic's men from their homes in Serb Sarajevo and were forced to settle in ruined houses of equally wretched and displaced people, members of other nations in Bosnia.

Powerful in emergency circumstances, he is aware of his marginal position in the circumstances in which real life is consolidating and drifting away from an epic. Therefore, he has to halt the process of normalization induced by Dayton.

Karadzic the poet is not giving up poetry, and he shows the same consistency in politics as well, which means he is not giving up his policy, either. He will be writing poems as long as there is readership and will be engaged in politics as long as there are Serbs.

His strategy presupposes that the Serbs in Bosnia remain as far from real life as possible, and as close to his poetic-political fiction as possible. The purpose of fiction is to make life in collective accommodation centers, from which even rats are running away, appear comfortable to the wretched. Karadzic is ready to further convince the Bosnian Serbs that such centers, precisely under his authority, are just the transitional station from which his people will reach the heights to which he is leading them.

It is not only the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were hostages to this strategy, but Yugoslavia was one, as well. Dayton opened a way out from that situation, and Kasagic imposed himself as a leader of substantially different orientation, who set out to pragmatically narrow the dimensions of the chaos.

Karadzic saw in that a danger and a chance. Without Kasagic, there is no Dayton, and consequently, there is no danger to Karadzic's position. Kasagic's removal is just a consistent step in maintaining the chaos. That it is another unconstitutional act by the unconstitutional president of the Bosnian Serbs simply adds to the whole picture.

B-H: Plavsic Stresses Implementation of Dayton Accord

LD2005161396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1511 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 20 May (TANJUG)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today that the Serb Republic People's Assembly had approved the Dayton agreement as a document which must be implemented without any exceptions.

The deputies of the Serb Republic assembly appreciate the importance of that agreement; they outlined their future activities on the basis of it; and its consistent implementation is their most important duty, Plavsic told a TANJUG journalist in Banja Luka.

We look upon the Dayton agreement as a law, as something we signed, which means that we must implement it, she added.

"That agreement is precious for us, and we must not abandon it easily," Plavsic said.

However, she stressed that the Serb Republic leaders cannot accept anyone's attempts to implement the peace agreement at the expense of the Serb people or alterations to it at the expense of any side in Bosnia.

Plavsic said that the latest changes in the Serb Republic put her in charge of international contacts, in order to ensure further promotion of the Serb Republic, in line with the peace agreement and the assembly's conclusions, about which, she stressed, Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been informed.

B-H: Plavsic Explains Karadzic's 'Transfer of Duties'

LD2005191196 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Biljana Plavsic said in Banja Luka today: The most important task I have been entrusted with is the implementation of the Dayton agreement and of the policy endorsed by the People's Assembly in line with the Dayton documents.

[Begin Plavsic recording] Dr. Karadzic, or rather the president of the republic, as referred to in the constitution, has the right to transfer some of his duties, some of his tasks, to the vice presidents.

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As far back as three years ago he charged me with looking after humanitarian issues in the broadest possible sense. Now that the war is over and our duties are changing to reflect the peaceful situation—and thank God that we are still alive to see it happen—we have to face different obligations, different problems, and this transfer of duties will, no doubt, change again [as heard]. I will not deny that there was a need for something like this.

The international community has, intentionally or not—which I cannot judge—the international community has assumed the following stand: The Dayton agreement cannot be implemented with the leadership in Pale, only with the prime minister, the then prime minister, Mr. Rajko Kasagic. If they had not created this impression, there would have been no need for something like this. Was he told by the former prime minister, Kasagic, that there was no one in the leadership committed to the Dayton agreement and that he was the only person capable of contacts over these issues? His mandate is really being linked with such an option—that there is no one in the state leadership capable of implementing the Dayton agreement. This link is the reason why I presume that Mr. Kasagic is behind these reports.

We did not know how to assure the international community that we have supported the Dayton agreement from the very moment it was signed, because it was our duty to our People's Assembly, which had discussed the Dayton agreement and planned its further policy in line with the agreement.

For reasons of which you are aware, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic, was not able to contact representatives of the international community, not that he did not want to meet them, but because they did not want to meet him. Is it not perfectly natural that, in this kind of situation, President Karadzic simply entrusts one of the vice presidents with the task of contacting the international community and telling them that all of us are in favor of the Dayton agreement? [end recording]

B-H: MBO Wants Serbs' Plavsic Declared War Criminal

AU2005150396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] of Bosnia-Herzegovina warned the public in today's statement that it should not fall prey to Karadzic's [words indistinct]. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government should persist in demanding that the international community extradite Karadzic to The Hague; moreover, it should demand that Biljana Plavsic be included on the list of war criminals. This move is calculated to deceive the international community and part of the Serb public, and to buy time to create more maneuvering space for the Pale clique to come up with new ways to avoid implementing the Dayton agreement. Karadzic's choice of Plavsic and Klickovic clearly shows that they are notorious supporters of the idea of a divided Bosnia-Herzegovina and are organizers and executors of genocide against Bosniaks and Croats, reads the statement issued by the MBO of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: West Making 'Malicious Interpretations' To Confuse Serbs

LD2005201096 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 May 96

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] The commitment of the Serb Republic leadership and people to persist in preserving the sovereignty and independence of the Serb Republic has been interpreted in a number of different ways by the media and diplomatic circles of some Western countries.

While some have interpreted Karadzic's decision to transfer part of his authority to Vice President Biljana Plavsic as a continuation of the Serb policy aimed at preserving national interests, others—by different malicious interpretations—are trying to cause confusion among the Serb nation and create a favorable climate for further pressure on the Serbs due to their alleged reluctance to cooperate.

However, doubts do not exist for those well-meaning people who love truth. It is clear and obvious that nothing has been done that is at odds with Dayton and the constitution of the Serb Republic. It is equally clear that pressure on the Serb Republic and President Karadzic continues for one sole reason: to abolish the Serb Republic so as to preserve a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina that has never existed.

B-H: International 'Games' in Federation's Creation Examined

AU1805134796 Pale JAVNOST in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 96 p 7

[Article by Ljubodrag Stojadinovic: "Instability Guaranteed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The agreement about the establishment of the Muslim-Croatian federation was signed in the White House, under the supervision of Mr. Bill Clinton, two years ago. It was necessary to sign such

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an act under the supervision of a powerful ward, as only this made it possible to extinguish the fires of the Muslim-Croatian war. Many people doubted that that political baby would have a long life. It was created under the circumstances of passionate hatred between its parents, and there were almost no chances for love or at least for "peaceful agreement to a future union."

Washington played the card of the necessity of any kind of anti-Serbian coalition, and the pressure on the signatories was—with that aim in mind—almost unbearable. It was proven that the efforts Christopher and Clinton made were sensible, as the energy that the married federal partners spent on their mutual extinction was saved for the decisive days of the war. Washington gave up every illusion of nonpartiality and joined one warring faction (the coalition) in the civil war. In that way, the inferior side (the Muslim-Croatian) gained the advantage, due to the air and logistics support and to the clear political decision against the Serbs and any kind of organization of theirs that would be above the level of the present division.

Without Federal Army

The Muslim-Croatian Federation lived as any other unnatural creation. The regime functioned as a puppet apparatus, but only because of the energy it was given for its survival from the powerful aggregate abroad. That regime somehow succeeded in finding the personnel for its incomplete political bodies, but their functioning showed all the signs of a future disintegration.

The biggest problems arose in connection with the organization of the army, however. Despite the capability of exerting pressure, despite stimulus and care, no one could force the partners to establish a joint, or to be more precise a "federal" army. There were many reasons for it, but the most important are its future concept and values.

Neither of the sides needs a federal army. Maybe a pact, but only in cases when their interests are stronger than their mutual animosity. The Muslim leadership has constantly been introducing the ideological concept of mystification regarding the core of "the future Bosnian state." A multiethnic and multiconfessional state is mentioned, and what is really meant is a pure Islamic state, with traditions that eliminate "everything that is different."

This is the reason why Alija tries to be a more orthodox Muslim than his Asian teachers. Croatia has neither given up Europe nor its decisive military influence over the Balkans. The latest unfolding of events keeps the Croatian leaders convinced that they have succeeded in this. Therefore, it is only logical that the Croats want to be dominant in the prospective armed forces of the Federation. These are incompatible attitudes, and the commanding personnel of both armies agree only in one thing: No one knows how it could function. The Federation army is in any case burdened by the mortgage of the mutual conflict, which cannot be removed with "the work on ideology," as there is no basis for any kind of common ideology, except for the platform of radical anti-Serbianism. In "the new state" the platform of the prescribed hatred could not exist forever. It will disappear either because of its uselessness or will be materialized through the continuation of the war.

This is, more or less, one side of the problem. The other one could annul, or at least diminish, the incompatible elements mentioned above. The United States is urging a law that would require the establishment of joint Muslim-Croatian armed forces. If they are not established, there will be no U.S. military help for Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, for the Muslim-Croatian coalition. The problem is, naturally, far more complex than it is believed to be. Neither will the United States realize its threats, nor will the Muslims and Croats be especially threatened. After all, THE WASHINGTON POST has disclosed that Clinton approved of weapons supplies to the Muslims during the whole war. The whole thing is primarily about the maintenance of U.S. prestige. The motives for the establishment of the stillborn state are perhaps not important any longer; it is important that the United States was the country that established it, so that it must last. Even by force. Therefore, the "federal partners" do not have to be afraid of being left empty-handed, at least regarding weapons.

The Power of One's Own Loop

All the games mentioned so far that are related to the Bosniak-Croatian union indicate in fact that it is dangerous to play games with surrogate states. They can exist only under the control of a power that is stronger than the powers of internal destruction, but such a construction cannot last forever. There are hypotheses according to which the creators of such monstrous states are also aware of the drawbacks of such creations, but they are maintained in order to keep live coals under the ashes. Insisting on "a unitary Bosnian state" means that the conditions for a new catastrophe are only being conserved. From the point of view of ideology, everything ends up with the dream "of brotherhood and unity," while practically this is an unreconcilable collection of differences, which the ring of global power only emphasizes.

The United States still has several standards when it explains its intentions to international and domestic au-

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diences. All the scandals in which important personalities are involved are officially suppressed, and new ones are prepared at the same time. If, in other words, the Muslim-Croatian army starts functioning, it will get weapons, and the balance of forces could—according to their calculations—be finally disturbed to the Serbian disadvantage.

And finally, if things really take a tragic course, no one could reproach the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for its engagement on the side of the Serbian Republic. Or could he? Kosovo and Metohija are still in the focus of attention. The loop is still here; it has only become somewhat narrower.

Instability is, in other words, guaranteed. If the Federation collapses, it will be very tumultuous; if it survives, it will be the pact for a long-term marginalization of "Serbian factors." This will, in fact, be the only motive for the survival of such an unnatural alliance.

The creation of such a relation of powers is not a coincidence. Weapons are not coming to the Balkans in order to corrode. This is not an international conspiracy—that kind of paranoia has probably left the Serbs. The loop we are carrying around our necks was put there with our own hands, if we are ready to share this "merit" with those who have been celebrating invented victories for months.

B-H: IFOR Seizes Weapons From Serb Police Recruits in Brcko

LD2105123596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1049 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 21 May (SRNA)—The first incident between the [Bosnian] Serb police forces and members of IFOR [Implementation Force] took place last night in Brcko. It was only thanks to the Special Brigade members' presence of mind that the conflict remained a verbal one.

The incident took place when a vehicle carrying 20 Serb police recruits, born in 1976 and 1977, was stopped by force at an IFOR checkpoint near the Brcko municipality building, SRNA's correspondent reports.

U.S. soldiers surrounded the vehicle, lined up the recruits in front of the municipality building, and stripped them of their automatic weapons, obeying the orders of General William Nash, IFOR Sector Northwest commander.

From 2000 until 0100 the following day, NATO aircraft flew low over the town in a threatening manner, and, since this morning, the presence of IFOR armored vehicles and IFOR members in Brcko has been strengthened.

Soon after the incident, on the spot where it took place, Second Lieutenant Momcilo Gasic, commander of the 3d platoon of the special police for antisabotage activities, met with Lt. Colonel Kukolo, commander of the American troops in this city.

After two hours of maltreatment, the Serb police recruits were released and they continued their journey towards the base, but the confiscated weapons have not been returned. The final resolution of the incident is expected to take place at tomorrow's meeting between Lt. Col. Kukolo and Gen. Goran Saric, commander of the Special Brigade of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic police.

B-H: Ganic Says Bildt 'Cannot Remove' Karadzic; IFOR Can

AU2005175796 Paris AFP in English 1727 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 20 (AFP)—The top civilian official implementing the Bosnian peace process cannot unseat Serb leader Radovan Karadzic but NATO troops could, a senior Bosnian official told AFP Monday.

Ejup Ganic, vice president of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation, said top international High Representative Carl Bildt cannot remove Karadzic by dint of diplomatic means.

The 60,000-strong NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) could force him out of power by arresting him, Ganic said.

Bildt, the civilian High Representative in Bosnia-Hercegovina, is currently spearheading an effort to force Karadzic from power by a series of diplomatic meetings.

Karadzic is indicted for war crimes including genocide.

Ganic however was dismissive of the effort Monday.

"Bildt has no chance but IFOR has by arresting him," said Ganic. "Anything else is ridiculous," he added.

B-H: Muratovic Deems Kasagic's Dismissal 'Counterproductive'

LD2005223496 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Jadranko Katana] Mr. Colum Murphy [spokesman for the office of international coordinator of the civilian operation in Bosnia headed by Carl Bildt] had this say about the current position of Carl Bildt's office on the events in the

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Serb entity and the likelihood of the criminal Karadzic [president of the Serb Republic] being dismissed:

[Begin recording] [Murphy, in English] We do not consider to have a firm agreement on Dr. Karadzic's resignation. We have in fact what we consider to be a firm understanding, a promise from the leadership of the Serb Republic. This was hammered out during a long night of negotiations the other weekend. We think there has been a sea change in their thinking. They agreed that Dr. Karadzic has to stay out of public life. In their own words, he would be neither seen nor heard, but we want some kind of a constitutional document. We are still discussing that and we do not intend to stop until we clarify the situation. But, something important has changed certainly.

[Katana] What is Milosevic's [Serbian president] position in this whole affair?

[Murphy, in English] We told Mr. Milosevic that we were not happy with the amount of help he was giving us. Mr. Bildt had a conversation with Mr. Milosevic and told him that he had expected far greater help from Mr. Milosevic. That was promised and there was a meeting of minds on that subject. We know that Mr. Milosevic was in touch with Pale several times in that whole night of negotiations and discussions. They were hard talks and we know that Dr. Karadzic was consulted a number of times and Mr. Milosevic was in touch with the leadership. Mr. Bildt will be telling Mr. Milosevic that he expects to keep the pressure on the leadership of the Serb Republic. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Katana] Let us now hear the Bosnian government's official standpoint on the events in the Serb entity.

[Begin recording Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic] It [dismissal of Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic] is certainly very counterproductive. Dismissals of state officials are very risky now even if it is a normal replacement and even if better people are brought in. A lot of time is needed for people to comprehend all the problems in the implementation of the Dayton agreement. The goal of this process is not only to remove those who are willing to cooperate, but also to slow down or block the implementation of the Dayton agreement. [end recording]

B-H: Croat Ministry Denies Police Barred Ganic From Stolac

LD2005173096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has denied Sarajevo media reports that the police stopped Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Mostar suburb of Kovacine yesterday and prevented him and a group of Bosniak citizens from visiting Stolac.

According to a statement signed by Ivan Vrankic, minister of internal affairs of Herzeg-Bosnia, a political meeting was organized in Stolac on 19 May. Bosniak and Croat politicians were supposed to attend the meeting and around 40 citizens of Stolac, currently residents of eastern Mostar, were supposed to visit the town at the same time. However, around 300 Bosniaks who wanted to visit Stolac gathered in Kovacine. When they were told that a visit by so many people had not been agreed upon, they stopped Ejup Ganic, blocking him for around three hours and preventing him from visiting Stolac.

When Ganic finally arrived in Stolac that afternoon, he was told that the meeting he was supposed to attend had ended and that the Croat officials had left. After this, Ganic returned to eastern Mostar escorted by Stolac police, the statement says in conclusion.

B-H: Zubak, Ganic Comment on 'Failed' Stolac Visit

LD2005223796 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to clarify ambiguities in connection with yesterday's vist to Stolac by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, we are again dealing with this topic today. We have tried to discover the truth about the failure to implement freedom of movement in the field by asking both Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Vice President Ejup Ganic to comment on this.

[Correspondent Sanela Fazlic] After the signing of numerous peace agreements in connection with the Federation, it is obvious that both sides support its implementation only on paper. If one really wishes to achieve real results, then what has been agreed upon has to be implemented, which was not the case yesterday.

After a series of new and old reports and misinformation on a failed attempt by Zubak and Ganic to hold a joint public debate in Stolac, where they were supposed to speak about a project on the return of Bosniak refugees and about the implementation of numerous peace agreements, Zubak and Ganic said the following today:

[Begin Zubak recording] We secured what had been agreed upon earlier. A large number of Croats came

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to attend the debate. It was later established that their number was around 1,000. I said that it will be very difficult to get 300 more people into a room that was already full, that this could provoke conflict, that everything will have a completely opposite effect, that a new meeting should be organized instead on another occasion.

Yesterday was the first step, and on some other occasion a wider meeting of Bosniaks and Croats should be held in Stolac. That is how it was. It is completely untrue that the Croats prevented their arrival, and what is particularly untrue is that Croat refugees from Vares and Kakanj who live here prevented their visit.

[Fazlic] Vice President Ejup Ganic said the following about the failed visit to Stolac:

[Begin Ganic recording] Bosniak citizens, refugees from Stolac, had heard that the public debate was going to be held, and proceeding from the fact that freedom of movement existed in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they set off in three buses, joining a column in which I was traveling.

The Croatian police intervened saying they were unable to let through that number of citizens, that they were unprepared to provide security, and so on. Then we wasted three hours trying to reach a solution. We waisted precious time, and when I arrived in Stolac with my team the debate was finished. The town was literally deserted. Just a few people were in restaurants, there was nobody else. The Croats had dispersed. I think that a good opportunity was missed for people to face each other, because some of them have to go south, others have to go north. [passage omitted]

The solution is to set up a mixed police, i.e., federal police in every place, where the composition of the police has to reflect the composition of the population that lived in the place in 1991. This will establish security for everyone. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Western Mostar Mayor: Croats To Go Ahead With Elections

LD2005193296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] No one has told us that the elections will be postponed. We assume that they are going ahead on 31 May as agreed and we are proceeding accordingly, said western Mostar Mayor Miro Brajkovic this morning, in response to a statement on the postponement of elections by Hans Buerchler, legal adviser to the EU administration in Mostar, who said the elections would be postponed, and also to a statement by the EU administration in Mostar that no decision to this effect had been made.

Our electoral commissions are working around the clock and we will not budge, Brajkovic said, adding that there was a decree by Administrator Casado on holding elections and the Croat side would take part.

If the elections are to be postponed, Brajkovic said, all the sides must agree to it. He said that in that case, the side that refuses to take part in the elections must be named. Up to now, the Croat side has always been accused of obstructing the preparations. Time has come to name the side that refuses to take part in the elections. Mr Buerchler's pronouncements are his personal matter, Brajkovic said, adding that the EU legal adviser would probably say that the elections would have to be postponed for technical reasons, but he knows very well that the reasons are to be looked for elsewhere, HABENA [Bosnian Croat news agency] has reported.

B-H: Mayor Stresses Need To Honor Mostar Election Rules

AU2005202896 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 pp 35-37

[Interview with western Mostar Mayor Mijo Brajkovic by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "Ballot for Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Karacic] [Passage omitted] The conversation with Brajkovic started with a hot Mostar topic—the local elections. No additional questions were needed, Brajkovic was very clear:

[Brajkovic] I believe that the elections are the most important thing in Mostar. To all of us in these posts it means a lot more to be elected democratically because we feel the mood of the people. This much is from the viewpoint of an individual. From the viewpoint of the Croats in Mostar, the elections are significant in many ways. The Croatian side is not opposed to Mostar being a unified town. We are constantly explaining to the world and the EU that there was a war here, and that a small people living in this Federation wants to have all the rights that others have. We do not seek domination. We do not want to be the first; however, we do not want to be marginalized, either. To be this, the Croatian peoples must have their own national, cultural, spiritual, and any other type of identity. It is on this principle, precisely, that the elections rest.

[Karacic] The principles of the Mostar elections are mainly defined by the Dayton peace accord. How do you view the agreement now?

[Brajkovic] For the Croatian peoples in Mostar, the Dayton accord is something positive. The Croats won

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three municipalities with their majority; we also agree with what the Bosniak side has got. We need elections to verify everything agreed in Dayton, through the people who will represent their peoples in the municipalities and in the town council alike. We agreed that all three municipalities with the Croatian majority unite as regards the joint functions. This is our right according to the Dayton accord and the agreement that we reached with the Bosniak side and the EU. It would be extravagant to set up three municipalities with three sets of authorities, numerous administrators, secretaries, office cars, and such in such a small area. I believe that the Bosniak side will act the same some day.

[Karacic] In other words, Mostar will consist of two municipalities, one with the Croatian and the other with the Bosniak majority?

[Brajkovic] This, precisely, is the concept that we have supported from the first day. It must now be verified in the coming elections. That is why the Croatian side wants the elections, and we will do everything that they be held. It would be very wrong to violate the Dayton accord in Mostar. If we do not honor it now, then any side will have the right to violate it in the future. That is why we advise the EU to mobilize all its available resources to organize the elections, that they be held on 31 May. It is well-known that the Dayton accord allows all citizens who lived in Mostar according to the 1991 census and who are present in the town on the date of elections to vote. We will not agree to anything else. We are merely honoring the Dayton accord.

[Karacic] Are you satisfied with everything that has been done in preparation for the Mostar elections, organized by the EU administration, so far?

[Brajkovic] Quite a bit has been done in preparation, neither too little nor too much. The EU is pursuing a very incorrect policy here. That is why I protested to EU Administrator Ricardo Peres Casado and demanded that the EU shape up. I am aware that the Bosniak side does not want elections. It negates them. The Bosniaks demand that the voting in consular missions or by post, by proxy, also be allowed. This would be really wrong. You must know that 17,000 Serbs used to live in Mostar. What will we do with them? The EU administration forwarded a request to all EU members to pass a decision whereby voting in consular missions would also be possible. This represents the violation of the law, because the law only allows this possibility in state elections, and by no means in local elections. If this happens, the Croats will not attend the elections because we believe that this would violate the Dayton accord. [passage omitted]

[Karacic] Why is the Bosniak side opposed to the elections?

[Brajkovic] I believe that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not in its interest. It was surprised that the Croatian side wanted the Federation. The Croatian people have no alternative here. They are the fewest people; however, they will not agree to any association in which they would not enjoy the same rights as the others. This transpired perfectly in Mostar, because Mostar fought for its municipalities. The Mostar example can serve for all in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosniak side has its own policy. It wants a civic state in which one vote would equal one man. The Croats do not stand a chance for survival in such a case. They can unify with the Bosniak people, however, through institutions. One such institution was Herzeg-Bosnia. It cannot be abolished overnight, it must evolve into something. At present, these are cantons. I personally believe that it is best to have national cantons, which does not mean nationalist or chauvinist. [passage omitted]

[Karacic] Mostar has recently gotten its second European administrator. What can you say about him and his predecessor?

[Brajkovic] I had nothing against Koschnick as a man; however, I had a lot against him as the EU representative, because with his decision he tried to endanger the interests of the people to which I belong. In western Mostar 16,000 expelled persons live at present. They were expelled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. We did not get a single German mark for the reconstruction of the apartments in which they would live. Everything went to the other side of the Neretva. Why? There are more than 400,000 Bosniaks in Germany. The goal of the German state is to return them to Bosnia-Herzegovina. A portion of them is also supposed to return to Mostar. They can be repatriated if the Croats allow them to return in their apartments. However, the Croats expelled by the Bosniaks live in these apartments. That is why we maintain that Mostar cannot be viewed separately from the Federation. All expelled people must return to their homes. The biggest mistake of Mr. Koschnick was that he was taken in by the policy of the Bosniak side, all this multi-multi-multi.... However, nobody knew what this "multi" meant. Is this not the case on our side where 9,000 Bosniaks and 3,000 Serbs live, while there are neither Serbs nor Croats on the other side? [passage omitted]

[Karacic] You are meeting with East Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic almost daily. How do these meetings look and could you say that you are cooperating?

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[Brajkovic] We regularly meet with each other, have a coffee; however, each of us protects the interests of his people. He has the advantage, because many important people watch out for Mostar from Sarajevo. They give him tremendous support. I am handicapped here. We proclaimed Mostar the capital of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, although more nominally than in practice. If we are not present in Mostar, we stand no chance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosniaks have Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac.... The Serbs have Banja Luka. What do the Croats have? They must have Mostar. That is where our university, schools, theater, galleries, and festivals should be....

B-H: Central Bosnian Canton Assembly Appoints Government

AU1705154296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Bosnia Canton Assembly met in Travnik today and appointed the government. Here is a report by Refija Kulasin:

[Begin Kulasin recording] In conformity with the Law on the Government of the Central Bosnian Canton and agreement on distribution of ministries and [word indistinct] (?staffing), with acclamation and with two abstentions, the assembly adopted the decision on confirming the appointment of the Government of the Central Bosnian Canton. Zeir Mlivo, economist from Bugojno, was appointed prime minister, and Mirko Batinic [word indistinct] from Novi Travnik was appointed his deputy. Minister of interior affairs is Enes Handzic from Donji Vakuf; justice minister is Zeljko Kerestinlic from Travnik; finance minister is Ivica Cavra from Kiseljak; minister of industry, energy, and mining is (Zeljko Poldip) from Jajce; minister of trade, tourism, and entrepreneurship is (Sefcet Jahic) from (?Busovaca); minister of traffic and communications is (Sulejman Becirevic) from Kiseljak; minister of agriculture, forestry, and water resources is (Mustafa Zebic) from Fojnica; minister of urban planning, zoning, and environmental protection will be from Croat ranks but was not appointed today, minister of [word indistinct] is Azra Izetbegovic from Bugojno; minister of education, science, culture, and sports is Fahrudin Karakas from Travnik; minister of labor, social policy, and refugees is [name indistinct] from Fojnica; and minister of reconstruction and development is (Josip Kilic) from Vitez.

Esref Begovac, president of the Cantonal Committee of the SDP [Social Democratic Party], expressed some serious remarks on the way this government was formed and on its composition, as well as on [word indistinct] Assembly. Mr. Begovac said that the composition of the Assembly does not reflect electoral results according to which the SDP should have eight seats and has only three with the possibility of having two more. A (?serious) remark was made on the composition of the government: two posts in the government should belong to the SDP and the party was offered those without portfolio. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: 'Fragility' of U.S.-EU Bosnia Cooperation Assessed

MS1505102196 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 15 May 96 p 2

[Report by Bruce Clark: "EU-U.S. Strains Show Over Policy on Bosnia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels—The fragility of US-European co-operation in Bosnia has been highlighted by the angry reaction of European Union foreign ministers to a critical press comment by Mr Richard Holbrooke, chief architect of the Dayton peace accord.

Mr Holbrooke, till recently an assistant US secretary of state and now an investment banker, wrote in TIME magazine that "important European officials" were writing ff the vision of a reintegrated Bosnia and preparing for partition. He also asserted that the military parts of the Dayton agreement had been well implemented by the US-led Nato force, while the civilian aspects were less successful because of "messy ineffective arrangements" insisted on by Europe.

A senior European diplomat said there had been "a lot of harrumphing" over the article at the EU foreign ministers' meeting this week, especially from representatives of Britain, France and Germany which co-sponsored the peace.

European officials insisted that the EU was taking the lead in efforts to reintegrate Bosnia by working to promote more moderate forces in the Serb-held area and undermine the power of the hardline leader Mr Radovan Karadzic.

They added that blaming Europe for "messy arrangements" in implementing the accord was unfair: the UK, France and Germany had waged a hard diplomatic struggle, in the teeth of US resistance, to secure a clear mandate for Mr Carl Bildt, head of the civilian part of the peace effort.

One official suggested that Mr Holbrooke might be preparing to use the Europeans as scapegoats in the event of a breakdown in the Dayton agreement. While European officials were careful to distinguish between Mr Holbrooke and US policy in general, the row was a reflection of the nervousness on both sides of the Atlantic about the prospects for the Bosnian peace process.

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The process is entering one of its hardest phases as policy-makers try to reconcile the expediency of holding elections as soon as possible with the principle that refugees have the right of return.

Observers say the ability of any outside power to fine-tune events in Bosnia will be severely limited if the United States acts on its promise to terminate its military presence at the end of the year, and Britain and France follow suit.

The wide range of views within the EU on defence co-operation was highlighted yesterday at a session of the intergovernmental conference on EU reform. The Italian presidency floated the idea that EU foreign ministers' meetings should sometimes be joined by the defence ministers from the 15 member states, a step tantamount to giving the Union a military function.

However, Britain opposes this idea, as well as a suggestion from both Germany and Italy that the EU's role as a sponsor of peacekeeping and humanitarian task forces should be written into the Union's founding treaty.

B-H: Commentary Examines Federation's First 100 Days

AU1605141796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by Ibrahim Polimac: "100 Days of Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is up to the historians to record, and the analysts to analyze, the results today, 100 days after the appointment of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

An inventory of what has been achieved in this period by [Prime Minister] Dr. Izudin Kapetanovic's cabinet has yet to be made, but some significant results are already visible. In other times and with other prime ministers, one would have made a media parade of many things so far. Dr. Kapetanovic, as well as his ministers, are almost shyly present in the media. They themselves are thus contributing to the atmosphere that has been present here for a long time, in which the government is guilty of everything that is bad, and when anyone talks about success, the government is, as a rule, in the background.

The crucial success is, without doubt, the establishment of the united Customs Office in the Federation. It started to operate on 1 April, and by mid-month some 15 million German marks [DM] had arrived in the treasury. For the first time since the Washington treaty, the federal authorities are getting the material background, too. To avoid any doubts, money is also arriving in the treasury from Mostar, the "western" one.

Physicians have started to receive pay, and under our circumstances one would say decently: DM500, in dinars, of course. University professors and others employed in education are no longer working for nothing, either. The financial means to pay pensions more regularly have also been obtained, and pensions will be coordinated with salaries.

In the first three months of this year, compared to the same period last year, industrial output is 53.7 percent higher. It is particularly important that the coal mines have almost reached the daily output they had before the war, some 5,000 metric tons per day. That is the initial lever for the electrical power system, which in turn is the initial lever for a whole chain of other output capacities.

Traffic data tell us that greater freedom of movement has also been achieved. In March, in comparison to February of this year, 45 percent more goods have been transported, and as much as 71 percent more passengers. The mileage is even more impressive, with a 300 percent increase.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina dinar has arrived in Gorazde, and a bit earlier in Una-Sana Canton. Pension payments have started in Gorazde, and soon voltage will pass through the transmission line to that town, via Visegrad, and will continue to Foca.

Slowly, the circumstances are being created for the return of refugees and the displaced. For example, in Sanski Most, 509 people have welcomed freedom. Today, there are more than 20,000 inhabitants in that town. There are no precise data on the total number of people who have returned to the homeland. If one can make his judgment from Sarajevo, the number is more than significant.

Although, not by much, the foreign trade imbalance is decreasing. It is also encouraging to hear that the largest balance sheet item is in machines and means of transportation—29.7 percent of total imports. Is it not an announcement of reorientation from trade and catering to production.

An unavoidable entry in the activities of the government is also the preparation of laws. Unfortunately, it has proved that a lot of effort has yielded only superficial results, and the reasons for that should be looked for somewhere rather than within the government, "in the extraparliamentary centers of power," as M.S. Vlado Soljic, minister of defense, recently said. That is, at the same time, the explanation for the situation in which, from the rostrum of the Constitutional Assembly,

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Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation, and then the representatives and delegates, praise the cabinet of Dr. Kapetanovic, only to refuse to accept the draft laws presented by the very same government a moment later.

It is, in fact, what Dr. Izudin Kapetanovic was aware of, and said in his inaugural speech when he was appointed prime minister. He warned then that in order to realize the objectives and tasks that are put before the government it is necessary to provide certain preconditions, first of all "a favorable political climate." This precondition has been only partially realized, so in that context one has to look at the fact that the defense law, for instance, has not yet reached the parliamentary benches. It will be no surprise if a similar game is played around the law on the central bank, for example.

Employment—that is, social programs—remains a weak point. The ambition of the government to solve that problem by activating existing capacities and stimulating the opening of small and medium-sized enterprises could start yielding some results in the foreseeable future. Apart from the two production factors we possess—land and labor—the third is also announced to arrive quickly: capital. As in a system of connected vessels, that could result in a reduction in the number of candidates for social help and larger funds for intervention and help to those in need.

The Federation Government has done a lot, but there is still a lot to do. It seems that it is prepared for challenges, because, as one of the government members said, it is "a draft government." Nevertheless, many of those who often make its job more difficult should give it a "push."

B-H: Results of U.S. Forum on Federation Viewed

AU1705182596 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 16 May 96 p 2

[Report by Bruno Lopandic: "Diplomatic Lego Model"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The long prepared for meeting, namely, the Forum for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned into a real diplomatic Lego model this week in Washington, but it was still successfully put together in the end, according to the participants. They still managed to reach agreement on all the issues on the agenda. An agreement was reached on the Act on Defense as well, for a U.S. State Department spokesman had announced before the meeting that the act must be passed. As expected, the agreement on this issue was the most difficult to reach. The eagerness on the part of the United States to demonstrate to itself and the parties involved that its peace project is being successfully implemented, despite growing skepticism, was evidenced by the strong engagement on the part of the State Department, and even President Bill Clinton himself became involved in the negotiations. The final solution, after a series of talks, was passed with a certain delay, and it was agreed at the last moment that the future army should be organized with a unified command and a single defense minister. This applies to formations from the corps level upward, while at lower levels, authority is shared between the Croatian Defense Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over the next three years, that model is supposed to result in overall unification at all levels.

The U.S. Administration has found in the negotiations a compromise between two different stances; that is, between a unified army and an army with separate jurisdictions. When speaking of other issues discussed recently in Washington, the United States particularly insisted on the establishment of legal financial institutions to make possible an efficient start on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. Secretary of State Christopher was quite clear: U.S. support can be expected only if all the Forum's agreements are implemented. The same applies to all other issues, as well as to the holding of elections, "which must be held on time and in the planned manner," spokesman Nicholas Burns stressed.

The Croatian delegation, headed by Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, made use of its participation at the Forum to discuss both the regional situation and bilateral relations between Croatia and the United States. In addition to the many compliments that representatives of both countries exchanged (the United States is extremely satisfied with Croatia's role in the peace process and its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, recognizing that Croatia is an important factor of peace and an excellent candidate for Partnership for Peace), the Americans also made several criticisms of varying seriousness. In the Congress and the State Department, the greatest concern is caused by initiatives regarding Jasenovac, which is seen in Washington as the greatest problem. In addition, Croatia was reproached for a lack of media freedom and for the current state of affairs regarding the Zagreb municipal authorities. As for the economy, much remains to be done. Although the Act on Investment Protection is being prepared and is about to be completed, things are not so promising with the Act on the Avoidance of Double Taxation. Well-informed sources at the State Department say it has to do with certain differences of opinion; that is, certain circles, unlike the late Ron Brown, are still hesitant. Two options are in play: The first supports direct economic ties with Croatia, while the other supports such ties but in a joint package with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Croatian diplomacy has used this visit to take a step that U.S. sources claim represents the beginning of a higher level of bilateral relations with the United States and a turning point that will bring about a new and improved level of relations. According to a U.S. diplomat, "certain remarks have been made for the sole benefit of Croatia."

In any case, Bill Clinton and Warren Christopher did not have an easy job organizing this meeting. Burdened with accusations that the United States is frustrated because the American peace project is not functioning in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it had to be shown in Washington that things are improving. For that reason, agreement had to be reached. It is a process that takes time, and much of its success still depends on the parties involved, hence Christopher's reserve after the meeting. Since the Americans are in a hurry and are bent on showing all their partners and the international community that the Federation can function, the meeting in Washington was an occasion for a new demonstration of the American view of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Croatia was again asked to support this attitude. The United States did receive such support from Croatia again. As Christopher put it, what remains to be done is to implement the agreements.

B-H: Daily on Intelligence Agency Personnel Changes

AU1605102796 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 96 pp 1, 5

[Article by Fadit Mandal: "Changes ine AID"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Agency for Research and Documentation [AID] was conceived as a framework for the information-security apparatus of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has, from its very founding, been provoking obvious attention, both from the media and from various political circles at home as well as abroad. The hypersensitive position that characterizes every organization such as AID is tempting enough reading, and is simply eaten up by the public as well as by other "friendly" interested services.

That is why it is no surprise that the newest personnel changes in the leadership of the Agency have already become the subject of downtown whisperings, intelligence analyses, and opposing newspaper headlines. However, what is indisputable are the names of the personnel who are leaving.

The Departure of Ljevakovic

Irfan Ljevakovic no longer has the position of assistant director of the AID. According to the new organizational list, he is to have the position of counselor. Enver Mujezinovic has also lost his position as an influential member of the security personnel. Last year he was the target of severe media criticism.

Looking at this from the sidelines, one gets the impression that these changes in some way represent a continuation of the internal police and political clash with the personnel of the former minister of the interior and first director of AID, Bakir Alispahic. However, this could just as well be the wrong conclusion. The sources that AVAZ has contacted claim that extra magnification is needed in order to totally comprehend the aforementioned changes.

Namely, within the inner circles of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following opinion of Irfan Ljevakovic has been established. He was brought into the structure of the former Service of State Security [Sluzba Drzavne Bezbijednosti—SDB] as a civilian in order to introduce some newness and a new method of thought into a institution whose infrastructure had been inherited from the former communist system. According to some information, he had the strong support of the ruling group [garnitura] in fulfilling this task.

A Burdening Biography

What has happened in the meantime, and why did Ljevakovic fall out of the foremost intelligence position right now? What is certain, and has been confirmed by those we spoke to, are the facts that this case, according to everything, does not deal with conceptual differences connected to the operation of an organization such as the AID. The same sources believe that this is primarily a case of Ljevakovic's tendency toward some "business" deals that do not have much to do with work in the state security service.

As opposed to his position, Enver Mujezinovic's position was vulnerable from the beginning on. Some of the local media, as well as some of the influential political factors, have never forgotten the details of his biography, that is, as a perspective operator of the KOS [Kontra Obvestevalna Sluzba—Counterintelligence Agency], the intelligence agency of the JNA [Yugoslav National Army], where he was, for a while, in the cabinet of Aca Vasiljevic, who was the head of the KOS at that time.

It is interesting that Mujezinovic's departure was expected much earlier by many—especially after the fall of his long-time protector, Fikret Muslimovic.

Moreover, informed sources point out the very probable possibility that even Nedzad Ugljen, the former head of the SDB, and now in an adequate position in the AID, will be leaving his post.

Those who know the method of operation of closed systems such as the AID do not view the aforementioned,

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or any other less important, personnel changes as radical or as something surprising to the extent that the local media are experiencing it. In principle, the heads of intelligence agencies bring with them the personnel they personally trust. Naturally this deals with the leading positions, whereas the classic operatives, who have been hardened and strengthened by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are not changed.

On the other hand, it is clear that the eventual changing of the complete group would bring with it dangers for the entire service. A strong group of "thrown away" personnel is not a small problem for any government. According to confidential information, certain personnel shifts have been made in the Federal Ministry of the Interior at the same time.

New Reinforcements

Yet another segment in the entire situation, regarding the changes in the AID, seems to have remained without being mentioned. It deals with, as announced from some circles, a demand for a greater inclusion of Croat—it would be better to say "Herzeg-Bosnian"—personnel in the security system of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Naturally, talk of those who are leaving sometimes eclipses the list of those who are to come, or who are already here. Although he is now the acting director of the AID, Kemo Ademovic is enjoying a great deal of trust from influential political circles, as well as the respect of his colleagues from the police section. One hopes that he will not fall right at the beginning into the trap of dealing exclusively with internal personnel problems as well as internal parrying.

Moreover, the example of Munir Alibabic—Munja, the former head of the CSB [Centar Sluzbe Bezbednosti—Security Service Center] of Sarajevo, and his conflict with Bakir Alispahic—is enough of a lesson and warning to all, because "hurt" people are in principle very stubborn in proving the correctness of their actions. And they want satisfaction. In this way they drain a part of a system that works well on marginal things, instead of directing all the energy into the strengthening and efficiency of the security system against outside strikes.

In the end, the fact that 10 foreign intelligence agencies are currently operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina only reinforces the urgent demands for the formation of a extremely professional security service in this country. The extent to which the political West is paying attention is a story in itself, but others are also analyzing the changes that are being made.

However, personnel merry-go-rounds have always existed and always will. It is important that with them one does not damage the stability of such a sensitive system as AID, and that the new personnel changes have a positive effect.

B-H: Jostling Among Military, State Security Leaders Viewed

AU2005112896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by Sefko Hodzic: "Secret Games With Secret Services"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A series of pointedly critical sensationalist articles that have appeared in relation with the changes announced in the military and already carried out in the state security (AID), are a sign that something big is going on either in these secret services or—around them.

The first critiques have been directed at military security and its head, General Jusuf Jasarevic, who is reproached for alleged "cooperation with criminals" and nepotism, and the critiques aimed at the leading people in the state security (AID) soon followed.

"Launching" of a General

As in LJILJAN's critique of the "anemic" Gen. Jasarevic, Gen. Fikret Muslimovic was "offered" as an alternative—the article said that "the Chetnik command was more afraid of him than of all other officers put together"—it would be logical to conclude that it is precisely Fikret Muslimovic who is behind that attack. But, when we talk about secret services, nothing is certain. As it is, in this way Fikret Muslimovic has once again come into the focus of attention after last year's move into the shade as Presidency counselor.

LJILJAN's "launching" of Gen. Muslimovic is based upon several pieces of information attempting to prove his advantages over Jasarevic. For example, Muslimovic is said to "have written and prepared more than a half of all documents signed by Delic" (supposedly, one of those documents is also the "famous" letter against Silajdzic, when he offered his resignation for the first time in August 1995), then that "the people around Delic are afraid of the capable Muslimovic"—which was the reason why they have "removed him from the commander"—and, finally, that his assassination had been prepared. Such a recommendation was intended to raise his position in the military hierarchy and possibly bring about his return as head of the military security. However, the Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has (at least temporarily) stopped Muslimovic's return and rise with his reaction to the article in LJILJAN.

Do those attacks on AID, as well as on the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], have the same background? In

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this recently founded organization, the new director of AID, Kemo Ademovic, is also subject to attacks because of his inexperience, "removal of Alispahic's closest associates," and alleged "giving employment to some people of former minister Alija Delimustafic." The changes really are great, but also the question whether those changes are motivated by the reasons published (again!) by LJILJAN in one of its texts. Although these changes have been ascribed to the director of AID, Ademovic, it is not at all likely that they could occur without the consent of the highest state leadership, since this organization is under the direct control of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Are these changes the result of the new circumstances in the country after the Dayton agreement? Without a doubt, but also the result of the suggestions and pressures of the mighty friends from behind the scenes, primarily the United States. Bakir Alispahic has been removed from the head of AID under pressure from the United States. Since his closest associates, Nedzad Ugljen, Enver Mujezinovic (former KOS [Yugoslav Army Counterintelligence Service] officer), and Irfan Ljevakovic have also been removed from their earlier positions, it is not hard to understand that they are a part of the same package.

What Is Going On in AID?

Ademovic's "inexperience," mentioned as one of his main shortcomings, deserves special attention. The appointment of this famous commander of our liberation struggle to the head of AID, tells us directly what kind of secret service we could have in the future. That is, what kind of secret service our state leadership wants to have, probably given suggestions by the powerful friends from behind the scenes. As a rule, "secret policemen" are loyal to the state leadership. But, since they are best informed, and since the crucial decisions are made often based upon their information, their role in the defense of the country and its leading people is immense. However, since they are human, the possibility of abuse of this information and misinformation is also immense.

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The largest number of our security officers belonged (and still belong) to the prewar school, called by some people "the KOS school of spectacle." Its essence is in the fact that attention is not aimed at the problem, but at the people—keeping an eye on them, eavesdropping on them, making them suspects, blaming them, and eliminating them. They leave, and often even cause some case to grow so much so that it can be solved only in a spectacular action in which, beside the real culprits, often the innocent get hurt. A typical case in this war was the showdown with Cela and Caco [as published].

Even some of our present expert security officers, in the prewar period, were experts in fabrication and the prosecution of the "unsuitable" in the name of the one and only party. But, this war has changed many things, as well as this relation, so that in many cases former prosecutors and the prosecuted have found themselves on the same side. Some of those prosecutors have found their level, some of them have not.

Kemo Ademovic, really, does not have such experience and that is his—advantage! But, he has got the other kind of experience—the experience of a warrior! He has, most probably, been assigned to the task of creating a modern secret service that will adjust itself to a democratic, multiparty system, that will not invent enemies, but will find them and fight them. And Ademovic has got great experience in that.

Regarding the accusations that Alija Delimustafic's people are coming to AID, as well as to MUP, there is only one true and incontestable fact: Businessman Delimustafic has been given first-rate advertising free of charge once again.

B-H: SDP Chairman Discusses Party Issues, Coming Elections

AU2005195196 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 11-12 May 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Nijaz Durakovic, SDP leader and member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Faruk Cardzic; place and date not given: "I Will Not Participate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nijaz Durakovic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leader of the Social Democratic Party [SDP], and—as many people would say—the uncrowned king of the Bosnian opposition, has not appeared much in the media lately.

[Durakovic] I deliberately chose to do so, as I mostly work in the field, where I am trying to consolidate the organization of the SDP on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to find my place in the existing controversial political situation.

[Cardzic] Still, is it not considered very important to take part in the media race?

[Durakovic] I do not think that daily appearances in those state-controlled media, or even insisting on that, can lead to anything, and I believe I am not suffering any political loss. Unfortunately, certain people appear in the media every day, and they even pester the public,

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and I think that is counterproductive. I will appear in the media, I hope, when I consider it politically profitable.

The Most Harmful Blows

[Cardzic] From your answers could we infer that speculations on your alleged withdrawal from the post of chairman of the SDP are incorrect?

[Durakovic] It is good to speculate a little, but I will nevertheless remain chairman of the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Cardzic] What is the present situation in your party?

[Durakovic] We recently held an internal party conference in Tuzla, and about 120 of our leaders came from the region between Bihac and Teocak and between Maglaj and Blagaj. On that occasion, I believe, we achieved full political unity, and all those who are counting on any divisions within the SDP are wrong.

[Cardzic] Does that mean that the SDP is ready for the elections?

[Durakovic] The present situation is extremely difficult for the SDP. Our party is completely devastated in the financial sense, blocked in the media, obstructed in politics, and we are due to suffer the most harmful blows from the parties in power, because I think they consider us their most serious political rival.

[Cardzic] Are the allegations that your party does not have young Social Democrats correct?

[Durakovic] Those allegations reveal a lack of information, as we have organized the Forum of the Young [FOM] almost everywhere. On the contrary, I think that the young are the greatest force in the SDP—of course, besides those old nostalgic people and revolutionaries, for whom the SDP is the only choice.

[Cardzic] The political program of the SDP is mostly well-known. How would it be realized in the event your party has good election results?

[Durakovic] Yes, that is the issue of discrepancy between the wishes expressed by the program and the real possibilities. However, what makes me commit myself to politics is the fact that there are more and more young people with us, beginning with soldiers who have carried the greatest burden of the war.

[Cardzic] So, do you expect to have many votes from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the upcoming elections?

[Durakovic] Of course, the generals are members of the parties in power, but try to take a poll among the soldiers and see.

Where Are the Communists?

[Cardzic] The poll results were not relevant for the first free, multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Durakovic] It is possible that we could have won those elections, too, if it has not been for the great swindle. We still have 1,300 protests in our archives, from telegrams to video tapes. The dead voted in those elections, and the living were deleted from the lists. We know, it is not a secret anymore, that at least 300,000 votes were taken from me. This is not a lamentation, and I am not sorry, because it was a time of changes, and I think that the so-called communists of that time left power in an honorable and democratic way. The people became a little unrestrained afterward; they wanted more than they had, and we all know what they got. I am not sorry it happened that way.

[Cardzic] Do you mean that the war might not have happened if the election results in 1990 had been different?

[Durakovic] I am sorry about the bloodshed that occurred. What I am trying to say is that nobody is responsible for the bloodshed but the Greater Serbian plan, which was made a long time ago and included Bosnia-Herzegovina into the territory of Greater Serbia. The preparations for the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina were long and careful. That is a little clearer—much clearer, in fact—to me now, when I read books written by my former "comrades." Accordingly, the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina would follow, regardless of the election results in 1990.

[Cardzic] Do you think it is time the communists came back to power?

[Durakovic] First, we are not communists, we are modern Social Democrats. I often make a joke and say that communists are in the parties in power. Those reds, as they are scornfully called, are now mostly in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], and we are happy that we got rid of them.

[Cardzic] Will the SDP enter the elections in Mostar?

[Durakovic] The elections in Mostar, under the present terms, would be a great farce and a great deception for all citizens of Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As those are the first elections announced, they would be a kind of experiment for the elections in the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the elections in September are going to be like the ones expected in Mostar, my opinion is that the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina has been sold and swindled.

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[Cardzic] You have not explained whether you would enter the elections.

[Durakovic] The SDP will not participate under the present terms. There are at least 15 reasons for the postponement of those elections, and the EU, as the protector of Mostar, should provide at least the basic conditions for the elections.

[Cardzic] Do you think that the situation in Mostar has improved enough for free elections at all?

[Durakovic] There are big, shady affairs going on in Mostar, and even the SGV [Serbian Civic Council] is divided in that town. There is a man on the right bank who represents the concept of Greater Croatia, although he is Serbian and leads a part of the SGV. There is Mirko Pejanovic's relative on the left bank, who is the leader of the pro-Bosnian oriented faction. Every party now wants to have those Serbian votes that perhaps can determine the result of the elections in Mostar.

Coalitions Are Welcome

[Cardzic] Will the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina try to use the name and work of Bogic Bogicevic, or rather the role he played in the crisis of former Yugoslavia, to their advantage in the elections in September?

[Durakovic] I do not think so. He played an important part, but the platitude "name and work" reminds me of Josip Broz, and one Broz is enough. Bogicevic is important, but not as much as Broz.

[Cardzic] The representatives of the UBSD [Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats] claim to be negotiating with your party about a possible coalition in the upcoming elections. Is there going to be a coalition?

[Durakovic] There will be coalitions, I think, and they are welcome. I think it is too early to say what those will be like and under which terms they will be made. Finally, it is a kind of party secret. It is too early to reveal everything.

[Cardzic] Still, which parties' programs are compatible with the SDP program?

[Durakovic] There are seven or eight of those.

[Cardzic] The SDP representatives in the Republic or Federal Assembly once supported former Prime Minister Silajdzic. What do you think of Haris Silajdzic's present role in the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Durakovic] To be impartial, Silajdzic surely has charisma and a good reputation among people, especially in certain strata. He should not be neglected in the political sense. Let us leave everything else for the election race.

[Cardzic] Has the Dayton agreement imposed a high electoral threshold?

[Durakovic] The real purpose of that is to make outsiders of the democratic forces, however minor they might be. As to us, however, I believe we will cross the threshold, and let us say we would be satisfied to be the inevitable constructive opposition.

I Do Not Accuse Anybody

[Cardzic] What do you think about the Dayton agreement, now that a certain period of time has passed?

[Durakovic] It is difficult to talk about that like this, ad hoc. I was the first—and probably the only—signatory of that document who was not enthusiastic. I was critical and reserved; however, I do not accuse anybody. I think that Dayton is the crown of mistakes and cheap compromises our negotiators have made. They could not have achieved more in Dayton. That agreement was obviously authorized and dictated by the powerful people who rule Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Cardzic] Which powerful people are you referring to?

[Durakovic] Unfortunately, we have to be aware that Bosnia-Herzegovina is not only a protectorate, but also a certain kind of occupied zone, and we do not make many decisions here. It is well-known who makes decisions and how, and our precious politicians should not have too many illusions about making decisions. Mistakes were made long before Dayton, and those are, unfortunately, incorrigible. What's done is done. Now we have to see what to do next.

[Cardzic] And what to do next?

[Durakovic] At this moment, I think, we have to fight for the Federation to come to life. There is no other way, because I consider the Federation the only way to reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina, although it might take a long time. I think that we now have to fight for Brcko, which is an open question, and which could even be lost in the international arbitration because of our stupid politics. If that happens, I see no future for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The guarantee for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to have a passage to the Sava River, but also to the sea. I see the present Bosnia-Herzegovina as an organism whose veins and arteries are occupied by someone else.

[Cardzic] Let us suppose you get the greatest number of votes in the next presidential elections. How would you feel as a member of the collective head of the state, accompanied by, for instance, Momcilo Krajisnik, or Velibor Ostojic?

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[Durakovic] First, I am not going to be on that electoral slate, that is, I will not participate in the upcoming elections. Let other people try their luck. I will wish good luck to Izetbegovic, for instance, so he can finish his work. He deserves the most credit for all good things, but he is also the person most responsible for the bad things, and I will repeat, let him finish his work. I root for Izetbegovic in these presidential elections.

[Cardzic] Does that mean that the SDP will not have its candidate for the Presidency?

[Durakovic] They most probably will not.

[Box, p 4]

The Presidency Must Be Preserved

[Cardzic] Are you satisfied with your political influence as a member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Durakovic] The Presidency has not been working according to the Constitution for a long time. It is a place where decisions made by other people are acclaimed. Obviously, the Presidency is strongly influenced by the president, or vice president, if he can be politically instrumentalized. That is the real situation. The question is why we, the rest of the members, agreed to have such a role, such a passive position? It was a state of war, and every kind of radical protest against that position could have been interpreted as a breaking of the liberation front, or in a similar way. You know that the Presidency, among other things, functioned as the supreme command, at least formally.

The situation is peaceful now, but all important decisions are still being made without the Presidency. For instance, Ivo Komsic announced his resignation recently and he sent in his written resignation. We still have not discussed that. The rest of us are contemplating doing the same, but we are afraid of being told "where were you when things were tough, why didn't you do it earlier, etc." Perhaps the Presidency should be preserved as the last symbol of the statehood of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the last bastion of what the Republic used to be. I think it would not be good for us to destroy it now, in the end, and provoke political disunion, although we had plenty of better chances and excuses for doing so.

[Box, p 5]

Tudman and Susak Are Leaving the Scene!

[Cardzic] Do you think that solving the political crisis in Croatia's capital might influence Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Durakovic] Certainly. We have to—let me make a joke—survive this year and live to see, primarily, the presidential elections in Croatia next year. I believe that democratic forces will win in Croatia, and that Tudjman's and Gojko Susak's politics will finally exit the scene—and the two of them are the main hindrance to the establishment of the Federation in general. That is my deep political conviction.

[Box, p 5]

Deception in Mostar

To have elections in Mostar under the terms offered would be a farce and a manifold deception.

"The first deception is the option that all the people who are presently in Mostar can vote. The second is that the present population can vote, including those who came to Mostar as refugees. The third deception is the possibility for the people who are in Mostar to vote, plus the voters who would be brought to Mostar by buses and planes from the whole world," Durakovic said, and added:

"The only thing fair would be for all inhabitants of Mostar, who are on the list made in 1991, to vote, wherever they may be on this beautiful planet."

[Cardzic] Presently, there are exactly 4,500 people from Mostar in Norway. They could cast their votes there in an hour. It is a well-organized state of law where all refugees are in computers, and they receive social help on that basis. It would not be a problem at all for the Norwegian Government to organize elections for the inhabitants of Mostar who live there. It also goes for Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, etc., and the people from Mostar should decide that. To vote under the motto "Mostar to its people" is a farce, a swindle, whatever you want to call it, in a time when less than 15 percent of the population from 1992 lives in Mostar.

[Box, p 5]

Election Boycott

"How can the alleged free, democratic elections be organized in Mostar, when the present authorities on both sides of the river were elected in a completely illegitimate way and contrary to the election results from the year 1990," Durakovic wondered, and added:

"How can people vote when they still are not allowed to move around freely, when the basic security of citizens has not been provided for, and not a single party—except the two parties in power—has possibilities to freely organize political activities, which stops them from presenting their political programs?"

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As Nijaz Durakovic said, there is actually no opposition in Mostar at the moment, although the opposition won the elections in the town in 1990.

"The opposition is nowhere to be seen. Not the SDP, not the UBSD. So, to accept the imposed elections is to accept the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in three parts, not in two anymore," Durakovic said and pointed out:

"If that happens, we—within the coalition bloc—will definitely boycott the elections."

B-H: Izetbegovic Describes Arrest in May 1992

LD0305141396 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne I Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 May 96

[Telephone interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic by moderator Senad Hadzifejzovic on the "Face to Face" program, during which various individuals comment on their roles in the events surrounding the arrest of Izetbegovic on 2 May 1992; Izetbegovic's voice is broadcast over a still portrait—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hadzifejzovic] Mr. President, you heard the introduction to the program, and on the basis of it I would ask only one question: was 2 May, in your opinion, an attempted coup d'etat and who was directing it?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I believe it is obvious and it was directed, of course, by the Belgrade regime and the Yugoslav National Army.

[Hadzifejzovic] Some names from Bosnia-Herzegovina have been mentioned in this connection. Do you agree with that?

[Izetbegovic] I do not know whom you mean.

[Hadzifejzovic] Mr. Halilovic [former Bosnian army commander] mentioned Fikret Abdic [member of the presidency at the time] and Alija Delimustafic [Interior Ministry official].

[Izetbegovic] I do not know what role Alija Delimustafic had, but Fikret Abdic's role was very clear and obvious. I believe that his presence in the [Sarajevo] Television building and his readiness to give a statement...[pauses] He probably expected the situation to develop in a different way. Everything was most probably staged.

To be honest, I do not know for certain what Alija Delimustafic's role was, although there are some indications that he and Abdic were in collusion. Generally speaking, they were political friends and associates, and we cannot exclude the possibility that they cooperated in this respect too, but, to be honest, I do not know if in this case they were closely connected.

[Hadzifejzovic] Mr. President, probably no one has asked you this yet, at least not publicly: If, on 2 May 1992, you had not made the statesman-like and courageous decision to land in your capital, would the events of the day have been different?

[Izetbegovic] It is difficult to say. In my personal case, everything would have certainly been different. I believe that it would have influenced considerably the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina because...[pauses] I do not know whether the circumstances are widely known. We were above the Adriatic Sea when we were told that we could not land and they told us that we should decide whether to land in Zagreb or Belgrade.

We said...[pauses] I consulted with [government member Zlatko] Lagumdzija and we decided to go to Zagreb. But after a few minutes, the woman copiloting the plane returned and said that we could land on our own responsibility. We decided to land and things then took the course they did.

As for me personally, things would obviously have been completely different, because I would not have been able to return to Sarajevo for the next month or two, even three. I cannot say how much this would have influenced the course of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think it would have been of considerable importance, but I do not know if I am right.

[Hadzifejzovic] While you were in the plane, you probably did not have any information about members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlling the headquarters of General Kukanjac [Yugoslav People's Army commander of 2d Military District]. Did you know this that evening in Lukavica [military base in Sarajevo] when we were in direct contact by television?

[Izetbegovic] I did not know before 3 May, just before...[pauses] that is, no, I did not. On 2 May, on that day, I did not know, because I was taken prisoner that day; nor did I know throughout the night, but the next day, by about midday, I gradually realized from telephone conversations, which were sometimes carelessly conducted in front of me. So, on 3 May at midday, I realized that Kukanjac was in fact surrounded and isolated.

[Hadzifejzovic] As far as I can see, on 2 May only journalists and yourself did not know, did not have real information. The members of the presidency and the Army had that information.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I was on the other side of the world. [laughs]

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[Hadzifejzovic] Perhaps that was for the best that evening, because we would probably have been calculating how to rapidly save the situation, and it was probably better this way.

[Izetbegovic] Probably.

[Hadzifejzovic] Mr. President, this evening you have heard, and for the past four years it has been said, that 2 May was an historic day for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the day of the defense of Sarajevo and the day which marked the beginning of the downfall of the idea of a Greater Serbia. Do you agree with these important assessments of that day?

[Izetbegovic] I believe that all citizens of Sarajevo think, and all those who witnessed the events, and, in particular, those directly involved, definitely know that events that day could have taken a completely different course if there had not been brave people in Sarajevo—and this is an opportunity to remember them and express our gratitude to them, many of whom are, of course, no longer alive today, for what they did for this city and Bosnia-Herzegovina on that very day—if there had not been a group of decisive and brave people; fortunately, there were many more of them than we anticipated and they put up resistance on many fronts. If that had not been the case, events could have taken a completely different course. This was not the first time in history that the resolution of a small group of people has altered the course of history. For Bosnia-Herzegovina it was certainly a turning point, in a positive direction.

[Hadzifejzovic] Do any of them, in your view, deserve to be particularly singled out? I mean any of those people in the group—organizations or individuals?

[Izetbegovic] I agree here that the Patriotic League played an important part, together with the territorial defense, of course. That is an historical fact which cannot be denied. It would not be a good thing to mention any individual here, because there were, thankfully, very many of them.

[Hadzifejzovic] Mr. President, we value your time and know that you are rather tired, that you have had a number of activities scheduled for today. Do you have any questions for any of our guests [in the studio]?

[Izetbegovic] No, other than greetings to all of them and many thanks. All of them played an important role. Naturally, they had different roles, but each of them played a positive and important role in the defense of the city that day.

I would just like to say something which I feel bound to say. Nobody ever mentions Nurudin Imamovic, my bodyguard, but he was with us. It is always reported that Zlatko Lagumdzija, my daughter, and I were there, but someone who showed a high degree of bravery and presence of mind was Nurudin, known as Dince. I am bound to stress his presence and his readiness, when they would not let us go, when not all of them agreed to let us go, even those who [words indistinct] agreed that someone must remain—first, some colonel said my daughter should remain, but, of course, I refused and said I would not go, but they had to release us—I did not know exactly what the situation was with Kukanjac and how they were constrained in that respect. Then they said that Lagumdzija should stay on the grounds, that they needed someone who knew English, because they were negotiating something and did not have an interpreter. Of course, that was rejected as well, and then Dince offered to stay. I am bound to stress that, to make that known, for his sake and for his children.

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Croatia: Hadzic, UNTAES's Klein Discuss Amnesty, Oil Fields

AU2005154996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Goran Hadzic, president of the Srem-Baranja Region, had talks in Erdut with Jacques Klein, UN administrator for the region. Here is a report by Bogdan Rkman:

[Rkman] In the statement he made after the talks, Goran Hadzic emphasized that they discussed the situation of the Djiletovci oil fields, payment of pensions, and the Croatian law on amnesty.

According to Hadzic, one has to have the oil fields function as soon as possible and, according to the agreement reached today, payment of pensions should begin in two weeks. The Serb region president did not say anything more concrete about either of the two problems.

Asked to comment on the Croatian law on amnesty for the Serbs on the territory of the region, Administrator Klein, with the reservation that he has still not received the translation of the text, stressed that he hopes the law meets his demands.

Emphasizing his own merit in such a document being adopted by the Croatian Government, Klein pointed out that the amnesty law creates prerequisites for the population to remain on the territory. We may demilitarize military hardware, but a psychological demilitarization is most important, Administrator Klein said and stressed the (?great) role the amnesty law is playing in the latter.

Croatia: Susak To Sign Military Agreement in Hungary

LD1705150796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Gojko Susak and his colleagues are visiting Budapest where an agreement is to be signed on military cooperation between Croatia and Hungary. The document is to be signed by ministers Susak and [Hungarian counterpart] Keleti. Ivo Kujundjic reports:

[Kujundjic] The one-day official visit to Hungary by the Croatian Defense Ministry delegation led by Minister Gojko Susak is very full. On arrival at the Hungarian Defense Ministry the guests from Zagreb were met with full military honors. Afterwards talks began between Gojko Susak and his Hungarian counterpart Gyorgy Keleti on the subject of military cooperation between the two countries. This afternoon the two ministers will sign an agreement on military cooperation. The Croatian defense minister was received this morning by Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs and this afternoon he will be received in the parliament building by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. Following this morning's talks Gojko Susak said:

[Begin Susak recording] This year we anticipate our entry into the Partnership for Peace program. Hungary has already joined, and the position of the United States is that we should also join together with Hungary and our Western neighbors. I hope that we will be successful in this. One of the preconditions for this is to have military agreements with countries which are already in the Partnership for Peace program. That is what we are doing today. We will do this with Hungary, Slovakia, and other countries. [end recording]

Today's visit by Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak is attracting great public interest in Hungary. This is indicated by the number of accredited journalists who will be taking part in the press conference to be held during the afternoon in the Hungarian Defense Ministry.

Croatia: City Assembly Chairman Interviewed on Zagreb Crisis

AU1805181896 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 May 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Zdravko Tomac, chairman of the City Assembly of Zagreb, by Nino Djula; place and date not given: "The President's Speech in Okucani Prompted Me To Bring Legal Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Djula] When the Government dismissed the Assembly, you stated that there would be no point in bringing a constitutional action, but you brought it the next day. What made you change your mind?

[Tomac] At first, the chairmen of parties thought that the constitutional action should not be brought, but I decided—after thinking it over and being advised by people more versed in those matters—to do it. I was told that the government's decision so violated the Constitution and was so illegal that the Constitutional Court could by no means reject my action.

[Djula] Who told you so?

[Tomac] We, the SDP [Social Democratic Party], set out to write the action on very short notice. Mato Arlovic worked day and night until he wrote it, and when I saw it, I sent faxes to all the parties' chairmen asking for their consent.

[Djula] They all supported you?

[Tomac] Yes, they did. I believe that it is good that we decided so. The Constitutional Court itself was not

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unanimous about our action, and it was accepted with six votes for and four against. I must say that some members of the Coalition had more doubts about the result of the claim than I did; I had hopes...

[Djula] But did you not state—a day before the action was brought—that your personal opinion was that it would be in vain to take such actions?!

[Tomac] Yes, I did. I said so, because such was the prevalent attitude in the coalition at the time. Perhaps the president prompted me to bring the constitutional action with his speech in Okucani, when he said that the coalition had evaded the Constitutional Court and disobeyed the Croatian legal system. I will repeat: I think it was a good thing to do. Personally, I feel a moral satisfaction, although the problem has not really been solved.

Constitutional Court Between Government and Action

[Djula] Do you mean that the decision of the Constitutional Court did not come as a surprise to you?

[Tomac] Yes. I expected such a decision. I wrote that it would be difficult for the Constitutional Court to annul the government's decision, equally as difficult as to reject our action. The point is that the government's decision to dismiss the Assembly was so violative of the Constitution that experts could not ignore that.

[Djula] In your reaction to the government's decision to dismiss the Assembly, you stressed that the appointment of the commissioner who replaced two assemblies was unconstitutional, not the fact that the government had not properly explained the dismissal. After your action, the Constitutional Court took the latter into consideration—and you hardly talked about it in your public stands. Is that a wrong political presumption?

[Tomac] No. We mentioned all those reasons in the constitutional action...

[Djula] Yes, but not in the public positions before the action.

[Tomac] The government can dismiss the Assembly, but it cannot appoint the Assembly instead of the voters. The government could appoint the commissioner but not give him the competence that the government itself does not have. The government does not have the legal capacity to elect a representative body, but it nevertheless appointed one person instead of two assemblies.

Primarily a Political Problem

[Djula] Contrary to your interpretation, the Law on Local Government and Self-Government is unambiguous about the right of the government to appoint a commissioner until new elections, if the Assembly is dismissed.

[Tomac] That commissioner must replace the mayor and the municipal authorities, too, not only the Assembly. The government proclaimed a state of emergency with that decision, and they simultaneously wanted one person—Brolich, in this case—to replace the assemblies, legally and legitimately. That is impossible.

[Djula] However, the Constitutional Court did not question the government's decision to appoint a commissioner. What is questionable is the unexplained decision to dismiss the Assembly. Should we expect the Constitutional Court to accept a possible new dismissal if there are better arguments for it?

[Tomac] That is also possible, as the problem of Zagreb is more a political than a constitutional or legal problem. I think that the Constitutional Court has deliberately chosen the soft option: to annul the decisions of the government and give on formal and procedural reasons for that. Anyway, the fact that six judges of the Constitutional Court made such a decision is encouraging in itself.

[Djula] Do you mean that your trust in the institution of the Constitutional Court has increased during the last two weeks?

[Tomac] Absolutely. We must even apologize to the Constitutional Court for saying things that we perhaps should not have said about that institution, things we said because we were disappointed by the previous actions of the Constitutional Court.

Mayor Expected To Resign

[Djula] The work of the Assembly has never been the problem of Zagreb, the impossibility of forming the executive authority has been. The Constitutional Court has not solved that problem.

[Tomac] Exactly. We have asked the government to evaluate the lawfulness of the work of the appointed mayor of Zagreb, Marina Matulovic-Dropulic, in whom the Assembly has voted distrust.

[Djula] Do you intend to amend the procedural mistakes made in the making of the budget, when you did not allow the appointed mayor to corroborate the budget, in one of the future sessions of the Assembly?

[Tomac] We have not discussed that yet, but I must say that we will keep up our work in accordance with the Constitution and the regulations, in order not to give the government an excuse to dismiss the Assembly again. I would like to add that I have written a letter to the government insisting on an

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answer to our request for the protection of lawfulness in the case of Mrs. Dropulic's term of office. The functioning of the executive authority in Zagreb violates the Constitution and the regulations. Therefore, I have asked the government to protect legality by dismissing Mrs. Dropulic and suggesting that the president appoint a new mayor. At the moment, Zagreb does not have a mayor at all.

[Djula] The coalition further proves the illegality of Marina Matulovic-Dropulic's term of office by the fact that the period of time in which she should have either resigned or suggested a new municipal authority has passed.

[Tomac] As she has not resigned, she should have suggested a new municipal authority within 15 days. It has been two months, and we still do not have the municipal authority—the one nominated in 1993 is still in function.

A Compromise—Comayor's Post

[Djula] What other legal solution does the Association have if the government does not respond to your request or rejects it? Will you seek protection of the Constitutional Court again?

[Tomac] I think that the Constitutional Court should react on their own, as it is its duty to protect the Constitution and the situation at stake violates the Constitution. We will do our best for this crisis to be resolved in a legal and legitimate way. However, I am not sure that we are going to make it, as the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is going to look for an excuse to dismiss us again.

[Djula] Do you expect the Assembly to work in the present form and under your chairmanship until the results of the advisory referendum are known, or will the HDZ government look for excuses to dismiss the Assembly before June?

[Tomac] I do not know as it is not us who make decisions. As the chairman of the Assembly, I will make efforts for the Assembly to function well, according to the Constitution and the regulations. I will also try and insist on the executive authorities in Zagreb to be improved according to the Constitution and regulations. As we said after the Assembly was dismissed, the Coalition will surely function until the new elections. Simultaneously, I am ready for talks and arrangements with the HDZ, but only as the coalition, not individually. The maximum compromise would be to let the HDZ have the mayoral post. Our system and regulations give the mayor all the power. According to that, you cannot be a mayor without the majority in the Assembly.

[Djula] As new elections are the most probable outcome of the political crisis that has lasted for six months, what are the coalition's chances in the new elections, when we consider the fact that the HDZ has started huge preelectoral activities and modified many regulations to suit its balance of forces in the Assembly?

[Tomac] Nothing can stop the coalition from winning—except its disintegration, of course.

The Spectacle

[Djula] Is it possible that the HDZ, as they once did in the parliament, could "reserve" a dozen seats in the Assembly for the respectable citizens whose mandates would not depend on the will of the voters, but on some other criteria?

[Tomac] When I was elected chairman of the Assembly, had someone told me that I would be elected and dismissed and reelected several times in the following few months, I would have said that such a spectacle is not possible in a democratic state. As the spectacle nevertheless happened, the HDZ action that you have mentioned is also possible. Why should we not expect that, as I have already been accused of being a Hitler, a fascist, and a communist? In that sense, just as in the James Bond movie, never say never.

[Djula] Is the opposition preparing—I am asking you as the party leader, not as the chairman of the Zagreb Assembly—for the less polite forms of the political fight?

[Tomac] We are going to use all legitimate forms of political battle, but we will not go over the limit for the time being—such is the position of the SDP. We do not favor the noninstitutional forms of political battle. As you can see, the constitutional action was also initiated and supported by the SDP members. There would never have been an action if it have not been written by Mato Arlovic. That is evidence that the SDP has their own way, which is also disputed, but obviously efficient.

Satanization of the SDP

[Djula] Are the results of research—the increasing number of SDP sympathizers among the voters and the decreasing popularity of the HDZ—true?

[Tomac] I have not seen those numbers, but I have heard about it from different sources, including HDZ sources.

[Djula] Do you, as a scholar, think it is possible that the popularity of the HDZ should decrease by more than 15 percent in such a short time and under such circumstances?

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[Tomac] It is possible, when we consider all the things the HDZ has done to harm itself in the last six months.

[Djula] Why did the SDP gain the votes that previously went to the HDZ? Why were those not distributed among the other parties in the coalition?

[Tomac] We should probably thank the HDZ members for that because they proclaimed the SDP the main enemy. They always demonized both myself and the SDP...

The Power of the Coalition

[Djula] Mr. Goran Granic of the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] has not been criticized less than you have, but his party has not seen such a sensational rise in popularity.

[Tomac] They stopped attacking him three months ago, when the new mayor was elected. The main strategy of the HDZ is to destroy the possibility of the three main opposition parties to join together—the HSLS, the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], and the SDP. They are trying to denounce the SDP as neosocialists, neocommunists, and a dathreat nger to Croatia, inviting the "sound forces" in other parties to support them, not the SDP. They are trying to stage a political fight for power between the HDZ and the SDP in Croatia. That strategy is very dangerous for us in one aspect, but it also does very much for the popularity of the SDP.

[Djula] Does the SDP have a future in Zagreb without the coalition?

[Tomac] Absolutely. The SDP would endanger its future only by breaking the coalition. The party that leaves the coalition first has no future in Zagreb. Still, I believe that the information about the enormous growth in the popularity of the SDP might have been launched by the HDZ, in order to stimulate those factions in the HSLS and the HSS that would not be willing to maintain the cooperation with our party. We are ready to be independent, should the other parties shut us out.

[Djula] Do you mean, theoretically, that you would have no prejudice about cooperation with the HDZ if you were rejected by other parties?

[Tomac] We do not have any prejudice at the moment. However, cooperation is very different from being a satellite forced to obey certain dictations.

[Box, p 4]

Factions in the Ruling Party

[Djula] They say that the amendment by your party colleague Mato Arlovic—that wants to solve the misunderstandings about the tax in the case of NOVI LIST and other publishers—will be adopted by the parliament, as it is supported by the radical left wing of the HDZ. How did that joining together come to be?

[Tomac] I do not know much about that, but a joining of interests sometimes emerges, and you do not really know how. I know, for instance, that one faction in the HDZ sees the HSS as an ideal coalition partner, while another faction would prefer the HSLS. One faction would prefer the coalition with the SDP. As the HDZ is more a movement that a party, having various political inclinations, it is clear that there must be confrontations about the strategy and tactics within that party. There are people in the right wing of the HDZ who sometimes emotionally side with the opposition because of their moral principles.

[Djula] Whom are you talking about?

[Tomac] I would not like to name those people. Some of them have often individually supported the opposition. You saw that in the City Assembly seven representatives would not vote against Drazen Budisa, so they left the hall when the voting began.

[Box, p 5]

The Constitutional Court Shocked the State Leadership

[Tomac] I think that the decision of the Constitutional Court is completely autonomous; it is pure coincidence that the NOVI LIST and PANORAMA cases happened at the same time. I believe that the state leadership and the HDZ leadership did not expect such a decision. I have some evidence of that, but I would not like to talk about them...

[Djula] Why not?

[Tomac] They were very surprised and shocked. I know they called an urgent session of the VONS [Council of Defense and National Security] and a session of legal experts in the Presidential Palace. I know that the summonses for that session were sent on Friday at 1230, three and a half hours before the decision of the Constitutional Court was officially known. When we consider their reaction, they clearly had not expected such a decision.

Croatia: President Tudjman Appoints New Navy Commander

LD1705153096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Retiring Headquarters Admiral [Croatian: stozerni admiral] Sveto Letica today

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handed over the duties of the commander of the Croatian Navy to Vice Admiral Vid Stipetic, who will take up the duties on 1 June this year in line with a decision of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. As part of the handover ceremony, they visited the command of the Navy's southern Adriatic sector [in Ploce]. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Journalists Face Libel Charges Against President

LD1705140196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 17 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 17 May (TANJUG)—Viktor Ivancic, editor in chief of the independent weekly FERAL TRIBUNE, and journalist Marinko Culic have been summoned to court in Zagreb on 14 June. They face trial on charges of "insulting and publishing a libel" against Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

The charges against the two journalists were brought by the municipal public prosecution in Zagreb with the Croatian president's written consent.

These are the first criminal proceedings against journalists based on the recently ratified changes to the Croatian criminal law, which introduced penalties for journalists for "insulting or publishing libel" against senior Croatian officials. [passage omitted]

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FYROM: Gligorov Views Relations With Neighbors

BR2005133196 Madrid ABC in Spanish 17 May 96 p 34

[Interview with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov by Ramiro Villapadierna in Skopje; date not given: "Gligorov: I Think Every Neighboring Country Wants Me Dead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *This venerable old man has come back from the verge of death. A few months ago, 20 kilograms of high-explosive ripped apart his blinded Mercedes, peppering his brain with shrapnel. The president of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] lost an eye and part of his head, but his brain remained intact and his mind sound. A graduate of the League of Communists, today he is the most loved man in Macedonia because, for the time being at least, he has saved it from war.*

Kiro Gligorov signed up for the so-called war of liberation when he was a student. In 1944, he entered the League of Communists and took part in the Antifascist Assembly created by Yugoslavia. For years, he was the secretary of state for finance, speaker of the Federal Assembly who oversaw the 1974 decentralization, and finally became president of Macedonia the year war broke out. As such, he witnessed at first hand the events that broke up his country. At 78, he has seen everything, and has even glimpsed death.

Interminable hours of brain surgery cleaned his neurons of shrapnel as his small country grew more volatile than ever. It seems that God wanted him to continue to lead his country as much as the Macedonian people did themselves.

[Villapadierna] So who doesn't like you?

[Gligorov] Given Macedonia's position and that of our neighbors, it is not hard to conclude that any one of them could have been behind the attempt on my life. But without proof, nobody can lay the blame for this kind of attack at the door of any country.

[Villapadierna] Now that the critical stage of the Greek and Serbian embargo is at an end, the government has split and a referendum is being demanded for new elections.

[Gligorov] I do not see it in exactly that way. The opposition made a mistake in not wanting to take part in the last election, and now they must wait until the next one. They are claiming their electorate, and that is the main source of the agitation. With regard to the petition for a referendum, I will today receive an official report on the number of signatures and their authenticity. Despite the irregularities, I think there are enough signatures to obtain a referendum. However, that will be a decision for parliament.

[Villapadierna] Notwithstanding recent friction with Sofia, Macedonia has forged new relations with its two large neighbors, Greece and Serbia.

[Gligorov] Yes, we have regularized relations with everyone, and we are the only Yugoslav republic to have relations with all the others. We have struck a "provisional agreement" with Greece for the recognition of Macedonia as an independent state, we have guaranteed our borders and the door for mutual cooperation remains open, with the agreement that the dispute over the name [Macedonia] must not be allowed to interfere.

[Villapadierna] That is something that has yet to be discussed. What new name is being suggested for Macedonia?

[Gligorov] Neither I nor the government can decide on the name because we are not empowered to sign anything that could threaten the identity of the country and its people. Parliament has a sufficient majority, but I can assure you that there will never be changes with regard to the name of this people.

[Villapadierna] In the normalization of your relations with Serbia did you define your part in the succession of Yugoslavia?

[Gligorov] I would say yes, although as a consequence of their recognition of the state of Macedonia, we recognized the fact that, after World War I, Serbia and Montenegro gave up their own state for the newborn state. However, like the rest of the international community, in no way do we recognize the new Yugoslavia as being the only successor to the old one. All the republics are its equal heirs.

[Villapadierna] Albania is a special neighbor because of the many Albanians in this country. There were angry scenes this week after you accused the promoters of the Albanian University of being separatists.

[Gligorov] That initiative in Tetovo was mostly the work of teachers from Kosovo who lost their jobs when the Serbian police closed their university. That means that Macedonia will have to receive all the students from Kosovo. The most important thing to bear in mind here is the political implications, and with schools that are already half Albanian this will further increase their cultural isolation. With the process of privatization, jobs will be hard to come by. We are currently developing a project, but inside Macedonian universities, to facilitate access to higher education for Albanians.

[Villapadierna] Do you not fear contagion as the situation in Kosovo deteriorates?

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[Gligorov] We are very concerned, and that is one of the reasons we have kept a UN presence in Macedonia. It is hard to plan any kind of development.

[Villapadierna] Have you read the book of the last Serbian representative in the Yugoslav presidency, all about Milosevic's plot?

[Gligorov] Yes. The only question is why he took so long to reveal all of that.

[Villapadierna] But you were there too...

[Gligorov] I was. All of us [federal presidents—ABC editor's note] had already understood that the Serbian leaders had a plan to create a state of all Serbs, with the dissolution of Bosnia and annexing a part of Croatia. Remember that President Izetbegovic and I tried a final, confederal initiative, but Croatia was already seeking its independence while the Serbs could only envisage all the power remaining in their hands. That is how it all ended.

FYROM: Gligorov on Kosovo, Rights of Ethnic Albanians

AU2005153496 Skopje MIC in English 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia--FYROM] Kiro Gligorov stated in the interview for the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS that "Macedonia's international position is now much more defined and stronger than earlier," emphasizing that "possible solutions have been found in the relations with the neighbors—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania." "Cooperation with them is our political priority," Gligorov told EL PAIS, MAKPRESS reports, calling upon the BETA agency.

Asked whether he expects the relationship with Greece to return to normal soon, President Gligorov said he does not know whether it will come to that soon, but believes that the Interim Accord signed between Athens and Skopje opens new possibilities in every respect. "The borders are now open and the cooperation can develop," Gligorov says.

In relation to the cooperation with FR Yugoslavia, the Macedonian President says that the Agreement for mutual recognition is a "chance for the two countries to restore economic ties, as they were before."

He stresses that the economic cooperation in Macedonia is "difficult and complicated," and that the privatization is continuing also with the introduction of market economy, in order to attract foreign capital and to stimulate private investments. In general, Gligorov described the relations with Bulgaria and Albania as good.

President Gligorov also stated for the newspaper EL PAIS that he is very concerned for what is happening in Kosovo, where the balance of power is shifting in favour of the Albanians who believe in taking more radical measures.

"Those currents among the Albanians in Kosovo demand an independent state, as a minimum, or a state under international protectorate," Gligorov says.

"The last time I spoke with Ibrahim Rugova, and that was around twenty days ago, after he returned from his tour of the European capitals and the United States, I gained the impression that he was disappointed by the lack of support for accomplishing his goal—an independent state," Gligorov says.

Gligorov says he asked Rugova why he didn't raise an initiative to open a dialogue with Belgrade, to which Rugova responded that the answer was always the same: "The Albanians should first uphold the Serb Constitution and laws."

Gligorov explains that "from time to time, we have contacts with the leader of the Kosovo Albanians Rugova, and we always try to emphasize that the most important thing is for them to open a dialogue with Belgrade."

In response to the remark of the journalist of EL PAIS that the "Albanians in Macedonia complain that they live in a language, educational, and working ghetto," President Gligorov said that "they have a guaranteed elementary and secondary education, and we are trying to find a solution that would ease their tertiary education."

"The main problem," Gligorov adds, "is the low level of their elementary and secondary education," due to which they feel that they don't have the same possibilities to enter the university.

In the interview for the Spanish newspaper, the Macedonian President dismisses the possibility of early presidential elections in Macedonia, adding that "the presidential function is a bridge between the institutions" and that according to the public opinion polls, he would receive the support of 80 percent of the voters again.

To the question whether there are any leads in the investigation into the attempt on his life, Gligorov said: "There are many indications, but there still aren't enough to submit as evidence in court. Judging by everything, there is a foreign connection. If someone planned to do what was done, then he had to have collaborators in Macedonia," President Gligorov stated in the interview for the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS.

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FYROM: Nuclear Waste Deposit Scheduled for Late 1996

AU2005153796 Skopje MIC in English 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] By the end of this year, the first nuclear waste deposit will be built in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the daily DNEVNIK says. The construction is explained by the radioactive lightning rods. Experts say that the deposit will be built for low radioactive waste. It will be built in cooperation with the International Atomic Agency.

The "Greens" activists claim that this deposit is making way for much more dangerous nuclear waste. They claim that the goods imported in Macedonia are not tested for radiation.

Prof. Done Gersanovski, nuclear physicist, stated for DNEVNIK that "the danger from high radioactive waste is great. I believe that the authorities and state are aware what the storing of nuclear waste in Macedonia can mean for the generations to come."

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Poland: Lukashenka, Yeltsin Concerned About Poland in NATO

LD2005170096 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1438 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 20 May—Belarus President Lukashenka shares Russian President Yeltsin's concerns that NATO expansion will cause a new geopoliticial situation to arise, which demands careful analysis, said Ivan Antanovich [Belarusian deputy foreign minister] when asked about Belarus's position on this issue. Antanovich pointed out, adding that it was his personal opinion, that he had not found any declaration in the Polish press that Poland, as a member of NATO, would not constitute a threat to Belarus nor that Poland would remain faithful to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. "It is a delicate situation, and contacts between Poland and Belarus are needed on this issue," he said, adding that the conference on 24 May could be an opportunity to talk on the subject.

When told of the announcement of intervention for the release of political prisoners by President Aleksander Kwasniewski with President Alyaksandr Lukashenka—made by Minister Marek Siwiec of the president's office after meeting Zyanon Paznyak, head of the opposition Belarusian People's Front—[Antanovich] replied that this was normal because both presidents had agreed to consult on different issues. President Kwasniewski's advice will be interesting to our president, Antanovich indicated. He added that he would also like to exchange experiences with Polish diplomatic representatives because Belarusian sovereignty was young and "is being built with great difficulty." [passage omitted]

Antanovich gave the assurance that Paznyak can return to Belarus, and, "if he is afraid of something, that is his affair." "No judicial or other body has made any decision forbidding him to return," he added. In his opinion, the actions of representatives of the opposition Belarusian People's Front are a result of the fact that they lost the parliamentary elections and Paznyak lost the presidential elections. Antanovich assured journalists that democratic institutions and an independent press, where the opposition can present its opinions, were functioning in Belarus. When asked what interpretation should then be put on Boris Yeltsin's statement that he intended to "give a lesson in democracy" to the Belarusian president, [Antanovich] said relations between the two presidents were close enough for Lukashenka to receive the Russian president's advice with pleasure.

Poland: Belarus Minister Regrets Minsk Incident With TU Head

LD2005143196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1303 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 May—At a news conference in Warsaw today, Belarus Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Antanovich expressed regret that the incident involving a Polish trade union delegation had occurred. He said, however, that in similar circustances, he would have acted as the forces of law and order did.

Antanovich has regrets because, as he stressed, it created a bad impression and many questions were asked in Poland, a country friendly to Belarus.

Marian Krzaklewski broke Belarus law because, in the opinion of the deputy foreign minister, "he organized or participated" in "an illegal rally." He also said his visit to Belarus was an official one.

When asked if the Belarus Foreign Ministry approved of the behavior of the forces of law and order toward Krzaklewski at every level, he replied that this behavior was not analyzed because Krzaklewski did not lodge a protest with any Belarusian institution against the actions.

Antanovich was passing through Warsaw today. He met the press but no representatives of the Polish Foreign Ministry. When asked about this, he explained that he is not avoiding contact with Polish diplomats, as he will see them on 24 May when he is back in Warsaw.

Poland: Official Receives Belarusian Opposition Leader

LD2005165196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1445 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 May—Marek Siwiec, the secretary of state in the President's Office authorized by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, today received Zyanon Paznyak, the chairman of the Belarusian People's Front, the team of the press spokesman of the president of the Polish Republic reports.

The meeting took place at the request expressed in a letter by Zyanon Paznyak to President Aleksander Kwasniewski dated 15 May. During the conversation, Paznyak presented his assessment of the political situation in Belarus, with particular reference to the state of observance of human rights. He gave the assurance that the Belarusian People's Front saw Poland as a good neighbor of Belarus and wanted both states to maintain close and friendly relations.

As the communique sent to PAP says, Minister M. Siwiec expressed support for dialogue between different

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Polish and Belarusian circles. He announced President Aleksander Kwasniewski's interest in the state of observance of human rights in Belarus. He announced that, in response to Paznyak's request, the president of the Polish Republic will appeal to President A. Lukashenka in the case of Yuryy Khadyka, the deputy chairman of the Belarusian People's Front, who is on hunger strike while being held in custody in Minsk.

Poland: President Meets Mayors, Favors Administrative Reform

WS2105101596 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 18-19 May 96 p 3

[Report by "URSZ, MICH" from Poznan: "Aleksander Kwasniewski Criticizes Organization of the State; Bad Authorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The state is not well organized. The state administration is costly and rather inefficient. Central steering prevails. Citizens get lost in the various procedures. Vague powers encourage corruption.*

This is how the president spoke about the government administration.

Aleksander Kwasniewski took part in the Ninth Nationwide Conference of Mayors and Village Administrators in Poznan.

Hooting and Applause

"Get out of Poznan," a hundred members of the Radical Anticommunist Action and the Ourness youth movement shouted to the president as he was getting out of his car. Representatives of self-governments, who came to Poznan from all over Poland, greeted the president with applause. Their special complaints were about lack of money for education and delays in implementing the self-government reforms.

Wojciech Szczesny Kaczmarek, Poznan mayor and chairman of the Union of Polish Towns and Cities, criticized the government for being unwilling to give gminas [smallest administrative units] powers to handle local issues, as well as to earmark money for carrying out their tasks. "There is a chance that the issue will wind up in the courts, because the law guarantees self-governments money to run the schools which they have taken over," Kaczmarek warned the president and a few ministers.

The Code of Municipal Finances

Kwasniewski offered assurances that in the future he would not allow self-governments to carry out tasks with less money than the government administration has at its disposal for carrying out the same tasks. "I will see to it that gminas receive more money from taxes," he promised.

He announced that a code of municipal finances would be drawn up. This was confirmed by Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers. The code would specify such issues as the rules of passing gmina budgets, conditions which gminas would have to meet to get a loan, and principles of functioning of Regional Accounting Chambers.

Miller also informed that the National Education Ministry had already received more than 1,000 motions to increase subsidies for gminas to take charge of schools. For the time being, the state administration will only earmark approximately 200 million zlotys from the central budget. "If it turns out that this is not enough, we will even think of widening the budget deficit. Children must go to school in September," Miller told us.

Deputy Education Minister Kazimierz Dera announced that the year 1997 would be one during which schools would be given preferential treatment.

To Return the Citizens' Rights

Kwasniewski recalled that the draft constitution envisions three self-government levels: "I am in favor of introducing powiats [administrative units that would be larger than gminas], because they will broaden the structures of the civil state naturally; the process would be based on local traditions. There are convincing reasons to liquidate the current model of the voivodship."

The president criticized the state administration, stating that it is necessary to promptly set up new centers of public administration in regions so that they will be able to take over some of the government's powers. He said that the decentralization of the state is a "process of returning power to the citizens which the state once appropriated." "We should meet halfway citizens' aspirations to assume responsibility for themselves and for their surroundings."

The PSL Will Come Around to Our Way of Thinking

Kwasniewski and Miller adamantly defended the idea of self-government reform. Miller stated that small voivodships, as proposed by the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], would not be self- dependent: "Real self-government cannot exist without self-financing. The only solution is to introduce self-governing gminas, self-governing powiats, and large voivodships." He revealed that draft laws on self-governments drawn up by the PSL and the Democratic Left Alliance would be submitted in the Sejm in the autumn. "Even the PSL is not unanimous

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on the issue of administrative reform," the URM head told journalists.

Kwasniewski, when asked about his reaction to the demonstration that was aimed against him, replied: "It is normal that in a democracy you have both supporters and opponents. Voters decide who should be the president."

Poland: URM Officials' Suspicious Land Deal Viewed

WS1705144196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 May 96 pp 3, 5

[Article by Michal Majewski and Pawel Reszka: "How URM Officials Bought Land Cheaply"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Employees from URM [Office of the Council of Ministers] and other ministries bought, without tender, a land plot owned by the State Treasury, which was used by URM. They are to pay almost $840,000 for it. According to an evaluation of experts hired by RZECZPOSPOLITA, the land is worth $1.67 million. It follows from this that the State Treasury lost $830,000 in this transaction.*

One cannot say that Nad Fosa [By the Moat] is a typical housing cooperative. Its members are people connected with URM and other ministries. The area where their apartments are to be built, which was used by URM until last year, was suddenly declared as useless for the government and sold to the cooperative without tender. To do this, officials made use of one provision in the so-called [former Construction Minister] Glapinski's special law. This provision was used so rarely that even lawyers specialized in real estate turnover usually do not know it. It was employed twice in Warsaw, in both cases—by state officials.

Some members of the cooperative—those working in the URM Auxiliary Economic Unit [Gospodarstwo Pomocnicze URM—GP URM]—can see the land plot where their houses are to be built from their windows at work. Until recently, the locality was part of the GR URM.

Until the present day, the plot was in no way separated from the GP URM. A soldier with a rifle who guards governmental facilities and with whom we spoke with in April did not know that his sentry box stands on the land owned by the Nad Fosa cooperative.

There is no doubt that the land bought by the cooperative is attractive.

"It is close to downtown, 7 kilometers from the Palace of Culture," Master Engineer Jacek Waldemar Szymczak rejoiced in a conversation with us. He is currently deputy chairman of the Nad Fosa cooperative. Until recently, he was its chairman and, simultaneously, head of the GP URM Department of Supplies and Marketing; but he has left his job.

An expert whom we asked to express his opinion calls this real estate "very attractive in terms of localization." This opinion is supported by the close proximity of Warsaw's main thoroughfares (Wislostrada and Sobieski Streets) and complete underground connections (gas, sewage system, water, electricity, central heating from a heat and power generating plant, telephones) to the plot. Moreover, it is possible to build an asphalt driveway on both sides of the estate; shops, service facilities, and bus lines are also nearby.

It is worth adding to this dry expert opinion that the vicinity by the intersection of Powsinska and Limanowskiego Streets in Mokotow district is quite attractive, quiet, and green.

Nobody Will Follow Them

We will now try to explain how the officials were able to buy this estate. It is worth noting that nobody will be able to follow suit because the law of 4 October 1991 "On the Change of Some Conditions for Preparing Investments in Housing Construction in 1991-95" (commonly called "Glapinski's special law"), which was used by these officials, lost its force on 31 December 1995. This may account for the hastiness in the settling of matters connected with the purchase of the land.

The law allows the purchasing of land without tender only for housing cooperatives. URM officials founded their cooperative on 26 September 1994; those interested met in a GP URM building on 69/71 Powsinska Street. According to the protocol available in the Registration Court, the meeting was personally opened by GP URM chief Janusz Lubowicz (who was dismissed on 20 November 1995 following explanatory proceedings regarding a controversial allotment of governmental apartments). At present, Janusz Lubowicz is not connected with Nad Fosa in any way, assures Jacek Szymczak. According to him, Lubowicz opened the cooperative meeting as chief of the GR URM. Nad Fosa was registered as a housing cooperative on 14 November 1994.

Founding Members

Jacek Waldemar Szymczak became the first chairman of Nad Fosa; Andrzej Lichosik, then director of the Rybaki governmental center, was deputy chairman; and Witold Sobkowicz, head of GP URM Department of Supplies of Transportation Means, was on the cooperative's board. Marian Grzeda, then deputy chief of the GP URM,

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was elected chairman of the Supervisory Council. Apart from him, the Supervisory Council included Zbigniew Kotula, head of the GP URM Personnel and Training Department, and Stanislaw Dabrowski, head of the GP URM Department of Investments and Repairs.

The list of the cooperative's founding members also includes: Stanislaw Kolanowski from the GP URM Real Estate Department; Katarzyna Aleksiewicz, head of the GP URM Department of Planning and Analyses; Krystyna Bialecka, GP URM chief accountant; Waldemar Czarnecki, acting head of the GP URM Economic Department; Urszula Turek, inspector in the GP URM Financial and Accounting Department; Jan Szymanski, head of the GP URM Recreation and Social Department; Irena Czaplinska from the GP URM Real Estate and Building Management Department; Malgorzata Rudawska, inspector in the GP URM; and Zdzislaw Rzyski.

It is noteworthy that three founding members—Marian Grzeda, Irena Czaplinska, and Jan Szymanski—were simultaneously tenants of the same apartment building at 4 Grzesiuka Street (on which RZECZPOSPOLITA reported in "How [former URM chief] Michal Strak Arranged for His Apartment").

At the very last moment, during the founding meeting, the undertaking was abandoned by Miroslawa Milosz-Pomierna, head of the GP URM laundry. She did not want to talk with us about the cooperative. She only said that she did not buy her share due to financial reasons.

The list of future tenants, apart from URM officials, included employees of other ministries. The initiators of the cooperative sent application forms to ministries. The forms included questions about "family housing conditions, development possibilities, housing savings accounts." The initiators received 400 applications.

"How can such an interest be explained? Do the government administration employees face such big housing problems?" we asked the cooperative's founders.

"Of course, they do. Everybody strives to achieve more in life," Witold Sobkowicz says.

A Visit to "Refrigerator"

Not just government administration employees are members of Nad Fosa. According to the 1991 law, a housing cooperative may purchase land without tender only after its members have deposited full contributions in their housing savings accounts. They are registered in the so-called refrigerator, or the Voivodship Registration Office of Candidates for Housing Cooperatives. There are 80,000 people in Warsaw who have met all the requirements set by the socialist state for obtaining a cooperative apartment. In the entire voivodship, there are 100,000 such people.

The spirit of Glapinski's law is contained in the following assumption: Since people were saving their money over years in good faith and since there is no way to ensure apartments for them, it is necessary to grant them some privileges. These privileges included a provision about the possibility to sell land without tender for those housing cooperatives which accept "refrigerated" members.

Nad Fosa accepted 32 such persons.

Tadeusz Salach, director of the Voivodship Registration Office of Candidates for Housing Cooperatives, underscores that land in a no-tender procedure is obtained not for nothing, but for a price fixed by an expert.

"Of course, one should expect that land purchased through tender is more expensive," Salach smiles.

The law does not specify the number of persons from the "refrigerator" who must be enlisted by a cooperative in order to obtain the right to purchase land without tender. The Voivodship Office in Warsaw determined that this number must be no smaller than 10 percent [of all cooperative members]. Why such an amount?

"It was determined on the basis of knowledge of financial capabilities of people from the 'refrigerator,'" Miroslaw Skowerski, a clerk responsible for setting such a norm, explains. Skowerski admits that he does not know what limits are determined in other voivodships or Warsaw gminas.

"I tried to hold informal consultations, but I failed," he explains.

Eventually, it was agreed that Nad Fosa will enlist 20 percent of "refrigerated" persons. The cooperative announced the construction of 150 apartments; it accepted 32 people from the "refrigerator." An agreement on this matter between the cooperative and the voivodship head was signed on 3 February 1995.

The Main Thing Is Land

As we have already mentioned, the land selected by the cooperative members was nearly within their reach. It was a part of the GP URM. Formally, the land belonged to the State Treasury.

Initially, the entry regarding nonauction sales concerned only gminas' land. Following the 10 June 1994 amendments, however, it became possible to acquire land plots belonging to the State Treasury on similar terms. According to the amendments, "land is exempted from sale

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or handed over for perpetual usufruct at an auction by a voivode's decision."

Only two cooperatives took advantage of the new rules: the aforementioned Nad Fosa cooperative and a cooperative of Presidential Chancellery employees, which was set up in 1994, and on which we are also preparing materials.

It was URM that had at its disposal the land in which Nad Fosa was interested, or more precisely, it was Undersecretary of State Janusz Zagajewski who was responsible for it. (He resigned after RZECZPOSPOLITA published articles about abnormalities in allotting apartments to URM employees).

On 6 October 1994, Janusz Zagajewski wrote the following to Jan Zagajewski: "The GP URM employees have come out with an initiative to resolve the existing housing problems themselves by establishing a housing cooperative." Lubowicz informed that the cooperative could build houses on a part of the land administered by the GP URM "which was not indispensable" for its operations and was not developed in a "permanent manner." Janusz Lubowicz asked Jan Zagajewski "to accept removing the land from URM's jurisdiction" and "initiate a procedure of handing it over" to the Nad Fosa cooperative.

The managers of the cooperative also met with Zagajewski, who accepted their arguments.

On 21 November 1994, Janusz Zagajewski sent to district office chief Andrzej Kosinski a request to terminate URM's jurisdiction over the real estate and "consider the possibility of handing it over to the Nad Fosa cooperative."

Following this, the cooperative petitioned the voivode to sell the land. The voivode gave his consent. The sale was conducted by Warsaw District Office Chief Andrzej Kosinski on behalf of the State Treasury. It was he who designated an expert to appraise the land.

By One Method

He selected Master of Engineering Andrzej Szymczak, an expert from the Warsaw voivode's list (the coincidence of his name with that of Chairman Janusz Szymczak is accidental). Andrzej Szymczak, apart from being an expert in appraising land, works with the State Treasury Agency for Agricultural Property. As luck would have it, the agency's office is located on 1 Szopena Street, in exactly the same place in which the GP URM Property Department is located. Some of the aforementioned Nad Fosa founders—for example, Irena Czaplinska and Stanislaw Kolanowski (former deputy chief the district office and expert from the voivode's list)—have their offices there. Andrzej Szymczak was surprised when we told him that he worked in the same building as the Nad Fosa cooperative founders.

In a conversation with us, Szymczak admitted that he did not receive many orders: "one, two, or three cases monthly... sometimes even none." So he remembered well the appraisal of the land plot on Powsinska Street which he conducted in May 1995.

At that time, he used a comparative method. The method consists in comparing sale prices of land located in one area. Land is assessed according to this comparison, through analogy.

"I thought that the comparative method was the most suitable in that situation," Szymczak says. Of course, he knows that in some cases, experts appraise land by several methods and then calculate the average price. However, he did not do this: "regulations do not require this."

He estimated 18,369 square meters of land at 2,080,340 zlotys [Z], or Z113 for 1 meter.

Converting this sum into dollars according to the exchange rate as of May 1995, 1 meter was estimated at $45.7, and the entire land plot at almost $840,000.

Andrzej Szymczak believes that he conducted a reliable appraisal.

New Appraisal

It it worth adding that neither the district office chief nor the author himself wanted to show us the appraisal. Andrzej Lichosik, the current Nad Fosa chairman, could not find the expert's appraisal in the cooperative's documents. He argued that this issue "is not a very interesting lead."

This fact, as well as conversations with people familiar with the real estate market who claimed that the price seemed to be too low, made us order an independent expert's appraisal. It was carried out in May 1996.

We had it conducted by Bohdan Stepien and Joanna Monika Nowakowska. Both are forensic experts, lecturers at Warsaw Polytechnic's postgraduate studies for appraising real estate, and active members of the two Warsaw-based associations of real estate experts. Over the past few years they have conducted several hundred land appraisals in the capital. We did not disclose to them the goal of the appraisal and the fact that the land had already been appraised by another expert.

Unlike Andrzej Szymczak, Bohdan Stepien and Joanna Monika Nowakowska used two methods of appraising the value of the land plot on Limanowskiego Street. The

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first price-comparative method included the technique of comparing pairs of properties. The second method included the technique of simple capitalization. While using two different methods, the results are averaged to make the appraisal as reliable as possible.

According to the first method, 1 meter of the land plot was estimated at $89, and according to the second—at $93. The final result was $91 for 1 square meter, and $1,671,000 for the entire land plot.

Our appraisal was carried out a year after the first one. According to the experts hired by RZECZPOSPOLITA, land prices converted into dollars do not change: "The price of land sticks to the dollar." The difference between the two appraisals is $45.3 per meter. This proves that the expert who was hired by the district office chief estimated that the land was $830,000 cheaper than according to the experts who did this at RZECZPOSPOLITA's request.

It is also worth noting that recently prices for such large land plots in Warsaw have not fluctuated considerably (unlike small land plots for development, the purchase of which one can deduct from taxes). It should also be noted that a notary deed was signed six months after the appraisal ordered by Nad Fosa, and the cooperative has not yet paid the State Treasury some of the money. However, let us not anticipate facts.

Land Purchased Through Installments

With the appraisal made by Andrzej Szymczak, the members of the cooperative went to the Warsaw District Office chief to arrange for a contract on the purchase and sale of the land plot.

In the course of the negotiations with the cooperative, office chief Andrzej Kosinski agreed to a payment in installments because the cooperative said that it had difficulties with collecting money.

As a result of the agreement, the payment was arranged in three installments. "I had no reason to doubt that they would pay," Kosinski explains. The notary deed was signed on 3 November last year; that is, two months before Glapinski's special law expired. The cooperative paid half of the amount (Z1,040,000) up front. It is scheduled to pay 25 percent by the end of this year, and the remaining 25 percent by the end of 1997.

The cooperative purchased the land, even though most often cooperatives receive land for perpetual usufruct. In such a case, they have to pay from 15 to 25 percent up front, and then 1 percent annually during the course of 99 years (if the land is slated for housing development) or 3 percent (if service, trade, or industrial facilities are to be built on the land plot).

One of the most widely known notaries from Warsaw (he wanted to remain anonymous), whom we asked to present his opinion, was surprised that the district office chief sold the land even though the cooperative did not have enough money.

"If the cooperative did not have money, it is clear that the land should have been handed over for perpetual usufruct. In such cases, payments are arranged in installments," the notary explains.

A certificate of title gives a cooperative broader rights. For example, a perpetual user must comply with deadlines and terms of construction which are defined in a civil-legal agreement. If he fails to do that, the landowner (in our case, it would have been the State Treasury) has the right to terminate the contract. If he wants to sell perpetual usufruct, the gmina has the right to preempt the land. These restrictions do not apply to the owner of the land.

Despite the fact that the transaction was completed six months ago, the official register still does not contain documents confirming the alteration of the territory's legal status.

Sudden Change of Concept

The By the Moat housing cooperative has been seeking a strategic investor from the beginning of its existence. It was supposed to be a big firm which would financially support the construction of apartments, and in exchange office area would be made available to it.

Witold Sobkiewich, member of the By the Moat housing cooperative administration told us in the fall: "We are seeking a strategic investor somewhere; the more generous the better. I would prefer to have one bank go bankrupt than 50 shopkeepers."

We managed to contact a representative of a large foreign company who confirmed that negotiations were held with the By the Moat housing cooperative. He had already prepared his own expert appraisals regarding the value of land. However, he ultimately backed out of the business.

Also the decision on conditions of the territory's development issued by the Mokotow Administration on 7 September 1995 confirms that the cooperative's members had the idea of engaging a large company to finance construction projects on the territory that they wanted to gain from the State Treasury. The Mokotow Administration approved the project for the construction of a housing-service compound, which was presented to it by the By the Moat housing cooperative and developed by the Gdansk-based Lokata design bureau. The

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plan, which was drafted in May 1995, mentions a 3,000-square-meter office, which was supposed to be built on the plot. Each building would be approximately five stories tall and contain a total area of 26,500 square meters. The compound would include 192 apartments totaling an area of 14,500 square meters. (We would like to bring to your attention the fact that when negotiations were held on admission into the cooperative of people from the so-called freezer, 150 apartments were mentioned).

At the beginning of 1996 the cooperative's chairman was replaced and the general concept changed, too. Deputy Chairman Andrzej Lichosik took over the functions of Chairman Jacek Szymczak. Both resigned from work at URM.

Lichosik claims that he resigned because he wanted to devote his time entirely to working for the cooperative. He is a full-time chairman and is paid 25 million old zlotys per month by the cooperative. Lichosik believes that it makes no sense to look for a strategic investor and that such activities could meet with ambiguous reaction. He explains the development plans for the compound. Under the current concept, the area for service facilities has been reduced to 500 square meters. He says: "There will be a store, a pharmacy, and the cooperative's office. In addition, there will be 180 apartments ranging from 50 to 150 square meters and underground parking."

According to Lichosik, Szymczak's resignation is connected with changes in the GP URM. It also coincides in time with the change of concept for membership in the cooperative. It is worth pointing out that the current head of the GP URM is Jan Karpinski, formerly the URM Chief's Office director during Marek Borowski's tenure. The officials who were directly responsible for the GP URM resigned following the scandal over the allocation of URM apartments for unspecified periods of time. Borowski then ordered an inspection of the GP's internal activities.

Lust for Construction

The cooperative's office is located in the GP URM building. The cooperative pays 100 zlotys per month to lease the office and pays their own telephone bills. In 1995, Kazimierz Korona, the URM employee who supervised the GP, assured us that the cooperative will be forced to move out. This has not happened.

Chairman Lichosik has a great desire to build. Witold Sobkowicz demonstrated similar excitement and determination in the fall of 1995 when he said: "I do not have any moral scruples, because we must act. We simply must act against all odds. I am not going to give up, because the construction of housing systematically decreases. Nobody has given us anything. Nobody will help us. Nor do we count on anybody but our members."

Lichosik says with enthusiasm that construction begins in June and that he will then move from the GP URM office to a makeshift cabin at the construction site. He adds: "I want to leave behind the feeling that somebody is giving us something for free."

He claims that the houses will be built by the end of 1997. He envisions cooperative members having to pay 1,300 zlotys for a square meter of apartment. When he is reminded that the cooperative managed to cheaply buy the plot of land, he replies that if the plot was more expansive the entire undertaking would be unprofitable because the price for the apartments would be no lower than on the market.

Lichosik stresses that most cooperative members are rank-and-file clerks, drivers, and women working in green houses. Nevertheless, the administration scrupulously protects the names of the cooperative members. We asked: "Are there any ministers or other high officials?" The answer was: "No, rather the next generation—their sons and daughters."

Poland: Minister Seeks Information on URM Land Deal

WS2005131896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18-19 May 96 p 1

[Article by M.M. and P.W.R.: "Following the Publication in RZECZPOSPOLITA, Minister Miller Orders Explanatory Proceedings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Inspection Bureau of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] will conduct explanatory proceedings. Minister Leszek Miller decided this after reading the item which appeared in the 17 May issue of RZECZPOSPOLITA.*

In the article entitled "How URM Officials Bought Land Cheaply," we presented the activities of the Nad Fosa [By the Moat] housing cooperative society, which was set up by URM officials and other ministries. Without any bidding, the housing cooperative society purchased from the State Treasury a plot of land managed by URM. The price was set by expert Andrzej Szymczak. The land was sold by Andrzej Kosinski, head of the district office in Warsaw, who acted on behalf of the State Treasury; Kosinski also chose the expert. Independent experts invited by RZECZPOSPOLITA estimated that the plot of land is worth $830,000 more than was stated in Szymczak's estimate.

Following this publication, URM head Leszek Miller ordered that explanatory proceedings be instituted. The

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issue is to be clarified by Jedrzej Wysocki, head of the Inspection Bureau at URM. According to Government spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska, the results of the bureau's inspection should be known within seven to 10 days.

Asked to comment on Minister Miller's decision, Andrzej Lichosik, director of the By the Moat housing cooperative society, said that he had nothing to hide.

Poland: Report Discusses Leak on Russian Agent in Oleksy Case

WS2005143196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 May 96 p 2

[Report by "KES,CL": "List of Suspects; Scandalous Leak"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Who had access to the prosecutor's document containing the name of the doubled Russian agent who identified Jozef Oleksy as a spy?*

Public statements indicate that among them were: Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz who wrote the explanation; his superior, Supreme Military Prosecutor General Ryszard Michalowski; two military prosecutors who assisted Gorzkiewicz in the course of the investigation; and top state officials whom Gorzkiewicz showed the full text of his explanation: President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Justice Minister Leszek Kubicki; and Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, who in turn handed over the document to the acting chief of the Office of State Protection, Andrzej Kapkowski.

It remains unknown whether this list is complete. It should be assumed that it could be expanded to include the names of several officers who hand-carried the document from desk to desk in the particular institutions.

If the fragment of the document containing the name of the secret informer [Grigoriy Yakimishin] published by ZYCIE WARSZAWY last Friday [17 May] is authentic, one of the above mentioned top state officials must have committed the crime of disclosing a state secret. Only one of them could have leaked the document to politicians and then to the press. Even if the leak was orchestrated by a lower-ranking official who is not on our list, his superior takes full responsibility for negligence in protecting a secret.

A special investigation should establish the source of the leak. It is difficult to say, however, which institution could be considered credible enough to carry out that investigation, considering that among the potential suspects are the justice and the interior ministers. The latter has already announced he will not administer such an investigation.

Asked about the leak by journalists during the exercises of the Vistula Military Units in Czerwony Bor last Saturday [18 May], Siemiatkowski said: "The document was circulated most probably among a very small group of deputies. Neither the Sejm Commission for Internal Affairs nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs will make an investigation because politicians would consider it a provocation."

Poland: Results of Governing SdRP Meeting Reported

WS2005143096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18-19 May 96 p 2

[Article by Iwona Trusewicz: "After the Session in Mierki; the SdRP in Favor of Further Cooperation With the PSL"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A two-day seminar of the leadership of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] ended on 17 May in Mierki, Olsztyn Voivodship. At the meeting, which was closed to the media, 100 leaders of the SdKP discussed the main principles that should be included in the draft of the party's new platform, as well as the election calendar and strategy that would help the party win next year's parliamentary elections. The participants also discussed "the condition of democracy and disturbing phenomena in Polish public life."*

Discussion of the paper which [SdRP Chairman] Jozef Oleksy presented on 16 May continued into the following day and, as we were told by Central Executive Committee member Maciej Poreba, "it was very frank and open, and not all the participants agreed with the presented theses." Friday was another day during which think tanks continued their work.

RZECZPOSPOLITA found out that one of the primary issues that are currently being discussed within the SdRP is the "development of the basis," or attracting more members. The number of new party members is growing especially in small towns. This has been made possible by the activities of regional organizations, consistency in maintaining the same platform principles, and the victory of Aleksander Kwasniewski in the presidential elections. For these reasons, the participants of the discussions in Mierki thought about what should be done to "become a stronger force in large towns and cities."

According to Maciej Poreba, the SdRP has more than 60,000 members now. "We are receiving signals from the regions that the party is growing; increasingly more young people are joining the party, and for this

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reason the number of the party's members cannot be determined precisely at the moment."

We found out from the statement prepared for the media that it was agreed during the discussions that "the social democracy must remain a Europe-oriented party that does its best to ensure economic growth." The social democrats couple taking care of the economy with "economic pragmatism," which they believe makes for "growth in public and individual consumption, as well as special protection of the poorest groups in society."

The SdRP will remain a party of values, among which the leftist activists listed patriotism, equal chances, sensitivity, access to education and work, equal treatment under law, and the rule of law. The discussants cautioned against looking upon democracy as "a value which is permanent and which has been given to us for ever." According to them, one of the threats to Polish democracy is the "brutalization of public life."

The participants in the meeting also pointed to the necessity of further decentralization of power and development of self-government. The SdRP expects the government to submit proposals for administrative reform within the next few months. The party intends to change the current system of supporting the poorest young people who want to broaden their education. It is in favor of a quick reform of the social security system and health service, as well as changes in the education system. The social democrats also decided that the party should continue to cooperate with its coalition partner—the Polish Peasant Party.

For the SdRP, the issue of ratifying the concordat is a "matter of observing the principles of a legal and ideologically neutral state."

Poland: Sequestering of PZPR Property From SdRP Discussed

WS2005144196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 May 96 p 3

[Article by Przemyslaw Rot: "Gdansk Court Executive Officer Has Nothing To Sequester From the Social Democrats; The SdRP Owns Nothing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The executive officer of the Gdansk District Court has dropped proceedings in two cases on the restitution of property of the former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] because of the inability to expropriate any money from the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP].*

The fates of four additional cases on reclaiming money to be paid to the State Treasury are uncertain. The sequestration proceedings in Warsaw have been going on for three years now. A court verdict was made ordering the SdRP to pay back 250,000 zlotys. Marek Borowski, the former head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, demurred from executing one lawful sequestration sentence.

The court executive officer wrote that local SdRP activists do not have any real estate qualifying for sequestration, the party's bank accounts have been closed, and the party office does not have any cash turnover.

The officer also stated that the local SdRP activists are using the office of Deputy Franciszek Potulicki in Gdansk-Wrzeszcz as their headquarters.

"How can it be that a party whose bank accounts have been closed and which does not have any income is ruling Poland?" wonders Marek Biernacki, the plenipotentiary for the bankruptcy trustee in charge of the PZPR estate in Gdansk. "It is very peculiar indeed for the strongest party in the country to have such huge debts and treat the decisions of independent courts with such nonchalance."

On 24 April the Supreme Court ruled that the former PZPR estate belongs to the state. The major problem, however, is sequestering that property from the SdRP. The party appropriated a part of the estate and proceeds from sales. "I am still waiting for a reply from the justice minister whom I asked to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal to change the SdRP statute so that it could be dissolved if it was proven insolvent," Biernacki told us.

Poland: Hong Kong Crime Groups Target Poland

WS2005144396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 May 96 p 15

[Report by Anna Marszalek: "Asian Mafias in Europe: Poland a Money Laundry for Hong Kong Triads"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The Polish police claim that, as the incorporation of Hong Kong into China approaches, criminal groups from the island are seeking new territories for their operations. One of the targeted countries is Poland, where, as operational surveillance indicates, they launder money by investing in legal enterprises.*

Knowledge of the operations of Asian groups in our country is scant. One reason is that they form closed enclaves, in addition sealed off by a language barrier. Statistical data show that they do not commit many crimes. The true numbers, according to the police, are far higher. Serious crimes such as executions, the settling of accounts, and racketeering are committed in the so-called Vietnamese Saigons. [passage omitted]

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Romania: Russian Envoy Opposes NATO's Eastward Expansion

AU2105111996 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 15 May 96 p 3

[Report by Al. Campeanu: "Yevgenniy Ostrovenko, ambassador of the Russian Federation in Bucharest: 'Russia Is as Interested in Signing the Basic Treaty as Romania'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "Relations between Russia and Romania have developed so far, although we did not have a treaty. We are ready to continue the cooperation even without a treaty in those areas in which the two countries are jointly interested," Yevgenniy Ostrovenko, ambassador of the Russian Federation in Bucharest, told a news conference yesterday. He added that Russia was no less interested in concluding the basic treaty than Romania. Talking about cooperation, he referred especially to the economic domain, noting that the volume of bilateral trade exchanges "is very large," but could be even larger.

The news conference was held jointly with Nikolay Buzo, general consul of Belarus, and was occasioned by the signing on 2 April by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka of the treaty by which the community of those two countries was established. On this occasion they clarified several things they considered necessary because, as they put it, one part of the press was presenting the treaty—ratified both by the State Duma and by the Belarus parliament—incompletely or out of context. [passage omitted]

During their meeting with the press, they said the rapprochement of their countries was taking place on the basis of OSCE principles and that it contained an embryo of general European security. "Our community does not threaten anyone but strengthens the security of our two countries."

In answer to a question, Ambassador Ostrovenko reiterated his country's position on NATO expansion. He mentioned that expansion would bring the military structures of the alliance closer to Russia's borders, which would affect its security. "We cannot accept such a thing," concluded the ambassador.

Romania: ROK Prime Minister Arrives on Official Visit

AU2005164696 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister of the Republic of Korea, Yi Su-song, arrived on an official visit in Bucharest. The guest was met at Otopeni airport by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, as well as other members of the government.

Tonight the Romanian prime minister is to give an official dinner in honor of the Korean prime minister.

The official talks of the two prime ministers will open tomorrow morning. Tomorrow's schedule also includes a visit to the RODAE car manufacturing plant in Craiova, as well as a meeting of the South Korean prime minister and President Ion Iliescu.

Romania: Daily Wants Cooperation Among Former Communist States

AU2005134096 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 17 May 96 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "The East's Awakening to Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu can now boast not only about his wooden language, but also about wooden protocol. His international contacts are proceeding in such a way as to fully resemble each other. Regardless of whom Ion Iliescu receives or visits, you have the impression that it is the same moment reproduced, with small nuances, over and over again, for scores or hundreds of times. This huge readiness to turn everything he touches into a routine matter explains—along with our almost exclusive focus on domestic policy problems—why the visit to Romania by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski has been seen as nothing more than yet another example of a bilateral Romanian-Polish encounter. However, if one carefully reads the statements of the two presidents, we realize that the Polish leader's visit to Bucharest is more than a mere visit of a European chief of state to another country on the continent. Both the statements issued and the agreements signed on this occasion reflect the mutual desire to relaunch Romanian-Polish economic relations. A reason for this is not only the realization of the incredible setback registered in the bilateral economic relations after the collapse of communism, but also of what one might call the beginning of a change in the atmosphere prevailing in the ties among the former communist countries. After 1989, an incredible cooling has been registered in relations among the countries previously occupied by the Soviets. The reason for this phenomenon must be sought in the fact that the much invoked fraternity between the socialist countries was only for the sake of appearances. Moscow was very interested in ensuring that the bloc it led gave the impression of unity without fissure. Therefore, many contradictions between the countries in Eastern Europe—contradictions arising from the failure to resolve certain conflicts rooted in the past or from divergent economic interests—were put

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on ice. Instead of a free and open debate among these countries, they put on a friendly smile. Therefore, it was more than natural that, after the collapse of the artificial unity represented by the much celebrated socialist camp, economic and political differences should emerge between the former communist countries. At the same time, the tension between the countries, which until recently claimed to be brothers, was exacerbated by an aberrant competition for gaining favor with the West. I do not know how it came to pass, but, after the fall of communism, the impression arose that the West is interested in turning the East into a competitive space for foreign investors, for adherence to the Council of Europe, and for acceptance into NATO. A heavy word was said in this respect by the discriminatory treatment applied to the Eastern countries. Many Western chanceries tried hard to present themselves to the former communist countries like a jury at a beauty contest. The countries, which have been under Soviet occupation until not too long ago, seemed to file past the jury in a strenuous attempt to obtain as high a mark as possible. In these circumstances, it is obvious that each of the former communist countries considered the others as competitors to be removed by all means. A lucid analysis of the situation would have told them that this kind of competition can only be counterproductive. In this respect, it is enough to think of the fact that, regardless of its weak points, CEMA was a united economic system, within the framework of which strong links have developed among the economies of the socialist countries. The dismantling of the economic bloc to which they belonged and their involvement in an absurd competition has pushed these countries into breaking up these ties. They all turned to the West in the belief that integration into the Western economic space was the only solution for the problems they were facing. However, with the passage of the time, the Eastern countries became increasingly aware of the noxious nature of competition among themselves. The political leaders realized that the much coveted access to the EU market risks not only to fail to solve their problems, but also to complicate them. Against this background, various Eastern capitals realized that, until they become part of the European capitalist circuit, the former communist countries should not neglect their bilateral relations. Without renouncing their striving for the West, the former communist states came to the conclusion that no harm would come to their economic development if they strove to end competition among themselves in favor of relaunching their relations in all spheres. The visit of the Polish president to Bucharest, the statements made by him and by President Ion Iliescu, as well as the agreements concluded on this occasion can be considered the expression of the start of a spectacular change in relations among former communist countries. In this respect, one can talk about the East's awakening to reality.

Romania: Social Democracy Party Confident of Election Victory

AU2005160296 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 14 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Viorel Hrebenciuc, manager of the electoral campaign of the ruling PDSR, by Ion Pavelescu; place and date not given: "Social Democracy Party of Romania Ranks First in All Election Evaluations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pavelescu] My first question: How did your party begin this electoral campaign?

[Hrebenciuc] Powerfully. The first confirmation of the truth of this assertion is the fact that we managed to cover the entire territory with candidates. Ours is the sole political party with candidates running in 2,815 out of 2,945 localities in the country. From this point of view, it is just the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] that managed to follow us, although their figure is more modest than ours. And let us not forget that they are not a party but an aggregation of parties. Regarding the number of candidates, we also rank first with a total number of 45,000 persons designated to run for our party. All this proves that our party is currently the strongest in Romania.

[Pavelescu] Do you think the fact that the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] is a strong party with a coherent, social-democratic message accounts for the increasingly virulent attacks being unleashed against it?

[Hrebenciuc] Absolutely. Whenever one confronts a force of our size, one must resort to all possible means to put that force in a difficult position. The CDR has candidates running in 2,500 localities, but the fighting that broke out among its member parties for a place on their electoral lists is far from suggesting that they are in a state of harmony.

[Pavelescu] One can distinguish between two types of attacks: One was launched by the USD [Social Democratic Union], especially by the PD [Democratic Party, a USD member] and its leader, Mr. Petre Roman. This kind of attack tries to lend credence to the idea that the PDSR is a party with a nationalistic nuance. Some leaders of the CDR do just the opposite and label the PDSR a party of old communists. What is your opinion on this?

[Hrebenciuc] We are tired of offering serious replies to nonserious labels with a demagogic tint. However, since you have raised the issue, let us see what we can do to rebuff the idiosyncrasies of our adversaries. We

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do not mind that the PD considers us nationalists. To a certain extent, this even honors us. If serving one's country with devotion is a sign of being nationalistic, then yes, we belong to this category, which is on the verge of extinction. We believe, however, that the term patriot would be more suitable. After all, we were the ones who helped Romania out of the catastrophic situation into which it was plunged by the previous governments; it was we who consolidated the democratic structures; and it was we who launched and have been keeping up the reform intended to establish a market economy. At the same time, it was also we who gave credibility to the policy favoring our European and Euro-Atlantic integration. A nationalistic government, in the obtuse sense of the word, would have never done those things. Regarding the accusation about our being old communists, no one believes that fiction any more.

[Pavelescu] Mr. Hrebenciuc, during the legislative period that will soon conclude, the CDR held the leadership of almost every large city in the country. Do you think the 2 June elections will bring a fundamental change in that respect?

[Hrebenciuc] They will. The CDR administration was faulty everywhere. People are not willing to put up with extravagances such as those of Mr. Halaicu [incumbent Bucharest general mayor], whose main concern is his new spouse, not running this Romanian metropolis. This is a scandal the Romanian electors want to end

[Pavelescu] What do the polls say now, three weeks before the elections?

[Hrebenciuc] They accurately reflect the electorate's frame of mind. According to all evaluations, we rank first. Of course, that is no reason for us to sit idle, so we continue working to see that our message of prosperity and economic and social progress gets through to the population. Our party, serves, body and soul, the great interests of the nation and our citizens. We hope that the 2 June ballot will prove that the people have understood that message.

Romania: CDR Leader Predicts 'Spectacular' Electoral Shift

AU2005132696 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 14 May 96 p 3

[MEDIAFAX note: "Emil Constantinescu Forecasts the Electorate's Shift From the Social Democracy Party of Romania to the Democratic Convention of Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's future will be decided by the electorate from the Moldova area, Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], said at a news conference in Iasi.

"We are faced with the problem of changing a certain type of regime, and the CDR is assuming the responsibility for this change," Constantinescu said. He added that at the moment the CDR is the dominant force in Banat, Transylvania, and the mountain areas, while the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the left are ahead in Moldova, southern Oltenia, and southern Wallachia; that is, in the poor regions. The CDR leader is convinced that "spectacular changes" in the orientation of the electorate from Moldova, southern Oltenia, and southern Wallachia will take place on the eve of the general elections and said that "the shifts will occur directly from the PDSR to the CDR, because the people who were cheated on two previous occasions will be very careful who they vote for now."

Romania: Employers, Unions Sign Collective Labor Contract

AU2005180896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1615 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The 1996 collective labor contract, valid at the national level, was signed today. The presidents of the CNSLR [National Confederation of Romania's Free Trade Unions] Fratia, BNS [National Trade Union Bloc], CSDR [Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania], as well as the Convention of the Nonaligned Trade Union Confederations of Romania signed on behalf of the trade unions. Paul Opris, representative of the Romanian employers attending the negotiations, signed on behalf of the employers.

The national-level collective labor contract comprises bases from which negotiations can begin to work out collective labor contracts in each economic branch.

According to ROMPRES, the Cartel Alfa National Trade Union Confederation refused to sign the contract on grounds that it does not include certain previously attained rights. Despite the fact that the union party agreed to reformulate certain texts in the contract, they made this conditional upon the employers first clarifying certain aspects, such as the protection of the union leaders or the overtime payments.

This is one reason why Cartel Alfa intends to organize a protest rally and a march in the capital city for 1000 hours on Friday [24 May], stated Romulus Nita, first deputy chairman of the Cartel Alfa National Trade Union Confederation.

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Slovenia: Government Rumored To Fall; Arhar Tipped as PM

AU2005154496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of the Liberal Democracy [LDS] and the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] have so far not discussed the situation that had emerged following the Thursday conclusion of the LDS club of deputies to propose the dissolution of the coalition agreement to the party council. The Christian Democrats still have not received any official information by their coalition partner, and that is why they maintain the position that they are staying in the government. Any attempt to undermine any of their ministers would result in the resignation of all of their ministers.

The United List rejects any speculation that in case of dissolution of the present coalition they would again be willing to forge a coalition with the LDS.

The rumor in the political circles these days has it that the government will shortly face a no-confidence vote in the parliament. Perhaps this will happen during the debate on the problems in the Videm paper factory. At the proposal of at least 10 deputies, the State Chamber can initiate a constructive no-confidence vote in the government and elect a new prime minister.

The Slovene People's Party after the recent toppling of Foreign Minister Thaler resurrected the idea of a technocratic government of nonparty experts. As a possible prime minister designate in such a government, the president of the Slovene People's Party mentioned current Bank of Slovenia Governor Dr. France Arhar. Arhar told Radio Slovenia that he did not know anything about this and that nobody asked him whether he would be willing to assume the post at all.

The SKD is not familiar with the initiative. They would support the idea of a technical government subject to circumstances. Primarily, they would want to know what would happen to their ministers in the government in such a case. The United List, however, is of the opinion that it is much too early to be deciding on support for Arhar as prime minister designate.

Slovenia: Ignac Golob Touted as Likely New FM

AU2005165596 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 18 May 96 p 6

[Article by Sasa Vidmajer: "Who Will Be the New Foreign Minister?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 17 May—It is risky to speculate about Thaler's successor at a moment when the disintegration of the coalition is still uncertain—particularly because it is questionable which of the candidates for foreign minister would under the present circumstances win the support of a majority in the parliament. The most likely among the names that have been in circulation for quite some time—after it became apparent that Thaler's position was not secure—is Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ignac Golob. In recent days Dr. Iztok Simoniti, a government adviser and head of the Slovene part of the diplomatic commission for demarcation with Croatia, has also been mentioned in this context.

The names of Golob and Simonize appear feasible also in light of statements given after the no-confidence vote yesterday, when one could hear the parties' opinions that it would pay to seek the new chief of Slovene diplomacy among established diplomats. The choice of a professional diplomat appears logical also if one bears in mind the situation in Slovene foreign policy. However, it is questionable how realistic this is. While it could be heard already last year that the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] would support the candidacy of Ignac Golob, a seasoned diplomat with many years of experience, the name of Iztok Simoniti is not linked to any political party. After his name appeared in circulation, those who are well informed assessed it as a mere tactical move. [passage omitted] The possibility of Zoran Thaler being succeeded by a foreign minister backed by the SKD seems less likely, especially in view of the announced cancellation of the coalition agreement. It is known that the SKD's main candidate was Dr. Boris Cizelj, an experienced diplomat, who, however, reportedly harbors different ambitions and would like to extend his current ambassadorial post and later take on the Foreign Ministry Bureau for European Affairs. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Peterle: Drnovsek Not Considering 'Radical Moves'

AU2005161896 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 18 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Christian Democratic Party, by V.V.; place and date not given: "SKD Lojze Peterle on Situation in Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [V.V.] What is your opinion regarding the position of the club of deputies of the Liberal Democracy, which wishes to break off the coalition agreement?

[Peterle] We are waiting for the official stance of the party council, that is, the prime minister. We have stated publicly on several occasions that cancellation of the agreement would merely normalize the current situation, namely, the nonobservation of certain provisions of the

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coalition agreement. The cancellation of the agreement does not mean the end of the world. I believe that the prime minister with his statement yesterday showed that he was not contemplating radical moves. I believe that it would be very difficult to accomplish anything before the elections.

[V.V.] Have your ministers, in case of the agreement's cancellation, already signed their resignation notices?

[Peterle] The majority have signed them already. The deadline is not fixed yet. The ministers said that they would follow the decision of the party organs.

[V.V.] Some deputies in the State Chamber on the occasion of the interpellation in the foreign minister said that Thaler inherited a situation that was already messy.

[Peterle] They are looking for a scapegoat now. Each minister inherits something from his predecessor. I inherited all the problems with Italy and Croatia from Dimitrij Rupel. After me Thaler inherited this. The biggest shortcoming of Minister Zoran Thaler's term of office was a lengthy deadlock which failed to yield any results. They tried to pass off this deadlock as a success, which, of course, cannot be.

[V.V.] Until further notice, Zoran Thaler remains the acting foreign minister. How would you comment on this situation?

[Peterle] Our legislation is such that this situation can last for quite some time. However, it is also not good for the prime minister or the country to ignore the will of the parliament, which united all parties expect the LDS. Even in LDS not everybody supported Thaler.

[V.V] Will you meet with Janez Drnovsek soon?

[Peterle] This decision lies with Janez Drnovsek. The way I understood him at the news conference (he did not inform us about anything himself) we can expect talks with him soon.

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Serbia

Serbia: President Milosevic Receives Bildt

LD2005222696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2156 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 May (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic this evening received high representative of the international community for Bosnia Carl Bildt.

Most attention was devoted to the process of implementing the peace agreement so far and steps being taken for the successful implementation of civilian and political aspects of the agreement.

Serbia: SDA Leader on Ethnic Cleansing in Sandzak

AU1605122096 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 96 pp 13-14

["Exclusive" interview with Dr. Rasim Ljaic, president of the Party of Democratic Action for Sandzak, by Blerim Shala in Novi Pazar, Serbia; date not given: "The Serbs Have Introduced Terror to Sandzak and in Three Years Have Killed 34 and Kidnapped 131 Bosniaks and Carried Out Several Hundred Terrorist Attacks!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the very founding of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] for Sandzak [in July 1990], Rasim Ljaic has been an important person for this party, which gathers together the majority of the Bosniaks in this region (in 1991 there were more than 300,000 Bosniaks on 9,000 square kilometers). In the beginning he was secretary general, and since last year the president of the SDA, and Ljaic is a politician rather close to the SDA leadership in Sarajevo.

He was born in Novi Pazar on 18 January 1964. He graduated in medicine in Sarajevo, where he also participated in the SDA Founding Meeting, and became its secretary general for Sandzak in 1990. At that time the SDA's president was Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin, a former boxer and dentist, who emigrated after his involvement in arming the Muslims of Sandzak. After internal party disagreements Ljaic emerged at the head of the SDA in Serbia, and his arrival marks a kind of turning point in relations toward Belgrade policy, best expressed in the question: "If Muhamed Filipovic can travel from Switzerland to Belgrade and negotiate with Milosevic, why can't we, who live here?"

However, Sandzak has been an area subject to Serbian extremist attacks since the times when Vuk Draskovic was threatening it, and his best man Vojislav Seselj continued to threaten it. One of the most drastic cases happened when several dozen Sandzak Muslims disappeared from the train coming from Montenegro to Serbia, in territory under the control of Radovan Karadzic's army. Their fate is still unknown. That case, which was extensively publicized, as well as many other cases of Serbian terror against the inhabitants of Sandzak, was the reason for this interview.

[Shala] Last week, the day after Elizabeth Rehn's visit, UN special envoy for human rights, was denied a visit to the region around Priboja (part of Sandzak in the border area between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been "ethnically cleansed" of Bosniak Muslims), you managed to visit these places. What did you see in that region?

[Ljaic] It is true that Elizabeth Rehn did not succeed in entering the village of Kukurovice, where as early as three years ago three Bosniaks were murdered and nobody succeeded in burying them. The Serbian police did not grant security to Ms. Rehn and she could not convince herself of our allegations on the spot. The day after we succeeded in approaching close to those 28 villages, which find themselves in some kind of isolation. We saw demolished houses and mosques, the deeds of Serbian reservists who were passing through there during 1992 and 1993. What we saw confirms, in fact, that the objective of the official Serbian policy has been achieved, the objective of both Belgrade and Pale—to ethnically cleanse the border region between Serbia and Bosnia, 30 kilometers in depth. Apart from some elderly people, there are no Bosniaks in that region. They have thus succeeded in disrupting the ethnic connection between the Bosniaks in Sandzak and the Bosniaks in Bosnia. On both sides of the Drina River, except for Gorazde, there are no Bosniaks.

Evidence of Serbia's Involvement

Otherwise, Ms. Rehn has promised that she would put pressure on Slobodan Milosevic to enable the Bosniaks, who have moved out and escaped to Western Europe, to return and form a special international committee. However, as we have learned so far, we do not believe that anything can be changed.

[Shala] You said that those parts of Sandzak had been ethnically cleansed during the passage of the Serbian reservists who had been going from Serbia to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That fact confirms the allegations of the direct involvement of Belgrade in the Bosnian war.

[Ljaic] Of course, it is clear that the Bosnian war was planned in Belgrade, and also as much as this part of Sandzak is concerned, it is clear that those are planned and well conceived actions. Let us not forget the fact that in this region three kidnappings have taken place—the first was the kidnapping of 17

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Bosniak passengers on a bus at the village of Mioce in 1992, then the kidnapping of 20 Bosniaks from the Belgrade-Bar train in 1993, and the kidnapping from the village of Bukovica in the municipality of Pljevlja (part of Sandzak in Montenegro) the same year. As late as today nobody knows anything about those Bosniaks kidnapped.

[Shala] The case of passengers kidnapped on the Belgrade-Bar train is the best known case of kidnapping Bosniaks. What did actually happen then?

[Ljaic] It is known that at the railway station in Belgrade the police asked for the personal identifications of the passengers, and marked the tickets belonging to passengers of Bosniak nationality. It is interesting that Matovic, former advisor to Dobrica Cosic (former president of Yugoslavia), was spotted at the railway station the moment before the departure of the train from which the Bosniaks were kidnapped. It is also known that a fieldball team was supposed to get on the train in Uzice, but the police forbade them to. Everything I mention here is evidence that the state leadership is deeply involved in this kidnapping.

[Shala] If these allegations could be proved, in your opinion would that be something sufficient for the Hague tribunal to bring charges?

[Ljaic] That would confirm allegations of the direct involvement of Serbia in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the kidnapping took place on the part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina under control of the Serbs, and where the train from Belgrade to Bar is passing, and that would confirm the fact that the human rights of Bosniaks are being violated under the direct sponsorship of the Belgrade authorities.

[Shala] How accurate are the data saying that during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina Sandzak was experiencing unprecedented torture by the Serbian police, that dozens and dozens of Bosniaks have been murdered and hundreds kidnapped and arrested?

[Ljaic] During the aforementioned period 34 Bosniaks were killed, including four women and two children, and 29 have been seriously or lightly wounded. We have data on 131 kidnapped Bosniaks, 18 armed assaults on villages a Bosniak majority, 54 business facilities owned by Bosniaks blown up, 50 houses destroyed, 11 religious buildings damaged, and 12 passenger cars blown up. All in all it is an obvious example of human rights violations with the intent of changing ethnic structure, which is, in fact, the very objective of official Serbian policy.

Bosniak Between Sarajevo and Belgrade

[Shala] Is it true that more than 70,000 Bosniaks moved out of Sandzak and sought exile in Turkey and western Europe?

[Ljaic] It is very hard to find precise data about that, although we have such figures. Surely almost one-fifth of the total Bosniak population has left Sandzak, and unfortunately the objective of Serbian policy has thus come true. Namely, in what has been revealed of Serbian policy both by state officials and the representatives of opposition parties, it is pointed out that Serbia cannot be a stable national state until there is at least 85 percent Serbs in it. If we bear in mind the fact that this percentage is currently 60 to 65 percent, it is clear that the difference can be compensated for in only two ways. The first method is to "pump" the Serbs into Serbia (to colonize Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia in regions where Serbs make up a minority), and the second is to "pump" the Bosniaks, Albanians, and the others out of Serbia. The first method has been tried in Kosovo, but it yielded no results. In Sandzak, the authorities apply this second method: They introduce fear and insecurity among the population in order to have the Bosniaks leave Sandzak in the long run.

We Have No Reason To Believe the International Community

[Shala] So the conclusion we have heard is that the Bosniaks would leave Sandzak on a massive scale and come to live in Bosnia (in the territory under Bosniak control), if, for instance, conditions for a better life were created in Bosnia?

[Ljaic] It seems to me that the Bosniaks are momentarily being stretched between Sarajevo, which is emotionally closer to them, and Belgrade, upon which they depend both politically and economically. I can say that, fortunately, the states of western Europe have introduced the system of visas with this present state. Otherwise, I am afraid that within a year Sandzak would be emptied, that is, almost all the Bosniaks would look for exile in the refugee camps of western Europe. Otherwise, the most vital part of the population, the young and educated Bosniaks, is expecting a solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the stabilization of the situation in Bosnia, so they can leave Sandzak one day and go toward Sarajevo. For instance, there are approximately 1,000 Bosniak houses on sale, which is alarming information.

[Shala] On dozens and dozens of occasions you have addressed the international community, and various institutions, whom you implored to do something in order to make the biological survival of the Bosniaks

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in this area possible. Why has nothing been done so far in order to stop the ethnic cleansing of Sandzak?

[Ljaic] After everything that has happened in Bosnia, I do not think we have many reasons to trust the international community. We have been trying to convince the representatives of the Western governments that the violation of the so-called outer wall of sanctions toward Serbia (made public by the Dayton agreement, which envisage that the West cannot normalize relations with Belgrade, and that Yugoslavia cannot join international institutions to get financial help, as long as the problem of Kosovo is not solved, and as long as it does not show any progress in solving the problems of human rights in Sandzak and Vojvodina) would definitely bury all our hopes of finding a solution for the Bosniaks in Sandzak. They, besides all the promises, recognized Serbia and Yugoslavia, and established diplomatic relations at the level of ambassador even before any political question had been solved in this state.

[Shala] Are you satisfied with what the Bosnian Government has so far done in order to protect the interests and rights of the Bosniaks in Sandzak?

[Ljaic] The political and primarily military circumstances have not allowed the government in Sarajevo to deal a bit more promptly with the essence of this problem. The Bosnian Government still has big problems both with the federal partner and the Serb entity, as well as with the international community, which is putting more and more pressure upon not the one it should, but the one it can, so that the government has neither the time nor the space to deal with our problem. True, I think that Sarajevo does not have any clear strategy toward Sandzak. We have insisted on the defining of a clear strategy, because it is obvious that the problem of Sandzak can be solved either by direct negotiations between the legitimate representatives of Sandzak and Belgrade, or within the bilateral negotiations between Sarajevo and Belgrade.

Political Battle for the Survival of Bosnia

[Shala] Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnian Presidency and the Presidency of the Federation, originates from Sandzak. It is known that the first commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, General Sefer Halilovic, is also from Sandzak. Why have they have not done more for Sandzak in Sarajevo?

[Ljaic] Pointing out their regional affiliation would cause more harm than benefit to the inhabitants of Sandzak. I think that Mr. Ganic is aware of that. Certainly, Ganic knows the problem of Sandzak best. Otherwise, we are Bosniaks, so we think that the regional affiliation is of no importance. Belgrade, and later, unfortunately, also Zagreb, were trying to cause a disagreement in the interests of the Bosniaks in Sandzak, the Bosniaks in Bosnia, and so on. We are deeply aware of that the battle for the Bosniaks in former Yugoslavia is going to be won or lost in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Otherwise, we expect the Bosnian leadership to raise the problem of Sandzak officially.

[Shala] Are there realistic perspectives for the survival of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Ljaic] If you put a full stop after the Dayton agreement, that agreement is very bad for the Bosniaks. If you put a comma after it, it only represents the cessation of bloodshed and the creation of preconditions for reintegrating Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that then the Dayton agreement is positive. It is a fact that both official Belgrade and official Zagreb did not accept the Dayton agreement because they believed in it but because they believe it will never be implemented. So now Belgrade—through the creation of misunderstandings and disagreements—wants to prove that the survival of post-Dayton Bosnia is impossible. I think that the political battle for Bosnia will be years long, and that one will need a lot of wisdom and political cleverness to preserve it.

Serbia: New Democracy, Bosnian Serb Party Sign Deal

LD2005170796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1310 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 20 May (TANJUG)—Dusan Mihajlovic, chairman of New Democracy [ND], and Milorad Dodik of the Party of Independent Social Democrats of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic signed an agreement on party cooperation at the ND office in Belgrade today.

Mihajlovic expressed the hope that their cooperation in the future would make a considerable contribution to strengthening peace and eliminating all potential hotbeds of new conflicts in line with obligations undertaken under the Dayton Agreement. [passage omitted]

Serbia: New Social-Democratic Union of Serbia Party Formed

LD2005153296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1449 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 20 (TANJUG)—Belgrade University Professor Zarko Korac has announced the formation of a left-centre party—the Social-Democratic Union of Serbia (SDUS)—which he said would be first of its kind in the Yugoslav republic of Serbia.

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Korac told TANJUG that a party under the name the Social Democratic Union (SDU) had already been registered, and added that on the political scene in Serbia there have so far been only abortive attempts to have such a party formed.

The initiators of the new party, as Korac put it, understand the left in a way it is understood in Western Europe today.

The European left, Korac specified, took over and accepted the principles of classical liberalism—the notions such as the civil state, pluralism, parliamentarianism and human rights, while simultaneously retaining the liberal economic structure.

Korac called for the regionalization of the southern Serbian Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) and the northern Serbian Province of Vojvodina.

Korac said that those advocating autonomy for Vojvodina wanted in the first place an autonomy in terms of the economy rather than politics.

If the Albanian minority in Kosmet had received 'very clear messages' from the international community that any ideas regarding a redrawing of boundaries would not be tolerated, then the Serbian authorities would have more resolutely to go into the settling of the crisis in this southern Serbian province, Korac emphasized.

In Kosmet, with majority ethnic Albanian population, a strong separatist movement has been active for a decade, aiming at the region's secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia and its merger with neighbouring Albania.

Serbia: Milosevic's Son Sues SRPSKA REC for Libel

AU2005125196 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 15 May 96 p 10

[Report by M. J.: "A Million Dinars for Dishonorable Texts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Court proceedings against the Srpska Rec publishing house and Bogoljub Pejcic, editor in chief of the opposition paper that bears the same name, will begin on Friday, 17 May in the First County Court in Belgrade. The suit was filed by Marko Milosevic [Slobodan Milosevic's son] because of several untrue and insulting articles published in several SRPSKA REC issues, which have hurt the claimant's reputation and honor.

In the lawsuit, Milosevic claims that false information was published in texts titled "Marko, Do Not Plow Glyphada," "Is Bucharest That Far?," and "Plowing the Roads."

Marko Milosevic claims that the texts, published in several issues of the paper, are not true. As evidence, Milosevic proposed examining copies of the controversial texts, witness accounts, and, if necessary, other evidence.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Party Leader Comments on Serb Bosnia Events

LD2005182496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1524 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 20May (SRNA)—As far as the ruling party in Montenegro—the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS]—is concerned, it is very important that all processes should proceed in a democratic way and that citizens' will should be respected in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and indeed in the whole of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what Predrag Bulatovic, chairman of the DPS club of deputies in the Montenegrin Assembly, told SRNA today.

"Personnel changes currently taking place in the existing bodies of power cannot have a considerable impact on the forces governing the Serb Republic," Bulatovic says.

According to him, the replacement of one prime minister and the appointment of the new one have taken place within the framework of the same government in the Serb Republic.

As for Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic's decision to transfer his authority to Vice President Biljana Plavsic, Bulatovic said that the most important thing is the forthcoming period in which elections should be conducted in the Serb Republic and former Bosnia-Herzegovina in a democratic way and in accordance with the Dayton agreement.

"It is important that a new leadership which will express the citizens' will should be elected in a democratic way and in a democratic atmosphere on the basis of their will. Of course, everyone protects their position in such circumstances—the same will be done by the current Serb Republic leadership," he said.

Bulatovic said that the international community is continuously putting pressure on Karadzic, the Serb Republic, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that it will most probably continue doing that.

"The most important thing is that all processes should continue in the interest of the citizens of the Serb Republic, and in the interest of the Serb Republic's identity, in which we in the DPS have invested considerable efforts," Bulatovic concluded.

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Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Welcomes U.S. Decision on Prishtina Office

AU2105132796 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 11 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Behar Zogjani on news conference given by Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova in Prishtina on 10 May: "There Is Understanding in Europe for the Independence of Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosovo, held a regular news conference in his office in Prishtina yesterday, presenting his own views and the position of Kosovar state policy to accredited journalists and to several foreign correspondents who had come especially to follow recent developments in the Republic of Kosovo. He welcomed the decision of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to establish a permanent representation in the capital of Kosovo, in support of the peaceful policy of nonviolence in the region. After this, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova welcomed the resolution of the European Democratic Union proposed by Alois Mock in support of the peaceful policy in Kosovo, as well as the statement by Mr. van den Broek, the EU political commissioner for foreign policy, that "the United States and the EU are agreed that the 'outside wall' of sanctions is tied to the issue of Kosovo." The president of Kosovo also welcomed the most recent statement of Carl Bildt that "the destabilization of Kosovo means the destabilization of the entire region," and the report of Rapporteurs sans Frontieres about the abuse of journalists in Kosovo. Dr. Rugova went on to praise the importance for both Albania and Kosovo of the visit of Albanian Foreign Minister Serreqi to Washington and the speech by Mr. Zef Mazi, Albania's ambassador to the OSCE, in Vienna. At the end of his survey of international developments surrounding Kosovo, Dr. Rugova thanked the foreign diplomats and journalists who have been visiting Kosovo in the last few days. [passage omitted]

Questions from journalists concentrated on international attitudes toward Kosovo and the opportunities for establishing dialogue and finding ways to normalize life in the province. Asked about the return of school premises to Albanian schoolchildren and students, Rugova stressed that "the issue of education has always been and remains topical. We will keep education going in the way that has been effective under present conditions, and there can be talks with the involvement of a third party to return school premises." As for Demaci's option of a Balkan confederation, the president of the Republic of Kosovo said, "I see no need to publish my opinions on people's views when our policies, our efforts, and our achievements so far are well known. The idea of a Balkan confederation is obsolete and our view is that everybody should first be master of his own house."

The Rights of the Albanians in Montenegro Must Be Promoted

I can say, Rugova said, that work is being done to establish Serbian-Kosovar dialogue. The United States and the EU in particular are putting pressure on Belgrade to start talks. Our position is of course that these should be held in the presence of a third party, whose role will be to facilitate the talks and guarantee their results, helping to improve life in Kosovo. Dr. Rugova said that for talks to proceed we have first asked for an end to the repression that is a provocation for the majority of the population here. The Albanians, through their sacrifices, have so far avoided and refused to accept these provocations. [passage omitted]

Dr. Rugova then welcomed the U.S. decision to establish a presence in Kosovo and the imminent opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina. Dr. Rugova called the statement on Kosovo by Macedonian [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Gligorov a very positive one, because Kosovo is a danger to Macedonia and other neighboring countries too. The University of Tetovo is meanwhile part of the Albanians' right to civilization and should have the support of Mr. Gligorov and the Macedonian Government too.

Regarding the situation of the Albanians in Montenegro and their relations with the Montenegrin authorities, the president of the Republic of Kosovo said that the rights of the Albanians should be advanced. Montenegro should recognize these rights and work for them together with the political parties in Montenegro. Asked about the priorities of Kosovar policy, Dr. Rugova replied, "We are interested, as is the international community, in creating the best possible conditions under these difficult circumstances and working for a status for Kosovo which will normalize the situation in the Republic of Kosovo."

Kosovo: Serb Faces Charges for Killing Albanian Student

AU1605074096 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 14 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serbian-run Public Prosecutor's Office in Prishtina [Pristina] has instituted criminal charges against Zlatibor Jovanovic (36) from Prishtina, accused for having killed a Kosova Albanian student, Armend Daci, in April this year.

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Quoting the Serbian public prosecutor, the Prishtina-based newspaper BUJKU said today (Tuesday) Zlatibor Jovanovic was detained on 21 April 1996 and has been in custody in Prishtina ever since.

In the small hours of the 20-21 April night, Armend Daci (20) student of the Medical Faculty of the Albanian-language University of Prishtina was shot dead in Prishtina by Zlatibor Jovanovic. Armend Daci was killed while on his way back home from a party with his friends.

Fazli Balaj, a lawyer from Prishtina, told BUJKU that a Serb judge, Aleksandar Obradovic, was in charge of the investigative proceedings. He has indicted Zlatibor Jovanovic. Citing the investigations report and the indictment, Balaj said Jovanovic killed the Albanian student consciously. Armend Daci was shot dead at his heart by one bullet of the "Crvena Zastava" (Kragujevac, Serbia) made revolver M-57, 7.62 calibre.

BUJKU quotes the defendant Jovanovic as having stated during the investigations he had killed Armend Daci "accidentally." Nevertheless, he is further quoted to have said he had "thought the boy might have been attempting to steal his car," parked in front of his apartment at the Bregu i Diellit neighborhood in Prishtina, a statement which contradict his initial testimony that he had allegedly committed the crime "accidentally," BUJKU says.

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